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Preface
Once upon a time, young people were terrorising the streets, …
Sometimes a single quote can be an inspiration for a comprehensive research
project. This came about on June 14th, 2007. On that particular day Dutch
parliament discussed antisocial behaviour (ASB) by young Moroccans. Local
council chairman Arco Verburg was invited to represent his borough in Am-
sterdam.1 He suggested introducing the British Antisocial Behaviour Order
(ASBO) in theNetherlands. Verburg stated that, in the UK, themeasure has been
successful in reducing ASB in inner-city areas. “The ASBO helps in the fight
against young people terrorising the streets”, he said.2 He referred to the new
British laws “as the best way to respond to problems in the public domain”.3
This statement by Verburg in the spring of 2007 raised a lot of questions.
When did ASB become street terror? Are young people indeed terrorising the
streets? Why does Verburg think a fight against them is needed? Do more
politicians agree? What do the media say? And what does the public think?
What exactly is a fight against problems in the public domain? Are new
measures required to fight this problem? What is the ASBO and is it actually
successful in the UK?
The theme of these descriptive questions fits within the recent criminological
debate on shifting crime policies. Influential criminological theories, notably
those of Garland (2001), Young (2007) and Simon (2007), stress the idea of a
Western increase in more repressive and controlling policies towards deviant
behaviour and crime. Although there are differences in phrasing and focus,
in essence they agree that there is a general trend away from social policies
towards expanding regulations. These studies aim to describe macro societal
developments. This approach in criminology often results in interesting ideas
and useful theories. However, there is a risk of overemphasising the evidence
of these trends. The study of crime policies can benefit from a complementary
approach which not only focuses on general trends but also zooms in on local
developments and can potentially identify divergent currents.
1 The Baarsjes.
2 <http://www.nicis.nl/nicis/dossiers/Zorgenwelzijn/Jeugdzorg/verrijktdossier/Jongerenoverlast_
1132.html> (accessed May 30 2008). http://www.baarsjes.amsterdam.nl/@51326/pagina/
3 As reported in De Volkskrant (June 13, 2007).
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AsGarland (2004) argues, once the large-scale patterns are evident, studies
of their presence and operation in defined locales is a crucial next step; es-
pecially since small-scale studies can turn up evidence of structural patterns.
The present Dutch study of ‘the response to ASB’ is an example of this next
step. Only fifteen years ago, measures against ASB on the street were on the
fringe of crime policies. Now it is this kind of behaviour that appears to be
the focus of many new anti-crime actions. Society is perceiving this kind of
behaviour as a bigger, more pressing problem than before (van Swaaningen,
2005; Pakes, 2004; Bauman, 2006; Tonry, 2004; Beck, 1998; Garland, 2001;
Buruma, 2005; Devroe, 2008). If this sort of sub-crime is indeed addressed as
a major security problem what does that say about the current crime policy
climate? The dialectics of such general and wide-angle views on the one hand
and an in-depth focus on the other, is vital for criminological research.
The amount and depth of the questions justified the start of an extensive
PhD-research project. The general concern of this project is to develop a critical
understanding of the practices and discourses of ASB control. Detailed empirical
research into media reports, public debate and political climate directed at
ASB will answer the questions raised. A comprehensive discourse analysis is
essential in order to understand the development of the discussed policies.
This is especially so, because Garland applied the same methodology in his
The Culture of Control; crime and order in contemporary society (2001).
The nature of the questions requires an approach from different perspect-
ives. To obtain a rich picture of the policies addressed in this thesis, four
essential discourses will be analysed. First, the legal4 discourse is unravelled.
Policies, laws and measures (the net result of the discourses) that were intro-
duced to fight ASBwill be discussed. Then, the political discourse (the breeding
ground of policies) is studied. The rationales behind the policies will be
examined. Third, the media discourse is investigated. The media can be the
primemover of new policies but at the same time be the interpreter of political
views (the seeds of the policies). Finally, the public discourse is analysed. The
views of the public are often used as a justification for crime policies (the roots
of the policies).
The analyseswill ultimately result in a history of the presentDutch position
in controlling ASB. As an historian and criminologist, I think a symbiosis of
the two disciplines will help in these analyses. Garland (2001, p. 23) advocates
an identification of the rules of thought and action that shape crime policies.
To do so requires mapping out these four essential discourses that underlie
contemporary crime control.
Garland (2001) argues that the Culture of Control has come to characterise
a number of contemporary societies, notably those of the US and the UK. To
assess the current Dutch crime policy climate within the context of the Culture
4 Legal in the broadest sense of the word, not only referring to laws (making) but also to policy formula-
tions and the issuing of instructions and rules.
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of Control, drawing a parallel with one of the two countries is vital. In this
thesis the focus will be on the UK. Almost every single Dutch discourse will
be compared to its counterpart in the UK. Often, our overseas neighbour sets
the example in terms of crime control. As became clear with the earlier re-
ported quote, Dutch politicians regularly refer to British crime measures as
a recipe for success (Koemans, 2010a). By comparing the UK with the Nether-
lands, an opportunity for a deeper understanding of Dutch crime policies is
created.
Thus, in short, the aim of this thesis is to uncover the implicit and more
explicit rationales for policies repressing ASB on the street. The motivations,
assumptions and rationales for the policies will be analysed. The ultimate goal
is to answer the question which rationales underlying the policies to address
antisocial behaviour by youngsters on the street can be identified within the Dutch
discourses and how can these rationales be assessed within the context of a Culture
of Control?
This concise introduction tells the story of a single quote by a politician
that resulted in this thesis. The remainder of this Chapter is organised as
follows. Paragraph 1 presents different definitions of ASB and paragraph 2
provides the basic ideas of the concept of the Culture of Control. In para-
graph 3, the main research questions are presented in relation to the theoretical
debate. Paragraph 4 discusses the data sources for the empirical studies and
justifies the chosen research strategy. Finally, paragraph 5 outlines the rest
of the book.

1 Introduction
1 DEFINING THE RESEARCH OBJECT
1.1 ASB by youngsters on the street: a social construct
It is often argued that in order to perform meticulous research, a definition
of the research subject should be agreed upon first. In this thesis, however,
defining the subject of the research question is part of the project. Antisocial
behaviour by youngsters on the street, or in this thesis ASB in short, is to some
extent a social construct that leaves room for debate and uncertainties.
To qualify as ASB, a particular act must be socially recognised and defined
as such (Harradine, 2004). Whether a case is classified as ASB ultimately
depends on the sum of processes like communication, negotiation, conflict
and rhetoric (Hacking, 2000;Muncie, 2006). This social construction perspective
is part of an impassioned dialogue in the academic world. It assumes that
people create a reality based on individual knowledge and from information
derived from social interactions with other people (e.g. Kuhn, 1962; Berger
& Luckmann, 1966; Rorty, 1999; Foucault, 1994; Gergen, 2003).
The social construction angle is relevant for criminology aswell. Formany
criminologists, crime (as a reality) does not appear as an established object
that is the same for all societies and for all times. Rather, it is seen as an
historically and socially constructed concept (Muncie, 2001). Some even push
this idea further and state that “there are no absolute standards” (Wilkins,
1964, p. 46) and “there is not one behavioural entity which we can call crime”
(Phillipson, 1971, p. 5). Although the dust in the criminologist field on this
subject has not settled, this thesis does not embrace this extreme relativistic
view.
Nevertheless, as will become clear in the following paragraphs, the reality
of ASB is different for different people in different places and in different times.
A social construction perspective makes it possible to examine the constantly
changing and contested nature of crime in general and ASB in particular
(Hacking, 2000; Noaks, 2004; Matthews, 1986).
It is essential for this kind of research to distinguish the different discourses
in which the construction process takes place. The four most relevant dis-
courses are identified as policy, political, media and public discourse (Philips,
2002; Muncie, 2005; Van Dijk, 2009; Hajer, 2006; Robbers, 2005; Reiner, 2002;
Gergen, 2003; Surette, 1998; Brants, 2002). Other classifications are possible,
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but as was explained in the preface to this thesis, these four different discourses
are the most relevant for understanding the development of crime policies
(see p3). In the theoretical debate on the Culture of Control, as will be become
clear in paragraph 1.4., these discourses are of overriding importance as well.
In the following Chapters of this book these discourses will be analysed
further.
Of course, this division in discourses is a heuristic device. In reality, these
discourses are not homogenous but encompass a variety of ideas. They also
overlap and are intertwined. Players within the discourses like politicians,
journalists and city residents constantly react to each other’s statements and
influence one another. In this thesis, their interrelated reactions and underlying
power relations are not examined, except when necessary for identifying the
rationales within the discourses.
On the other hand, these players all have distinct roles in the construction
of the problem of ASB, although their roles can constantly fluctuate in terms
of importance. On some occasions, politicians are the primary actors in the
construction process; in other instances they react to a public outcry. Sometimes
the media rely on one major institutional source, for example the police; in
other times they investigate events independently.
It is possible to overestimate the scope for political action, because there
is a tendency to focus on politicians as the prime movers in bringing about
penal change; however as Garland also argues, they are often the final movers
rather than the primary ones (2004). Their choices are conditioned by institu-
tional structures, social forces (public debate) and cultural values. To con-
centrate on this political discourse alone is to ignore the long chain of inter-
dependence that link the politicians to the interests of other social actors and
debates.
To conclude, in this thesis social construction is defined as the ‘building
process’ of a social problemwithin different discourses. The rationales (in the
sense of the underlying ideas and motivations) behind the policies to tackle
ASBwithin these discourseswill be analysed. As a consequence of this building
process, defining ASB by youngsters on the street is quite an undertaking, as
will be become clear in the following subparagraphs.
1.2 Youngsters on the street: definitions
The focus of this thesis is on ASB by youngsters on the street. The new measures
in the UK and the Netherlands to tackle ASB, concentrate specifically on this
kind of ASB. In the political as well as in the media and public debate on ASB,
the behaviour of youngsters is at the centre of attention, as became clear in
the preface (e.g. van Swaaningen, 2005; Pakes, 2005; Rodger, 2008; Cachet,
2008; Burney, 2009). Unfortunately, an unambiguous definition of the term
‘youngsters on the street’ is difficult to obtain. Sometimes politicians refer to
Introduction 3
young teen-agers, sometimes even younger than twelve (the so-called , ‘12-
minusses’); in other discussions the category is used for young adults.
As Garland (2004) rightfully says, a specific conceptualisation of a research
subject employed for one study may not be appropriate for another study.
Complex phenomena have many different aspects and can be viewed from
different angles. However, the conceptualisation of a research problem calls
for pragmatic decisions. Thus, for the sake of this thesis’ readability the term
youngsters will be used to refer to young people in the age bracket between
10 years and early twenties. When referring to ‘youngsters on the street’, it
basically means kids spending time on the streets.
Even a concept like the street is open to interpretation. Does a street include
a schoolyard, public park or parking lot? In itself, a term like public space
would be more appropriate, but ASB on the street is becoming the common
term in the media and the political debate. Along these same lines, here the
street, in the widest sense of the word, is used to denote where the research
is conducted.
1.3 Antisocial behaviour: definitions
1.3.1 Academic definitions
While analysing the different academic definitions of ASB, the difficulty of
formulating objective criteria for this kind of behaviour soon comes up. Living
in close proximity to each other generates all kinds of inconveniences, but the
point at which these issues turn into ASB is different for each of us. This is
not only on account of the subjective individual experience, but also because
the tolerance of a community as a whole is subject to change. Social interaction
gives ASB its shape, content and meaning (Van de Bunt & Bijleveld, 2003).
Concepts of ASB change in time and in connectionwith biographical and social
developments (Buruma, 2007).What the concept comes tomean has to dowith
society’s level of tolerance. Four decades ago, hippieswere still part and parcel
of life at the Dam, a famous square in downtown Amsterdam, but nowadays
youngsters hanging around there are no longer accepted.
One inevitable result of the lack of a comprehensive definition is that ASB
covers a wide range of inconveniences. Dog dirt, aggressive conduct, graffiti,
loud music, litter on the sidewalk are all manifestations of ASB. Researchers
acknowledge the problem of defining and describe ASB as a meaningless
container concept (Devroe, 2008; Ashworth, 2004; Bannister, 2006; Burney, 2005
& 2009; Bright & Bakalis, 2003; Brown, 2004). Some researchers try to formulate
working definitions, such as “objectionable, offensive behaviour” (vonHirsch
& Simester, 2006) or “disorderly conduct” (Squires, 2008). Devroe (2008) notes
that the public character, the citizen and the government are the three main
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elements defining the concept of ASB. Features like quality of life, mobility
and well-being play a role in this connection.
To create some kind of footing, a distinction is drawn in the international
academic discourse between social and physical ASB (Pleysier, 2006; Lippens,
2008). Social ASB is mainly maladjusted conduct within a social context such
as drunkenness and threatening language. Physical ASB is relatedmore to signs
of degeneration in a neighbourhood such as vandalism, graffiti and litter on
the sidewalk (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2005). In the Netherlands, this dis-
tinction can also be found in national surveys on the feelings of safety (Veilig-
heidsmonitor (CBS), 2011).
In the Dutch academic literature ASB has become a broad label too that
is attached to a seemingly endless range of nuisance behaviours. For example,
Buruma (2007) refers to incivilities and adheres to the widely used definition
of inadmissible conduct formulated by the Academic Council for Government
Policy (Academic Council for Government Policy (WRR, 2003). Pakes (2005)
in line with the British example speaks of social ASB on the part of youngsters.
Furthermore, the term nuisance (as a literally translation of overlast) is regularly
used (see Chapter 2). Van Swaaningen (2008) applies this term for instance
in his article on the issue of local safety and the politics of banishments, but
also uses the phrase antisocial behaviour on the street. He refers to groups
of (mainly Antillean and Moroccan) youngsters, drug addicts, beggars and
homeless peoplewho (according to a Rotterdam survey) constitute a nuisance
in the public domain, but does not explicate the terms (see Chapter 5). Other
authors describe ASB by the annexation of public space by a certain group that
can be perceived as threatening (Elffers & de Jong, 2005). Van Stokkom (2007)
too draws a link between ASB and a sense of insecurity in the public domain
but does not explicitly define ASB.
So also in the Dutch academic debate ASB stays a rather vague term. To
avoid the definition problem, academics often cite several examples of conduct
covered by the term ASB such as bothering people on the street, intimidating
and offensive conduct, noise, littering, graffiti, loitering, vandalism and urinat-
ing in public.
1.3.2 Legal1 definitions
Certainly, the short academic overview given above is not exhaustive, but it
does demonstrate how well nigh impossible it is to define ASB. The European
Commission (2008) has reflected on official guidelines for an unambiguous
definition and concluded that “antisocial conduct is conduct that, without being
1 Legal in the broadest sense of the word, not only referring to actual laws but also to policy
formulations and the issuing of instructions and rules.
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a criminal offence, can by its cumulative effect generate a climate of tension
and insecurity”.2
The Dutch legislature only partially concurs. One aim of the new law
Measures to Combat Soccer Vandalism and Severe Anti-Social Behaviour Law
(Wet maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast) enacted on
1 September 2010, is to address ASB.3
This new law4 gives more power to local authorities (Gemw art 172a).
Dutchmayors can issue restraining orders to people who have displayed ASB,
without the interference of a judge. The restraining order can be issued for
a year (in phases of three months) and must be revised every quarter.5 If the
order is breached, it becomes a criminal act (on the basis of the already existing
article 184 Sr (see appendix III), as addressed in the informative memorandum
on the Law) and the case can be brought before a criminal court (Chapter 2
for more information). A prison sentence up to three months or a fine can be
the end result So, it is a combination of administrative and criminal law (see
appendix III for an overview). In Chapter 2 the development of the law will
be discussed further.
Relevant for the issue of defining ASB is the way the legislator described
this kind of behaviour. Gemw art 172a reads ‘A person who repeatedly, as
an individual or in a group, disturbed public order’ (persoon die herhaaldelijk
individueel of groepsgewijs de openbare orde heeft verstoord). Disturbing public order
is not further defined in the law. In the informativememorandumon the Law,
this behaviour is described as repeatedly (also as escalating) disturbing conduct
that has consequences for the safety and people’s well-being in neighbour-
hoods.
This definition fails to clarify the behaviour in detail. This is not uncommon
inDutch law (for example, assault (mishandeling) article 300 Sr). In those cases
the legislator leaves the concept open for interpretation by the judge. Assault
means deliberately inflicting physical pain or injury. Deliberately harming
somebody’s health is equatedwith this behaviour (paragraph 4). Through the
latter provision, the concept is deliberately given wider scope (Cleiren &
Verpalen, 2010).
As a guiding tool, ASB is specified in the informative memorandum on the
Law as varying from disturbing hanging around in a manner that bothers
people and has no purpose, whistling or spitting at passersby, intimidating
people, urinating on the street, pasting things on walls, being drunk in a way
that bothers people to persisting vandalism and breakingwindows.6 The long
2 European Commission (2000). The Prevention of Crime; EU Reflections on Common
Guidelines, p 4.
3 TheMeasures to Combat Soccer Vandalism and Severe Anti-Social Behaviour Law (31 467).
4 Gemw art. 172a; WSv art. 50ghh & WvS (141a &184a). Relevant for ASB are the first two
articles.
5 Or one can be ordered to report at certain times.
6 Some of these actions are already be prosecuted.
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list of examples illustrates again the wide range of possible sorts of conduct
that can be sanctioned. On April 4th 2011 the new law was first applied. In
Utrecht a seventeen year old boy received a restraining order (3 months) for
frequently and severely disturbing public order. Hewas said to be a ringleader
of a group of youngsters, and for three months he was barred from entering
De Meern, a neighbourhood in Utrecht.
1.3.3 Political definitions
This new Law was in keeping with the policy of the former Balkenende IV
Cabinet on combating ASB. In early March 2008, former Cabinet Ministers
Vogelaar, Hirsch Ballin, Rouvoet and Ter Horst published a joint plan of action,
A Tough Approach to Bad Behaviour .7 It pertained to ASB in the residential
environment. What this ASB exactly was, is not defined in detail in the plan
of action. Nonetheless, distinctions were drawn between various types of ASB:
drug-related conduct, bad behaviour by groups of youngsters, graffiti, aggress-
ive conduct in traffic, speeding, unnecessary beeping of horns, damaging street
furniture, littering the streets and even dog dirt.
Both these official documents suggest the possibility of defining ASB. The
empirical study conducted for this thesis amongMembers of the Dutch Lower
House demonstrates that politicians, including those from ruling parties,
nonetheless often do notwant to define ASB. The empirical results are discussed
further in Chapter 3.
In 2008, 101 City Councils were asked to define ASB. The Centre for Crime
Prevention and Security (CVV, 2010) conducted a survey among them.8 The
results of this survey confirmed the earlier analysed notion that ASB by young-
sters has come to serve as a container concept (Dubbeld, 2008). This term often
extends to include a wide range of conduct and phenomena that are often not
further specified. An analysis of the responses of the cities produced 21 cat-
egories ranging from graffiti, shooting drugs and urinating on the street to
illegal motorcycle racing and littering. More than half the respondents indi-
cated that in their cities, the ASB of youngsters consists of groups of youngsters
making noise andmaking amess. So, according to the CVV, politicians in these
cities are mainly confronted with “irritating groups of youngsters” and “groups
of youngsters that bother people”.9 The irritating group is defined as young-
sters who make noise and maybe damage property and exhibit early alcohol
and drug problems.
7 Parliamentary Documents II 2007-2008, 28 694, no. 130, see www.minbzk.nl//onderwerpen/
veiligheid/veilige-samenleving/nieuws--en/110943/kabinet-en-gemeenten.
8 In the end, 44 cities filled in and returned the questionnaire.
9 This is a classification that was formulated earlier by the Beke Advisory and Research Group
(Ferwerda 2004) and is widely used in municipal policy papers.
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1.3.4 Public definitions
In reference to ASB on the street in their neighbourhood, Dutch respondents
indicate that they perceive this behaviour as a problem. If the respondents
are asked to mention specific types of ASB, leaving dog dirt on the street is
mentioned the most frequently. A little over 30% of Dutch respondents indi-
cated that this conduct occurs a lot in their neighbourhood. Numbers 2 and
3 on the list of most frequently mentioned types of ASB are speeding and loiter-
ing. Hanging out on street corners is in a shared 6th place of the 14 types of
ASB that are mentioned (CBS, 2008, 2011). A little over 10% of the Dutch re-
spondents said that this conduct occurs a lot in their neighbourhood. The CBS
survey provides respondents with a pre-defined list of possible social and
physical kinds of ASB. The problem with this method is that respondents are
not free to describe the forms of ASB they experience. This may lead to a
distorted picture of events. In Chapter 5, further empirical evidencewill show
that residents of inner-city neighbourhoods find it harder to define ASB than
the CBS-surveys might suggest.
1.3.5 Media definitions
Empirical research for this thesis shows that the press defines ASB in many
different ways (for detailed information on the research, see Chapter 4). For
example, urinating on the street, intimidation, vandalism, drug-related conduct,
bothering people and graffiti are referred to by the press as ASB. So once again,
defining ASB is no simplematter. Especially because themedia often substitute
the term ASB with ‘street terror’. In this thesis it acknowledged that the phrases
can mean different things, in different contexts and that the connotation of
terror is of a different order than that of antisocial. However, in the media
debate (and for that matter also in the public and political one) ASB and street
terror are used alternately. It makes defining ASB even more complex.
For example, the Dutch headline ‘State education needed to counter rising
street terror’,10 refers to an article on ASB on the street but only the term street
terror is used. It implies that the problem of ASB is such a pressing problem
that the expression ‘street terror’ is a better characterization for this pheno-
menon.
This and other Dutch headlines suggest that recently ASB in the form of
street terror became an urgent matter. It is implies that in the Netherlands
ASB (in Dutch overlast) is on the rise. However, ASB is definitely not a new
phenomenon (Van Weringh, 1978). This kind of behaviour has been a reality
at different times in history. Thinking of the last two decades the problems
10 (Binnenlands Bestuur, 12-4-2010)
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with ASB of squatters and drugs tourists spring to mind. There have always
been concerns for incivilities in local areas at certain times.
Hughes (2007) rightly emphasized in The Politics of crime and community
that social scientists should be ware of assuming the newness of this problem
and the responses to it.
Also the phrase ‘street terror’ is not a new description of problems in the
public domain. In the Netherlands the term ‘street terrorism (straat terreur)’
can be found in the media and political debate as early as 1934. In that year
theAlgemeene beschouwingen over de Rijksbegrooting called for effective measures
against street terror (Rijksbegroting, 1934). At that time the wrongdoers were
the socialist workers who demonstrated on the street. The depression created
social unrest which led to political concern.
Again in 1966, the phrase was used in the media (Parool, 1966). The so-
called Provos were labelled as such. Provo was a Dutch counterculture move-
ment that focused on provoking violent responses from authorities using non-
violent bait. The Provos borrowed their name from criminologist Wouter
Buikhuisen, who, in a 1965 dissertation, talked about ‘young trouble-makers’
as ‘provos’.
The term street terror is common property now and generally used. A quick
scan of all the Dutch news articles published last year (28-8-2009 until 28-8-
2010) shows that in 211 articles the term was applied.11 All items dealt with
problems of youth hanging on the street. Merely a decade ago, the term street
terror appeared only in 37 items (28-8-1999 till 28 – 8- 2000). Half of the times,
the term referred to terrorists attacks of ETA, only in eight articles street terror
meant troubles with youngster on the street.
Street terror as a term is now even linked to plans for a special police force.
The PVV, the second largest political party, proposed in June 2010 a new force
of a 1000 policemen that should act on special request by mayors of major
cities and carries the name ‘street terror police’.12
Consequently, the additional complexity with defining ASB in the media
(and for that matter also in the political and public debate) is that is it con-
nected with the even more confusing concept of street terror.
1.3.6 Translating ASB: an additional problem
The term ASB on the street, is apart from being difficult to define, also difficult
to translate. In the Netherlands, often nuisances or disorder (overlast) is used
instead of ASB. In Germany themediamention difficult (hinderlich) behaviour,
in France the focus is on maladjusted youngsters (les jeunes inadeptées) and
in the UK the term ASB or incivilities are used (Koemans, 2010c; Burney, 2009;
Cobb, 2007; Cachet, 2008; Hörnqvist, 2004). In the UK, ASB and especially the
11 In Lexis Nexis @ Academic.nl
12 4th June 2010 at www.Nu.nl and www.RTL.nl
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ASBO are generally accepted concepts. The latter became such a strong symbolic
label that a punk band from Brighton proudly used the term as part of their
name: the ASBO retards.
The differences in translationmake comparative research somewhat compli-
cated. Thus, to enable a comparison between the UK and the Netherlands (as
explained on page 4, the two countries examined throughout this thesis), the
terms ASB on the street and the Dutch version of ‘overlast’ (nuisance) and ‘street
terror’ are equated with each other.
1.3.7 Conclusion on defining ASB
It is clear that in subjective terms and depending on the particular context,
discourse and time, ASB by youngsters on the street is defined in diverseways.
Is the lack of a binding definition of ASB something we should be concerned
about? No, in itself the lack of a strictly delineated and generally valid defi-
nition of ASB is not an insurmountable obstacle. The French philosopher Jacques
Rancière, even suggests abandoning the whole pursuit of fixed definitions.
He argues that words are not there to compose definitions out of them. In
fact, he feels words are there to discuss. After an animated process of thinking
and debating, in the course of time behaviour can be formulated. Not somuch
as definitions, but as social constructs that can be workedwith within a society
(Rancière, 1999).
Then one can ask oneself; why focus so extensively on the various defi-
nitions of ASB? The answer is relatively simple; because the diversity leads
to vagueness on the part of politicians, the people who make and carry out
policy, and private citizens. The British Economic and Social Research Council
(2009) concludes that this vagueness leads to inconsistent policies (for further
discussion see Chapter 2). What is more, evaluative research in the UK is
impeded by the fact that ASB falls under various legal categories (see appendix
II and III).
In conclusion, for the sake of comprehensive research and of the feasibility
of this thesis a common denominator of the issues above is chosen. As a result
ASB in this case is defined as persistent, un-acceptable, non-criminal criminal
behaviour by youngsters on the street. Of course, this definition is still dis-
putable. Therefore, the examples given in the informative memorandum on
the new Law (as discussed in paragraph 1.3.2) will also function as a guiding
tool for this thesis. To clarify further, other sort of incivilities or nuisances on
the street like, drugs related behaviour, dog dirt or road rage, will be left aside.
This research concentrates on the construction of the problem of ASB.
Feelings of unsafety of the public will be mentioned but not examined. They
will be addressed through the different surveys (British crime survey and CBS-
surveys) and will only be brought into play when deemed necessary. The
theoretical discussion on the causes, the extent and consequences of ASB will
also be left out of the analyses. So the question is not why and how ASB
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develops but how the term is constructed and how policies for this kind of
behaviour mature in society.
2 DISCUSSING THEORY
2.1 Garland: The Culture of Control
At first glance, the described reactions to ASB appear to confirm the influential
Culture of Control theory of Garland. David Garland explained in The Culture
of Control: crime and order in contemporary society (2001) a Western rise of more
repressive and controlling policies towards deviant behaviour and crime. Social
problems are re-interpreted as security threats andmet with strongmeasures.
Although there are differences in emphasis (i.e.Governing through crime (Simon,
2007) and phrasing, like Culture of fear (Furedi, 2005) or Justice in the risk society
(Hudson, 2003) there is a large body of literature that focuses on these develop-
ments (Newburn & Sparks, 2004; Wacquant, 2001; Crawford, 2009; Furedi,
2005; Young, 2007; Simon, 2007; Hudson, 2003; Zedner, 2007; Bauman, 2006;
Ericson, 2007; Devroe, 2008) .
While various of the above mentioned authors added interesting notions
to the debate, the focus in this thesis will be on Garland’s leading study of
the Culture of Control. Garland (2001) was one of the first to analyse the
shifting crime policies on such a large scale. In his study he analysed how
discourses and practices of crime control have developed in the last two
decades of the twentieth century. He identified a turn in crime policies in the
US and the UK towards more repressive measures and described these as a
Culture of Control. In his much discussed (e.g. Zimring, 2001; Braithwaite,
2003; Hudson, 2003; Hörnqvist, 2004; Young, 2003; Melossi, 2004; Loader &
Walker, 2004; van der Woude, 2010) study Garland (2001, p. 106) takes ‘the
normality of high crime rates’ and ‘the acknowledged limitations of the crim-
inal justice state’ as points of departure. He described the high crime rates
and low criminal justice effectiveness in America and the UK as social facts
(a statement that is often criticized as will become clear later on). He argued
that this awkward predicament led to a shift in crime policies.
2.1.1 Currents of change
In these so called ‘high crime societies’ in the UK and the US, Garland indicates
twelve currents of change (from 1970 till 2000). For the sake of conciseness
not all indices of change will be discussed here. The ones related to the ideas
on punishment (reinvention of the prison, re-emergence of punitive sanctions
and the decline of the rehabilitative ideal) are not considered. Also some
elements concerned with the transformation of criminological thought and
new management styles will be left out.
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Only the ones that are of importance for a better understanding of the
Dutch discourses on ASB policies will be debated. These indices of changewere
never meant to be used as a kind of checklist. Garland (2001, p. 21) argues
that these are not subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by the study itself,
but form a basic presupposition for further research. As Daems (2009, 119)
correctly states, they are indications of change, not guiding principles, to verify
to what extent the Culture of Control is applicable for other societies. Having
said this, five of these indications are of importance for this thesis since they
especially relate to the process of (crime) policy-making. Not as a manual, but
as a the basis for the structural analyses made later on.
1. Changes in the emotional tone of crime policy
Garland identified a change in the public discourse about crime. He did not
define the concept of a public discourse but in his overall explanation he refers
to a fearful, angry public that had a large impact upon the style and content
of policymaking in recent years. The ‘proof’ for this fear of crime as a promi-
nent cultural theme is according to Garland, delivered by public opinion
research that showed a large majority of the public think that crime rates are
getting worse whatever the actual (declining) patterns. He concludes that the
new discourse of crime policy consistently invokes an angry public, demanding
strong measures.
2. Protecting the public as a perennial concern of crime policy
Garland states that in an age (he does not explicate the period) when crime
rates were low and fear of crime not yet a political motif, protecting the public
was not a motivating theme of policy-making. Now, he argues, there is an
emphasis upon the need for security and the containment of danger.
3. Politicization of crime policies and the new populism
Crime became a highly charged election issue. For this thesis, especially the
statement that policy measures are constructed in ways that appear to value
political advantage and public opinion over the views of experts and the
evidence of research, is relevant. Criminological knowledge is downgraded,
‘common sense’ is the norm. It is not one political party that moved away from
the old views on crime but as Garland states: they all have. ‘Tough on crime’
and ‘concerns for public safety’ are not longer only favourite topics for right
oriented political parties. The sound bites like ‘zero-tolerance’, now appear
to dominate the public and political debate.
4. Expanding infrastructure of crime prevention and community safety (including
civil society)
Within this context, especially Garland’s statement that national crime control
strategies are accompanied by ongoing, low key local efforts to build up the
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internal controls of neighbourhoods and to encourage communities to police
themselves, is considered important for this thesis.
5. A continuous sense of crisis
Garland identifies a volatile pattern of policy developments, because there
is a growing sense that the structure of the criminal justice statemay no longer
be adequate to the problem of crime. So, high crime rates are seen as signs
that crime control is based upon a model that is inappropriate for its tasks.
Consequently, the public has lost confidence in the criminal justice system
and the politicians that are held responsible for it.
2.1.2 Different responses to changes
According to Garland, as a reaction to the indices of change, two kinds of
crime policies were created. On the one hand adaptive (acknowledging the
changes and adjusting to them), on the other non-adaptive (denial and acting out)
responses.
Garland described six main types of adaptation (like rationalization of
justice, redefining success and the commercialization of justice). In short, these
policies face up to the described predicament and introduce pragmatic new
strategies. The agencies involved (for example the police) acknowledged the
changes over time and responded by revising their practices and building new
institutions. A relevant type of adaptation for this thesis is, the responsibilization
strategy. Garland’s describes this approach as the effort to extend the reach
of state agencies by connecting them with practices of actors in the private
sector and the community (see Chapter 2 of this thesis).
Furthermore, the focus shift to the consequences of crime rather than to its
causes is deemed significant. So there is a new (political) emphasis on tackling
the effects of criminal conduct, for example the fear of crime (see Chapter 3).
In addition, the adaptive process of defining deviance down is relevant. In the
sense of lowering the degree towhich certain behaviours are criminalised and
penalised. Garland gives examples like, lower fixed penalties for offences that
before were prosecuted and community sentences for offenders who earlier
would have gone into custody. Themeasureswere slowly expanding, therefore
making them hard to detect from outside the judicial institutions. At the same
timeGarland acknowledges the conflicting so-calledmisdemeanor arrests and
the broken-window approach but states that these are very public exceptions.
As will become clear later on, these ideas have been criticised.
These adaptive responses co-exist with the non-adaptive ones. Garland
argues that these two approaches of contemporary crime control occur simul-
taneously; but that they are taking place in different policy domains (2001,
p. 38). While the first relates more to the administrative machine of the state
(for example, the street level bureaucrats who are faced with various forms
of deviance on everyday basis and have more pragmatic approaches to crime
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control (2001, p. 112), the latter more to the state’s political machine. According
to Garland this second line of policy development (of non-adaptive responses)
is a more politicised, populist regressive one, focusing on restoring the public
trust in criminal justice. One of the two non-adaptive strategies is the denial
of the described predicament. The government tries to reinstate the myth of
the strong state by re-imposition of control, usually by punitive means. Politi-
cians repeatedly deny evidence that crime does not respond to severe sentences
or new police powers (although these limitations are recognized by their own
administrations). Instead, they seek to expand state power. For example,
criminalisingmore behaviour (see Chapter 2). This in contrast with the earlier
described process of defining deviance down. So in short, a sovereign state
dealing with its limitations by denying they exist.
This denial strategy is possible, argues Garland, because the groups that
aremost affected by these policies lack political power and arewidely regarded
as dangerous and undeserving and the groups least affected could be assured
that ‘something is done’.
Garland states that the other non-adaptivemeasures can be best described
as ‘the government acting out’; with for example, symbolic police actions to
impress. The very fact of acting is enough. The capacity of the government
to control crime, however doubtful, is constantly emphasised.
This idea of ‘acting out’ can be analyzed within the concept of a moral
panic. Garland does not mention this in The Culture of Control but described
it later on in his article On the concept of moral panic (2008). He argues, in line
with the ideas on a Moral Panic as defined by Stanly Cohen (1973), that in
times of transitions in the social, economic or moral order of society, moral
panics can develop. According to Garland the Culture of Control can be seen
as an example of a moral panic, which was partly caused by the impact of
social change upon established ways of life; the breakdown of previously
existing structures of control and the threat to existing hierarchies. In times
of great public outrage and anger with crime (moral panic), with this reaction
of ‘acting out’ the state demonstrates it is in control. Garland argues that
policymaking becomes a form of acting out that downplays the complexities
and long-term character of effective crime control in favor of the immediate
gratifications of a more expressive alternative (2001, p. 140).
As discussed, these contradictory responses to the predicament have co-
existed. Garland describes this structured ambivalence of state responses, but
does not give a very clear explanation for it. He explicitly states that it is not
policy of bifurcation (a two sided approach which on the one hand higher
sanctions for serious offences/ milder ones for lesser) but its the political
ambivalence resulting from a state confronted with its own limitations that
lies at the basis of these developments. However, on the remaining question,
how these policies came about, he is less clear.
Garland does acknowledge that the two different policy approaches are
on bad terms with each other. The acting out strategy has the effect of under-
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mining the more preventive adaptive strategy. He argues that penal welfarism13
(1890 – 1978’s) has been increasingly dismantled, but is not completely replaced
by the new politics of crime control. Thus, the different policies co-exist. One
the hand the adaptive, defensive tactics of everyday crime prevention and
the other more aggressive call to act out.
Often aggressive media attention and opportunistic politicians are blamed
for this complex, ambivalent system, but Garland explicitly avoids pointing
the finger only to them. He states that the reasons for the rise of these schizo-
phrenic crime policies has more to do with the ‘new social fact of high crime
rates’. These lead to the governmental responses discussed above (the govern-
mental story) and the adaptations society in general makes (the cultural story).
“They (high crime rates, MK) changed how people think and feel, what they talk
about and how they talk about it,..’(Garland, 2001, p. 163). The media and politi-
cians did not produce this change but tapped into it. Garland states the media
then dramatized and reinforced this new public experience and in doing so
has institutionalised that experience.
In the end, Garland (2001, p. 23) concludes that crime control is a recon-
figured complex of interlocking structures and strategies that are themselves
composed of old and new elements, the old revised and reoriented by a new
operational context.
2.2 Reactions to Garland’s Culture of Control
Different authors subscribe (e.g. Crawford, 2009; Furedi, 2005; van Swaaningen,
2005) to these general ideas of Garland. They endorse to the analyses of the
rehabilitative ideal falling out of favor and the failing of a penal welfare
complex to protect the public from risk associatedwith crime. Thus, they agree
that there is a reemergence of punitive sanctions, expressive justice, the return
of the victim and politicisation of crime issues. Furthermore, they state that
there is empirical evidence to confirm these theories (see, e.g. Simon, 2007;
Hörnqvist, 2004; Edwards, 2005).
On the other hand, Garland ideas have also been criticized (see, e.g. Young,
2003: Hudson, 2003; Zedner, 2007; Zimring, 201; Daems, 2009; Hughes, 2004).
Garland’s critics argue that he tends to ignore the different approaches to the
crime problem and exaggerates the level of social acceptance of ‘high crime
rates’. In the end, concluding that Garland draws an incomplete picture of
the developments.
The critical comments sometimes overlook the fact that Garland does
mention the complexity of the process. He did observe various developments
that were not reducible to a singular process. For example, he identified a
13 Community based solutions to the crime problem, rehabilitating offenders, indeterminate
sentences creating tailor made solutions to each deviant unique qualities.
Introduction 15
bigger criminal justice state, but also a state that was more aware of its limita-
tions than ever before (2004, p.169). Garland wanted to stress the complex,
contradictory character of the field of crime policies. He identified a complex
pattern of change; the rise of the so-called schizophrenic crime control complex.
Garland is aware that he understates the importance of the actors in the
policy process whose divergent preferences and policies were lost out in the
overview of the current debate (2004). He agrees with his critics that he did
not pay enough attention to the policies that failed to gain support and he
admits that he focused more on the established policies (Garland, 2004).
However, he states that it was a necessary choice in order to study the develop-
ments on a more structural level and to explain the transformations that had
occurred.
This present study on the Dutch reactions to ASB will pay attention to the
details of this complex process and will also analyze the counter voices and
the struggles within the policy process (see paragraph 1.5). In order to create
a more complete picture of the wide field of fully settled practices and not
so firmly established ideas (that can still influence policies). As Jones and
Newburn (2002; 2007) argue, an in-depth study of crime policy processes is
desirable.
Other forms of critique are that Garland did not address in detail the
differences in crime control strategies between the US and the UK (Hogeveen,
2003; Young, 2003; Hagan, 2004). In a reaction Garland (2004) argues that he
did pay attention to the differences between the two nations; most of scale
and intensity. For example, the US rate of imprisonment is five times higher
than in the UK and capital punishment was abolished in 1965 in the UK and
is still present in several American states. However, Garland argues that
despite these differences, the focal points as mentioned above were remarkable
the same. Thus, even though they operated through different legal and political
institutions, the structural forces were the same. In this thesis the rationales
in the current Dutch crime policy climate and the British strategies in crime
control will be assessedwithin the context of these structural forces, so amore
complete picture of possible differences can develop.
In addition, there are more reasons for studying the different discourses
more thoroughly. Garland provides no empirical evidence for his statement
on the level of influence of the media and politics. Also his basic assumption
of ‘high crime rates becoming a social fact’ is difficult to judge on an empirical
level. Therefore, in this thesis, the discourses are not only analysed on an
abstract, structural level but also on a more down-to-earth one. Figuring out
how people, politicians and media talk about, discuss and construct views
on ASB. As addressed in the preface, Garland (2004) himself states, once the
large scale patterns are evident, conducting studies of their presence and
operation in defined locales is a crucial next step.
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2.3 Dutch version of a Culture of Control?
Garland (2004) described the Netherlands as a country that unlike the similar
social and economic disruptions as the US did not develop the same strategies
and levels of control. Nonetheless, several foreign observers (Nelken, 2002;
Tonry, 2004; Edwards, 2005) did perceive some harsher aspects of crime control
associated with the Anglo Saxon model in the Netherlands. For example,
Edwards (2005, p. 357) observed a ‘dramatic’ and ‘rapid transformation’ of
the Dutch Culture of Control, one of tolerance to one of punitive populism.
Jones and Newburn (2007) studied a policy transfer of the ideas of zero toler-
ance from New York to Great Britain (see Chapter 4 ) and suggested a move
to continental Europe as well.
Several scholars from the Dutch-speaking region (e.g. van Swaaningen,
2005, 2008; Devroe, 2008; Boutellier, 2002; van de Bunt, 2003; Buruma, 2004;
Pieterman, 2008; van Stokkum, 2007; Pakes, 2005; Muller, 2010; van Noije &
Wittebrood, 2008, 2009; Noorda, 2006; Daems, 2009) also identified elements
of a Culture of Control in the Netherlands. They described the existence of
a safety-mantra and suggested that Dutch policies towards crime in a way
mimic these Anglo-Saxon developments. Although arguably, these trends (like
longer prisons sentences) weremore pronounced in the two countries Garland
analysed and were observable later in the Netherlands.
In this paragraph, two Dutch articles in reaction to Garland’s study will
get more attention. First Pakes’ work because it focuses on the relation between
the UK and the Netherlands, which is relevant for this thesis and secondly the
work of Van Swaaningen because he studied the supposed Dutch version of
a Culture of Control with the most scrutiny.
Pakes described an emerging Dutch-style Garlandian social discourse of
crime and security (2004, p. 284). He argues that the two main components
that constitute this discourse are the ‘realignment of crime as an issue of
security rather than of justice’ and ‘a reappraisal of a variety of policies of
non-enforcement’ (in Dutch gedogen). The shift in discourse is, according to
Pakes, best summarised as a conversion from one of crime and justice to one
of crime and order in which crime became public concern, rather than one
exclusively for professionals within the institutions of the criminal justice
system. Although this not (yet) resembles the American of British crime com-
plex, Pakes argues changes have occurred at an unprecedented pace. So, he
does mention a shift in discourse but does not study the various discourses
at a more empirical level. A consequence of this form of inquiry is that it
possibly tends to understate the counter voices and practices that can still exist.
Therefore, his statements can benefit from more in-depth discourse analyses.
Van Swaaningen studied the supposed Dutch version of a Culture of
Control most intensively. He sees the Dutch situation as a exemplary case
study of governing through safety. Van Swaaningen states that earlier the
Netherlands were generally characterized as a tolerant, liberal country: per-
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missive towards vices, foreigner friendly and amild penal climate. The Dutch
were sober-minded, research led. Downes (1988) earlier described this idea
as well, in his often cited comparative study of the Netherlands and England
and Wales.
Van Swaaningen (2005, 2008) argues that at the beginning of the new
century theNetherlands turned into a rather confused, intolerant and punitive
country. Central to the punitive turn has been the rise of populist parties like
the LPF (list Pim Fortuyn) and the PVV. He studied the local development of
ideas on prevention of crime into a merely exclusive politics of public safety
and described the creation of a safety discourse (integral safety policies) and
identified fear as a major political advisor. Van Swaaningen refers to the
popular idea of zero tolerance that Dutch politicians took home from their
visits to New York. In line with Jones and Newburn (2007) he described this
‘largest policy transfer in criminological history’ (2005, p. 292).
He further argues that the current Culture of Control should be seen in
relation to an alleged ‘lack of control’ in the preceding decades. First crime
prevention was primarily supposed to take place outside the realm of criminal
justice and to focus on tackling the (mainly) social causes of crime. Now fears
of law-abiding citizens are the driving force behind the new politics. The
uniqueness of theDutch case according to van Swaaningen lies in criminalisa-
tion and stigmatisation of ethnicminorities. He correctly points to the fact that
although crime figures have been falling for a quite a number of years, rather
a large percentage of the ASB on the street indeed does involve ethnicminority
youth. On the other hand, van Swaaningen does not examine the (media)
construction of the problem of ethnic youth in combination with ASB at an
empirical level. Determining how the link of ASB to ethnicminority youngsters
is constructed in the media and political discourse could shed light on the
(unforeseen) effects on the groups in question (youth & immigrants), such as
isolation and criminalisation. This present thesis will therefore examine awide
range of construction processes regarding ASB.
2.4 Conclusion
The above described signs (new repressive measures, tougher political talk)
seem to confirm a Dutch version of a Culture of Control. Indeed there is much
that appears to be in common. The point of this thesis is not to deny aWestern
trend of a Culture of Control. This study does not concentrate on identifying
macro developments. It aims at providing an additional perspective bymeans
of an in-depth study of ‘Dutch discourses on ASB’, with the primary focus on
uncovering the implicit rationales for policies repressing ASB.
As a result of this focus, it will become clear whether this exchange of
policies related to ASB did indeed take place or that there is more to it. It could
be that in the Netherlands the shift from prevention to repression is from a
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different order. Some scholars point to the fact that the Dutch did not com-
pletely left the idea of combining ‘restraint and tolerance’ towards deviant
behaviour. For example, Uitermark and Duyvendak (2005) see that local
authorities have continued to use social politics contrary to their tough talk.
Others (van Noije & Wittebrood; 2008, 2009; Doorten & Rouw, 2006; Fiers &
Jansen, 2004; van Steden & Jones, 2008) also describe wide-ranging policy
plans. Several mixed strategies seamlessly overlap in these plans; from strong
law enforcement to community prevention.
This thesis will unravel the rationales for thesemixed policies. As Garland
(2001) described himself, the Culture of Control, is a complex pattern of
change. By identifying possible divergences of a tougher approach on deviant
behaviour, a more complete picture develops.
To study the constantly changing and contested nature of social problems
in general and crime in particular, a social construction perspective serves this
purpose best (Hacking, 2000; Matthews, 1986). American criminologist Gregg
Barak (2007) states that when a researcher analyses the dynamics of law, crime
and law enforcement, he should be aware of the constructions of these pheno-
mena. Also Hillyard (2004) and others (Flyghed, 2005; Donoghue, 2008; Muncie,
2006; Garret, 2006) argue that criminologists must not stand back, but that
they ought to think critically about the criminal justice system, its rationales
and the possible disruptive social effects of criminal justice expansions.
In this thesis, these ideas will be followed through. In the hectic dynamics
of he creation of crime policies sometimes there can be little room for con-
templation. Therefore, the assumptions that guide these crime polices will be
entangled in this thesis. Crime policies are in general a result of public views,
media attention, political debate and scientific evidence, as was discussed in
the preface (paragraph 1.1.). A more in-depth analyses of these four essential
discourses is necessary, as will be carried out in this thesis. In the end aiming
at uncovering the implicit rationales for policies repressing ASB.
Special attention will be paid to typical Dutch developments as van Swaa-
ningen among others identified. Such as the link of ethnic minorities to the
problem of ASB. As argued earlier, the possible complex pattern in the Dutch
situation up till now, did not get the full attention on an empirical level it
deserves. It should be imperative that Dutch scholars, students, politicians
and policymakers are aware of how the different discourses on ASB came about.
Studying the construction of the phenomenon in detail will add more depth
to discussion. Only then variation and complexity are liable to bemost visible.
To round off this paragraph, the theoretical concept of the Culture of
Control functions primarily as means rather than as ends. So this study does
not focus on the falsifiability of the Culture of Control but the theory will be
applied as a tool for analysing the identified rationales rather than as topic
of analysis.
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Table 1.1. List of main assertions paragraph 1.3 & 1.4
Research Street terror Goal Why?
Theoretical & Scientific
relevance
- Develop broader vision on
current crime policy climate
(Culture of Control?)
- Contribute to knowledge on
policy development ASB
- Create better understanding of
construction phenomenon
through discourse analyses
- Little progress in debate
on current Dutch crime
policy climate
- Possible incorrect
assumptions as basis for
policies ASB
- In-depth studies in crime
policies are rare
Social relevance - Develop nuanced and critical
view on policies for ASB
- Salient issue in politics,
media and social life
- Possible unforeseen effects
on groups in question
(youth & immigrants) like
isolation, criminalisation.
3 DISCUSSING RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Asmentioned before, the central research question is;which rationales underlying
the policies to address antisocial behaviour by youngsters on the street can be identified
within the Dutch discourses and how can these rationales be assessed within the
context of a Culture of Control?
To answer this coordinating question, a comparison between the UK (often
the example in terms of crime control) and the Netherlands will be made. The
choice for the UK will be further justified in paragraph 6.
For every discourse a different research question was derived from the
literature. It should be noted that the sort of sub research questions is by no
means exhaustive. Many other questions could have been asked as well. The
present questions, however, are of specific importance for the discourses that
are under consideration.
· In Chapter 2, the legal discourse is analysed. The question what kind of
measures are taken to tackle ASB in the Netherlands and the UK, and what are
the potential effects, will be examined.
· When studying the political discourse (Chapter 3) the leading question
is what are the rationales of Dutch and British politicians for tackling ASB?
· In Chapter 4 the media discourse will be analysed and the question how
the discourse on ASB andminority ethnic youth developed in the British andDutch
media, will be answered.
· The analyses of the public discourse in Chapter 5 focuses on the question
to what extent the supposed retreat from condoning ASB is supported by the
public?
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In every separate discourse specific assumptions are made. Only when con-
sidering the individual motivations and premises of players in the field a better
understanding of the whole domain of policies controlling ASB will develop.
4 DISCUSSING METHODS
Aswas discussed in the preface, gathering in-depth evidence is essential. Only
detailed empirical research can clarify the issues raised. The general trend in
criminology is analysing quantative and secondary data. A recent review finds
that such research (especially statistical survey research) regularly leaves
‘eighty or ninety percent of variance unexplained’ (Weisburd&Piquero, 2008;
Ferrel, 2008). To reproduce the endless discussion between the ‘soft’ and
‘hard’14 social scientists, is not relevant for this thesis. As Silverman (2001)
argues, the dichotomy of qualitative versus quantitative is risky because it
tends to place researchers in opposing groups, whereas combining the two
enrich criminological research.
In this thesis some quantitative data are collected and analysed in the
different Chapters, but the main focus will be on qualitatively oriented dis-
course analyses. Because as is explained on page 17 qualitative analyses in
general best explain social events, cultures and relationships in a social and
temporal context (May, 2000; Meuser, 2002; Noaks, 2004; Goodwin, 2002). In
order to be able to ascertain the Dutch version of the Culture of Control a
qualitative discourse analyses is the most suitable. Also Garland (2001)
analysed how discourses and practices of crime control have developed in
the last two decades of the twentieth century. Similar methods will be put
into practice in this thesis.
Furthermore, internal validity15 is a strong point of this qualitative
approach (Kalikin-Fishmen, 2001; Coffey, 1996;Wester, 2004). It producesmore
rich data that can lead to a deeper understanding of what is going on. For
example, when crime politics are analysed criminologists write about the
possible rationales but seldom ask politicians in person for their motivations
or media representatives for their role in the process of policy-making.
By addressing the ways in which ASB now features in the thought of
different members of society, this thesis will pay attention to these voids in
research. The following paragraphs will provide an overview of the applied
methods.
14 Soft referring to the qualitative research and hard referring to the quantitative approach.
15 The truthfulness of evidence.
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4.1 Discourse analysis
Discourse analysis deals with perceptions of reality, meaning and power,
therefore it can be a valuable tool for this kind of criminological research. It
addresses issues like, to which extent does a certain policy includes people
views, which presumptions guide crime policy decisions and what are the
interests behind the discourse. Though having ancient roots, discourse analysis
is by no means a consolidated school of thought. Over time, the method has
been described in very narrow as well as very broad ways. As a result, dis-
course analyses cover amultitude of rather different approaches and research
methods (Hammersley, 2002; Hajer, 2006; Philips, 2002; vanDijk, 2009;Wester,
2006; Levi, 2006; Krippendorff, 2004).
Having said this, there is a common denominator in discourse analyses;
the notion that a problem can be understood, constructed or narrated in
various ways. In line with Hajer (2006) a discourse is defined as an ensemble
of ideas, concepts and categorisations through which meaning is allocated to
a social phenomenon. A discourse analysis can therefore be considered a
research tool, providing insight to a confusing situation or development. For
example; dead trees as such are not a social construct. The point is how one
makes sense of dead trees. Or to relate to the research topic; street terror is
only deviant behaviour because people understand it as such. Therefore a
discourse analysis is the appropriate method to figure out the complex con-
struction of this phenomenon.
As was discussed earlier, strong point of this method is rich results. These
results can reveal towhat extent a certain policy includes people views, which
presumptions guide policy decisions and the interests behind the discourse.
These revelations are important for examining the relevant elements of a
Culture of Control like repressive policies and intolerant attitude towards ASB.
Weaknesses of thismethod are the issues of reliability and generalisability
of the results. First, the problem of reliability is addressed.16 Often the criti-
cism is that anything goes. To counter this critique, it is important not to
analyse simply by spotting features. Since the method requires the researcher
to pass judgment on possible motivations and interpretations, the fear of
subjectivity is realistic. This can partly be resolved by being explicit in the
selection of texts and transparent about ones choices on themes (Silberstein,
2004; Coffey, 1996; Wester, 2006).
Another possible solution is triangulation (e.g. Noaks, 2004; Wester, 2006;
May, 2000). In this way, the results can be compared and crosschecked by a
variety ofmethods. Noaks (2004) argues that utilising asmany diversemethods
as possible is the right way to answer a research question. On the other hand,
one should be aware that constantly adding new research techniques does
not automatically mean a better thesis (Kalekin-Fishman, 2001; Noaks, 2004).
16 Here reliability is qualified as unobtrusive measurement.
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In this thesis the idea of a ‘mild’ form of triangulation will be followed.
Different research techniques were used.
Table 1.2 – Overview of applied methods
Discourse/Chapter Method 1 Method II Method III Data refer to
1. Legal discourse
Administrative
measures in crime
control
Analyses of
memoranda of
new laws
Analyses of
academic judicial
literature
1999-2008
2. Political discourse
The war on street
terror. Why tackle
ASB?
Semi-structured
interviews
politicians
Content analyses
political
documents
1998-2008
3. Media discourse
White trash versus
Moroccan street
terrorists
Content
analyses of
printed news
Semi-structured
interviews
journalists
1990-2008
4. Public discourse
Down these mean
streets
(In)formal
interviews with
the public and
key-figures
Observations in
neighbourhoods
Surveys
among public
September
2008 -
January
2009
In the next paragraph only the content analysis will get explicit attention,
because this method is the dominant method throughout the whole thesis.
In the different relevant Chapters the othermethodswill be discussed further.
The remaining question is how tomake the connection between the specific
and the general. Researchers usually address this problem by conducting
comparative research in order to develop more general explanations (Goodwin,
2002). This strategy will be followed here as well. For example, the case of
ASB will be compared to the reactions to organised crime (Chapter 2). In
addition, as stated earlier, in almost all the Chapters the situation in the
Netherlands will be compared to the one in the UK.
The British situation in underprivileged neighbourhoods is only to some
extent comparable to the Dutch. In the British class society, the social disad-
vantages in certain neighbourhoods are greater than in the Netherlands
(Downes, 1988; see also, Pakes, 2005). What is more, the structure of the
problems is different (Punch, 2005; see also Waiton, 2008). These differences
make a comparison between the two countries difficult but not impossible
and certainly no less interesting. Especially because Dutch politicians often
cite British measures and refer to the ASBO as a recipe for success (Huisman
& Koemans, 2008).
Thus, it is not so much a detailed comparative study of the UK and the
Netherlands. To do so more thorough research would have been required,
for example, on the differences between the two judicial systems. Instead, the
focus will be on developments that might occur in both places, despite the
obvious differences in law, culture and politics.
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As argued earlier Garland (2004) suggests, in order to find out whether
or how the Culture of Control in other societies developed, further comparative
investigation is necessary. Only then the extent to which the Anglo-American
patterns of adaptation are exhibited elsewhere, can be examined. Garland
expects that despite a certain level of unique detail, a rather limited variety
of adaptive patterns has occurred. Because, as he argues, a nation’s welfare
regime will be a good predictor of the crime control that is likely to emerge.
He presumes that European nations typically have state bureaucracies that
are less exposed to popular pressure, and less susceptible to punitive populism.
Furthermore, Northern European countries, exhibit multiple-party political
systems that are less inclined to populist politics, according to Garland. He
explicitlymentioned the Scandinavian countries andGermany in this context,
but given themultiple-party political system in theNetherlands, this observa-
tion is relevant for this thesis as well. The comparative research done in this
thesis will shine new light on these ideas (as far as the UK and theNetherlands
are concerned).
4.2 Content analysis
Some researchers consider discourse analysis to be part of a content analysis,
while others take the opposite view (Neuendorf, 2002; Gubrium & Holstein,
2000; Hammersley, 1997; Blommaert, 2009). This thesis chooses the latter
perspective. This means that, to describe and explain a particular discourse,
content analyses of texts (e.g. media reports & policy documents) form part
of the broader analysis. Other parts are for instance interviews and surveys.
The criminological scientist Meuser (2002)17 among others (Larsen, 1997;
Vasterman, 2005; Hammersley, 1997) states that the best way to approach a
text for criminological study purposes is a content analysis with a constructivist
view rather than a more standard quantitative content analysis. In defending
his statement, he argues that his preferred method gives more room for
patterns of interpretation of reality. This specific form of content analysis aims
to uncover the way in which social reality is constructed, as is relevant for this
thesis. So how is this method put into practice?
The focus will not so much be on the coding of a large number of texts,
as is customary with the general content analysis (so a system of automated
coding of documents, for example ATLAS.ti, will not be utilised).18 Instead,
17 These ideas are opposed by scientists who believe that (criminal) law defines crime and
that it is not a social construct.
18 Silverman (2001) emphasises the importance of limiting data to that which is manageable.
The scale of the project is a key consideration. Noaks (2004) states that a small-scale project,
(like this thesis) is not suitable for a computer coding system, since too much time might
be spent sorting and retrieving data at the expense of writing.
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the main focal point of this method, involves organising a number of texts
into themes (see for example Chapter 3) and ideas (see Chapter 4). On its own,
the act of categorisation does not constitute an analysis. It is the process of
‘going beyond the data’ as Noaks suggests (2004, p.133) and generating theories
and frameworks that the stage of interpretation should involve (see Chapter 5
and 6).
Of course, with this approach there are limitations as well. It tends to
understate the importance of actors whose preferences and policies failed to
gain support. Furthermore, there is the possibility of overemphasizing the
degree of interpretation. With analyses of four different discourses and with
triangulation this problem can be overcome. Results can be compared and
crosschecked by the variety of methods used. For example, a series of inter-
views with key participants in the policy process like Dutch elected officials,
Dutch spokesman of political parties and British andDutch civil servants. The
interviews will result in rich first hand-accounts of the Dutch policy process
compared to the British situation.19 This kind of comparative ethnography
can be very useful for the study of policymaking in the sphere of criminal
justice, but it is not often done (probably because it is time consuming). Other
methods used are observations and surveys. They will be discussed further
in Chapter 6.
The results were collected in a period of a little over three years. Starting
in January 2007 and ending in April 2010. The data cover a decade; from the
beginning of 1998 until April 2009. The starting date was chosen because in
1998 the ASBO was introduced in the UK and the end was set by the majority
vote in Dutch parliament on the new bill Measures to combat Soccer vandalism
and severe antisocial behaviour (see table 1.2.).
5 OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
The four discourses, legal, political, media and public were analysed in four
different articles, starting from four different research questions. In every
article, the choice for that specific question is further justified. This research
structure resulted in the following Chapters.
Chapter 2 discusses the legal discourse and especially the new administrative
measures in crime control. It is argued that potentially these new laws criminal-
ise more everyday behaviour. Chapter 2 explores the introduction of British
andAmerican initiatives in relation to recent developments in theNetherlands
concerning ASB and their possible paradoxical net-widening results. Content
analyses of a selection of policy-documents and memoranda of the new laws
19 In total N = 18.
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are carried out. Also academic literature and legal reviews (secondary sources)
on this subject are interpreted. In addition new policies concerning organised
crime will be discussed, as a method of comparison. In the end, providing
an overview of the current policy debate.
Published: Huisman, W. & M.L. Koemans (2008). Administrative measures
in crime control. Erasmus Law Review, 1(5), 121-145.
Chapter 3 focuses on the political discourse. The central question here is, why
do Dutch and British politicians want to tackle ASB? Is this simple evidence
of a punitive turn or is there more to it? This question is answeredwithmeans
of content analyses of political documents and speeches. To complete the
picture ninemembers of Dutch parliament were interviewed aswell as several
policymakers and city counselors in the UK and the Netherlands.
Published: Koemans, M.L. (2010). The war on ’street terror’. Why tackle anti-
social behaviour? Crime, Law & Social Change, 53(5), 477-491.
Chapter 4 examines themedia discourse on ASB and youngmigrants. The Dutch
press often associates ASB with Moroccan teenagers. Based on a comparison
of Dutch and British political and media discourses starting around 1990, this
article demonstrates that the British media do not systematically link ASB to
ethnic minority youngsters, rather to white teen-agers. The question then is
how this issue of ASB and ethnicity is constructed in the Netherlands and UK
in their political and media discourses. And does this construction differ in
accordance with the actual problems?
Published: Koemans, M.L. (2010). ‘White trash’ versus ‘Marokkaanse straat-
terroristen’. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 52(2), 201-217.
In Chapter 5 the public discourse on the local support for new ASB policies is
studied. The article is based on interviews with social workers, policemen,
troublemakers themselves and residents of eleven so-called ‘problem neigh-
bourhoods’ in four major Dutch cities. Questions such as how can this kind
of behaviour be defined and how can the problems best be addressed, were
raised. As a result an insight was obtained into the public reactions towards
this shifting policy landscape.
(Under review) Koemans, M.L. & J.P. van der Leun (2011). Down these mean
streets. Tackling antisocial behaviour: local Dutch support? Urban Studies.
In Chapter 6 the main findings of the foregoing Chapters are discussed. This
will lead to an assimilation of the results, discussion of theoretical implications
and an answer to the overarching questionwhich rationales underlying the policies
to address antisocial behaviour by youngsters on the street can be identified within
the Dutch discourses and how can these rationales be assessed within the context of
a Culture of Control?

Legal discourse

2 Administrative measures in crime
control
Abstract
Wewant to discuss several new administrativemeasures thatwere introduced
into the Anglo-Saxon world and that have been copied in part in the Nether-
lands. One is aimed at tackling nuisance1 in the public domain and the other
at the prevention of organised crime. These newmeasures have been praised
by Dutch politicians as effective methods to reduce crime levels without
bringing criminal law into play.
At first glance, these administrative measures indeed appear to tackle
deviant behaviourwithout applying criminal law.However, the recent reforms
can have unexpected and paradoxical consequences. This paper argues that
potentially these new laws do more to criminalise everyday behaviour. This
can lead to an increase in criminal cases and in the end adds an extra burden
to the criminal justice system instead of lightening its load. By eroding the
division between administrative law and criminal law through the introduction
of certain administrative measures, one can actually increase the scope of the
criminal justice system. However, these negative effects are generally ignored
by Dutch policy-makers. This article explores the introduction of British and
American initiatives in relation to recent developments in the Netherlands
concerning anti-social behaviour2 and organised crime and their possible
paradoxical net-widening results.
Published: Huisman,W. &M.L. Koemans (2008). Administrativemeasures in crime control.
Erasmus Law Review, 1(5), 121-145.
Dr. Wim Huisman is Professor of Criminology at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam.
Monique Koemans MA, MSc is a Ph.D. fellow at the University of Leiden.
1 In this chapter, first published in 2008, the term nuisance and ASB are both used. Later
on in the research project the term ASB was singled out (see chapter 1 for the explanation
of this choice).
2 In this chapter the abbreviation ASB for Anti-social behaviour on the street is not applied.
This chapter was first published in 2008, at that time I did not yet use the term ASB as
such.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, the British New Labour government claimed a general failure
of the judicial system (Garret, 2006). In England and Wales, courts were
overloaded with cases, people in inner-city neighbourhoods felt unsafe, and
crime rates increased each year. It was asserted that crime and behaviour
closely related to crime could no longer be controlled by the state alone. As
a result of this system failure, local authorities and civil society were given
more responsibilities in order to help in the fight against crime and public
insecurity. Garland identified this system failure as the ‘predicament’ with
which the authorities currently have to cope (Garland, 2001).
In addition, new administrative and civil laws were introduced: for
example, the anti-social behaviour order (ASBO). One could argue that civil
and administrative law – in addition to criminal law – became a tool for crime
control in the UK.3
Another example of using administrative law as an instrument for crime
control is found in the US. Under former prosecutor and then mayor Guiliani,
New York authorities realised that applying criminal law simply resulted in
members of the Mafia being put into jail but not out of business. Alongside
an intensive application of criminal law, the city administration introduced
administrative measures to attack the positions of power that criminal
organisations had build up in several of the city’s legitimate economic sectors.
Such steps can be seen as examples of the strategy of situational crime
prevention that has been popular in crime control during the last two decades
(Clarke, 1997). The theoretical assumption of this approach is that the level
of crime is determined by the presence of facilitating situational factors: for
instance, the presence of attractive targets, a low level of supervision, and a
low risk of apprehension (van der Bunt & van der Schoot, 2003). Situational
crime prevention is not aimed at altering the state of mind or motivations of
criminals by issuing jail sentences or behavioural treatment. Its goal is to limit
the opportunities for criminal activities or to remove incentives. Following
the idea of responsibilisation,4 actors other than the traditional agents of
criminal justice are called upon to reduce the facilitating role of situational
factors. For example, civilians are encouraged to protect their houses and
valuable assets against burglary and theft, and financial institutions are
pressured to preventmoney laundering. This paper focuses on administrative
authorities and the measures they can take in the fight against crime.
Developments in the UK and the US have quickly followed in the Nether-
lands. New administrative sanctions have been created here as well, such as
the administrative fine, but existing measures under administrative law are
also used now for a new purpose: to fight crime.
3 Scotland introduced the ASBO as well in 1999.
4 In short, the policy of making more people in society responsible for reducing crime.
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We considered it of interest to examine the consequences of these develop-
ments. Accordingly, the application of administrativemeasures in two shifting
domains of criminal policy will be discussed: nuisance in the public domain
and the prevention of organised crime. These domains are particularly interest-
ing because here several new administrative laws are being introduced and
proposed, thereby copying foreign developments like the ASBO in the UK and
the administrative approach to organised crime in New York.
After a short introduction of the administrative measures applied in each
domain, the following questions will be discussed: Why were these measures
introduced? What are the main objectives of these new policies? And what
are the consequences of these new approaches, especially with regard to the
crime problem and the relation of administrative law to criminal justice?
Although for the Dutch cases it is too early to assess the impact of the intro-
duction of these measures, it will be argued that certain net-widening effects5
can already be identified (Steventon, 2007). Furthermore, administrative
measures can be introduced either as an addition or as an alternative to
criminal law. In theNetherlands, the latter was to a certain degree the rationale
behind the de iure decriminalisation of prostitution and the retail selling of
marihuana. This step was defined by Brants as ‘regulated tolerance’ (Brants,
1998). Themain ideawas that by regulating these activities, criminal elements
in these markets could be more effectively targeted. However, this article will
argue that by eroding the division between administrative and criminal law
through the introduction of administrative measures, the scope of the admin-
istration of criminal justice is widened. The consequence is that these new laws
potentially criminalise what can be seen as everyday behaviour.
2 NUISANCE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
2.1 The UK
The new British measures tackling anti-social behaviour are a significant
example for Dutch policymakers. Therefore, before we address recent develop-
ments concerning anti-social behaviour in theNetherlands, wewill first discuss
the situation in the UK. Although the British setting differs considerably from
that in the Netherlands,6 this consideration will be shown to be highly relevant.
5 In short, the effect that has been demonstrated that both adult and juvenile diversion
practices are being applied largely to clients who were previously not subject to justice
system insertion.
6 For instance, the developments concern civil law rather than administrative law as a crime
fighting tool.
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With the introduction of the Anti Social Behaviour Order (ASBO7) by the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the New Labour government hoped to remedy
the ‘serious problem’ of the judicial system failure, as identified in the Intro-
duction. Police and local councils were given more power to respond to all
kinds of anti-social behavior (Bright & Bakalis, 2003). The then Primeminister,
Tony Blair, stated that if traditional criminal law processes in cases of antisocial
behaviour continued to abide, the rights of victims would be allowed to be
routinely trampled upon and would leave courts ‘fighting 21st century crime
with 20th century methods’. He claimed that the use of control orders were
the best available means for protecting the public.8
The primary intention of this introduction of the ASBOwas to protect those
people in society who are most vulnerable to the results of human disorderly
behaviour: in short, to protect them from their neighbours from hell (Burney,
2005; Home Office, 2004).
The ASBOs have a minimum duration of two years, can last indefinitely,
and contain prohibitions considered necessary to prevent the repetition of a
person’s anti-social behaviour. In the law, the conduct is defined as ‘behavior
which caused or was likely to cause alarm, harassment, or distress to one or
more persons not of the same household as him or herself.’ The ASBO is a civil
order. Restraints of certain behaviour can be imposed by a civil court (phase
one), and breaching is a criminal offence (phase two).
The idea behind this is that in civil court a person does not have to give
direct evidence against his/her neighbour, thus diminishing the fear of re-
taliation. Accordingly, hearsay evidence is allowed (Bright & Bakalis, 2003;
MacDonald, 2003; van Stokkum, 2007).
One can go to a civil court – via, for example, the Social Landlord9– and
ask for an ASBO (Burney, 2005; Home Office, 2004; MacDonald, 2006). This
is an unmistakable example of a ‘responsibilisation strategy’ in which other
agencies, such as Social Landlords, help in the fight against insecurity (Bright
& Bakalis, 2003). Some large cities in the UK greeted the new order with
enthusiasm. In the period 1999 to 2005, around 7000 ASBOswere issued (Home
Office, 2004).Greater Manchester issued 1045 ASBOs that led to its nickname
ASBO city, while others used it more as a last resort. For example, Greater
London ‘only’ issued 745 ASBOs. As Ashworth stated, the introduction and
the use of the ASBO seem reasonable (Ashworth, 2004). One could even argue
that the ASBO serves a noble cause: to make neighbourhoods more liveable
7 The ASBO has been effective from 1999 onwards andwas altered in 2004, giving authorities
more power. In addition, the ASBO was no longer limited to persons aged 16 or over.
Sheriffs can now grant an ASBO against a child aged 12 or more.
8 <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11769.asp>.
9 Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) are independent housing organisations registeredwith
the Housing Corporation under the Housing Act 1996.
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and to fight feelings of insecurity in the public domain. However, many pitfalls
can be identified.
2.2 Defining the crime problem
One of the first problems to manifest was the sheer endlessness of the list of
things people can be forbidden to do (Garret, 2006; Pakes, 2005; MacDonald,
2006). For example, boys were not allowed to use their skateboards in a
particular area, or they were given an ASBO because they kicked balls against
garage doors. Other ASBOs were imposed when youngsters continuously
listened to loud music on the streets, or when they were verbally abusive to
people in their neighbourhood. Of course, some of this kind of conduct is
indeed disturbing to a number of people and it can be an enormous problem
in inner-city neighbourhoods. Yet, the lack of definitional specificity leaves
room for the inclusion of an extensive range of behaviours (Burney, 2005).
This can lead to draconian uses of ASBOs: for instance, a suicidal woman was
forbidden to be around certain bridges and railway roads; an 87-year-oldman
was prohibited from making sarcastic remarks to his neighbours; a car thief
was not allowed to enter a car park in England orWales; and a prostitute was
prevented from carrying condoms (MacDonald, 2006; Steventon, 2007). The
enormous scope of this list can be partially explained as a result of the vague
definition of anti-social behaviour. Hudson defines the ASBO as an act of
frightening vagueness because a term like feelings of distress in the definition
of the ASBO is extremely subjective (Hudson, 2003). In these examples, an ASBO
is disproportionate, since it not only prohibits the anti-social behavior but it
also imposes restrictions on forms of behaviour that are themselves not anti-
social. Steventon points out that such a wide interpretation can encourage
intolerance to all kinds of petty nuisance, or simply towards individuals who
behave oddly (Steventon, 2007). The second reason for the length of the list
of ‘forbidden conduct’ is that different actors are allowed to ask the court for
an ASBO: namely, local councils, the police, and Social Landlords. For this last
non-legal actor, the primary aim is to help the complainer, not to defend the
accused (Hodgkinson & Tilley, 2007). This can lead to awkward situations.
For instance, a 17-year-old was forbidden to use his front door, while a 13-year-
old boy was ordered not to use the word ‘grass.’
Ashworth considers the ASBO – although part of private law – as an indi-
vidual crime law for the reason that almost anything can be called anti-social
behaviour (Ashworth, 2004). So in a way, the ASBO was introduced to enable
people from ‘problem neighbourhoods’ to act and thereby increase their
feelings of security. However, in the end it appears to work the other way
around. It enhances the power of the British State in the sense of a net-
widening of the law (Steventon, 2007). It appears that more problematic
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behaviour is being addressed by the law instead of by social policies.10 Recent
research and publications confirm that constructive preventive measures to
address the root causes of antisocial behavior, such as parenting orders, seem
less likely to be used (Hörnqvist, 2004; Burney, 2005; Cobb, 2007; Matthews
&Easton, 2007; Donoghue, 2008). Even though it is most probable that support
and social work programmes are more likely to succeed in the initial stages
of nuisance behavior by young people, it appears now that the law (civil and
criminal) is used as a dragnet. All kinds of nuisance behaviour that is otherwise
lawful can now be trawled by the law.
Pakes addresses another problem: the idea of net-deepening of the law
(Pakes, 2004). He refers to the example of prostitution. In general, prostitution
in the UK is not a criminal offence as such, but because of an ASBO (a restrain-
ing order that can prevent a person from standing on the corner of a street)
it can be criminalised when the term is breached. As a result, more behavior
is being criminalised. This criminalisation of otherwise regular anti-social
behaviour can lead to other problems as well. For example, in 2006 the Youth
Justice Board addressed the problem of what was termed badge of honour.11
Its one-year study in England andWales revealed that many teenagers viewed
the ASBO as a ‘diploma’ that boosted street credibility. Hence, the ASBO can
have a reverse effect when it is seen as glamorous.
Research performed by the Policy Research Bureau identified another
problem.12 Teenagers who are given ASBOs can be publicly named and shamed
in the local press. Since 2004, pictures of ASBO children have been printed in
leaflets and sent to all the neighbours. Therefore, such youngsters are labelled
criminals and are treated as such at school and in their neighbourhoods (Cobb,
2007). As a result, according to some critics the ASBO system is ‘demonising’
young people (von Hirsch & Simester, 2006). Home Office minister Tony
McNulty reacted to these concerns and said ASBOs were used sparingly and
only as a last resort to change behaviour that badly disrupted communities.13
3 ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AND THE EXECUTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Phase two of the ASBO is probably the sting in the tail: if a person breaches
any term – which 50 percent do – he/she can go to prison (with a maximum
sentence of 5 years), as 50 percent do.14 Hence, although the ASBO is a private
10 Steventon argues that it has been demonstrated that both adult and juvenile diversion
practices are being applied largely to clients who were previously not subject to justice
system insertion.
11 http://www.yjb.gov.uk/en-gb/> (accessed May 30, 2008).
12 <http://www.prb.org.uk/> (accessed May 30, 2008).
13 BBCnews, Asbos viewed as badge of honour <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
6107028.stm>.
14 (Home Office, 2004) the case of the aggressive beggar who ‘got’ 3.5 years imprisonment.
Administrative measures in crime control 35
law measure, breaching it is a criminal offence and a criminal court decides
over it. The problem here is the admissibility of hearsay evidence in these
proceedings. The initial idea was that the ASBO (by keeping offenders out of
court) could enable local authorities to act quicker in a problematic situation
(Ashworth, 2004). However, in some cases this intention has been used in an
impropermanner. For example, authorities sometimes choose to place an ASBO
on a criminal act, such as burglary, rather than to prosecute before a criminal
court, because it is easier and much quicker: no criminal evidence is needed
and hearsay evidence is allowed. However, the problem is that the ‘offender’
does not have the same ‘safeguards’ as he/she would have had in a criminal
court. This problem was addressed in a procedure in the House of Lords.15
The outcome was that indeed the ASBO should be considered civil in nature
and that, therefore, hearsay evidence could be admitted. One of the reasons
given by their Lordships was that if the ASBO was criminal rather than civil
in nature, ‘...it would inevitably follow that the procedure for obtaining anti-
social behaviour orders is completely or virtually unworkable and useless’,
given the problem of witness intimidation.16 Hence, the House of Lords did
not reclassify the ASBO as criminal, although in practice it often is. In 2005,
the Council of Europe on Human Rights expressed concern about the way
in which the ASBO was being used. In a report, the Council suggested ASBOs
be screened by a responsible authority to ‘guarantee against excessive use’.17
Notwithstanding the academic concerns, the British public appears not
to mind. Eighty-five percent of the people support the existence of the ASBO
(Mori, 2005). According to Blair, the ASBO is the best solution for the problem
of anti-social behaviour (Blair, 2005). He said: ‘Our critics, who usually do
not live in the communities most affected by crime and anti-social behaviour,
often describe these measures as overly punitive and a threat to basic legal
principles. (...) But the basic liberties of the law-abiding citizen should always
come first.’18 Other countries were inspired by the use of the ASBO. In 2006,
Ireland became the first common law jurisdiction outside the UK to introduce
it. And recently, in 2007, the New Zealand government, as well as the Austra-
lian government, announced proposals for the introduction of their own ASBO.
Identical developments can be detected in the Netherlands.
15 McCann and others v. Crown Court at Manchester.
16 McCann and others v. Crown Court at Manchester.
17 Council of Europe, ‘Preventive Legal Measures against Organized Crime- Organized Crime –
Best Practice Survey n°9’ (Strasbourg: 2003) PC-S-CO (2003) 3 E.
18 <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8745.asp>.
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3.1 The Netherlands
In October 2004, the Dutch Minister of Justice, Hirsch Ballin, was pressured
by parliament to adopt the British anti-social behavior order. Extra heat devel-
oped due to a widely publicised case in which a couple had been ‘forced out’
of their house by harassment from a group of Moroccan youths. In short, the
couple no longer felt safe in the Diamantbuurt in Amsterdam because they
were tormented and called all sorts of names by these youngsters (van
Stokkum, 2007; van Swaaningen, 2008). The group had ended up throwing
stones through the couple’s window, and the twomoved out of the area.Many
politicians called for tougher measures to tackle ‘street terror’ and they referred
to the British ASBO. In the end, the idea was withdrawn because the Minister
expected the costs of introducing this new measure to be too high and he
feared an extra strain on the already over-populated prisons.
In 2007, discussion of the ASBO in the Dutch parliament was rekindled.
In June of that year, two chairpersons representing local boroughs in Amster-
dam19 suggested introducing the ASBO in the Netherlands. They stated that
in the UK it was successful in reducing anti-social behaviour in inner-city areas.
‘The ASBO helps in the fight against young people terrorising the streets, before
criminal law comes into the picture,’ said local council chairman Arco Ver-
burg.20 He referred to the new British laws ‘as the best way to respond to
problems in the public domain’.21
But it was never mentioned that in the UK the ASBO was controversial, to
say the least (it is unclear whether this omission was the result of ignorance,
wishful thinking, or negligence). These statements of success are especially
remarkable because up to the present the actual effects of the ASBO on reducing
anti-social behaviour are not yet clear.22 Nonetheless, the ASBO continues to
inspire Dutch politicians as they consider implementing similar legislation.
The most recent example is of a proposal by the current Dutch cabinet.
At the beginning of September 2007, the cabinet presented a plan to deal with
the problems of forty probleemwijken (problem neighbourhoods), and the
council of ministers agreed on a proposal for a new act (article 172a Gemeente-
wet). The law, titled in short ‘severe anti-social behaviour,’23 gives more power
to local authorities. For instance, mayors can issue restraining orders to people
who have displayed anti-social behavior, without the interference of a judge
and for a longer period of time than the current law allows. Although the ASBO
19 Resp. Slovervaart and de Baarsjes.
20 http://www.nicis.nl/nicis/dossiers/Zorgenwelzijn/Jeugdzorg/verrijktdossier/
Jongerenoverlast_1132.html> (accessed May 30 2008).
21 As stated in the Volkskrant (June 13, 2007).
22 At the end of 2008, the Home Office in England will publicise an effect study.
23 ‘aanwijzingen ernstige overlast.’
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is a mixture of civil and criminal law rather than administrative and criminal
law, as is the case with the Dutch proposal, the ideas behind it are very similar.
This new law is designed so that the mayor can act quickly when he
considers the anti-social behavior to be a serious problem.A precise definition
of anti-social behavior is not given in the proposal, but it declares that the
behavior should be ‘persistent and grave.’ Information on the case can come
from partners in the judicial system, like the police, but also from administrat-
ive authorities, like social services and the local Department of Education. The
restraining order can be issued for a year and must be revised every three
months.24 If the order is breached, it becomes a criminal act (article 184 Sr)
and the case can be brought before a criminal court.25 Thus, like the ASBO,
it is a multi-stage approach.
In the Netherlands, mayors have more power than their British counter-
parts. According to current law, they can also issue restraining orders, but
with the new law they can prolong this period and couple it to ‘a duty to
report.’ In addition, the public prosecutor has more authority as well.26 The
Minister of Justice gave examples of disorder caused by animal rights activists,
hooligans, and rowdy youth, and stated, ‘[I]t is a very important expansion
of the ability to act in a case of anti-social behaviour.’ Prime Minister Balken-
ende added that the new law would help ‘to create safe communities.’27
The notion behind this administrative measure, according to the explana-
tory memorandum, is that anti-social behavior in the public domain adds to
the feelings of insecurity in inner-city areas. This proposal is part of the govern-
ment’s strategy to make the Netherlands a safer place to live in and to reduce
criminal conduct, as can be read in the memorandum.28
Of course, it is still a proposal and so the results can not yet be evaluated,
but the political rhetoric surrounding the new law in theNetherlands is similar
to that in the UK. Both the Dutch proposal and the ASBO have been introduced
as a supportive element for the overburdened criminal justice system and as
an additional weapon against crime and feelings of public insecurity. Local
authorities are accordedmore responsibilities, and in both cases the definitions
of anti-social behaviour are very broad (Brown, 2004).
Whether the Dutch proposal will also lead to a net-widening and a net-
deepening effect of the law, and to the stigmatisation of youngsters, will
remain a crucial question. At first glance, however, it appears that certain anti-
social behaviour, often not criminal in itself, is being approached as a security
threat rather than as a social problem. Furthermore, it is consequently
24 Or one can be ordered to report at certain times.
25 A prison sentence up to three months or a fine can be the end result.
26 Restraining order, duty to report, contact injunction.
27 NRC Handelsblad (September 8, 2007).
28 Wetsvoorstel (2007) Dutch title: maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige
overlast (31 467).
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addressed by the law instead of by social policies. It would be interesting to
see whether administrative law in the other domain, the prevention of
organised crime, is also exercised as an instrument for crime control.
4 THE PREVENTION OF ORGANISED CRIME
The administrative approach to organised crime is another example of that
was inspired by a purportedly successful method from abroad. According to
the biographers of the New York City authorities’ fight against organised
crime, this battle was successful partly due to the introduction of administrative
measures alongside a very intensive criminal policy:
… themobilization of local regulatory authority to attack organised crime is aNew
York City–specific innovation. Until recently, mayors viewed organised crime
control as the responsibility of law enforcement agencies. The Giuliani administra-
tion accepted responsibility for cleaning up racketeer-ridden industries, arguing
that they impeded the city’s growth and prosperity. The city’s regulatory initiatives
have significantly expanded the repertoire of organized-crime control strategies
(Jacobs, Friel & Radick, 1999).
The Giuliani administration introduced screening procedures and licensing systems
to end the power positions that five Italian-American crime syndicates had built
up in several legitimate economic sectors in the city. The applicant had to be
screened to obtain a licence, and if any connections to organised crimewere found,
the licence was refused. A similar pre-qualification procedure was used to prevent
building contracts from being given to Mafia-controlled construction firms.
Dutch police and justice officials where introduced to theNewYork approach
to organised crime at the Dutch-American Conference on Organised Crime
in The Hague in 1990. According to its organisers, this conference caused a
major turnaround in Dutch thinking about combating organised crime (Fijnaut
& Jacobs, 1991). During the conference, policy-makers became convinced that
this type of crime could also be tackled by an administrative approach (Fijnaut,
2002).
Not only was it this conference but also the rise – and assassination – of
the first ‘Godfather’ of Dutch organised crime, Klaas Bruinsma, that led to
a white report from the Dutch Minister of Justice on organised crime and its
containment (Ministry of Justice, 1992-1993). The report addressed the risk
of the infiltration of criminal organisations into legitimate sectors of Dutch
society, such as branches of industry and local administration. The report stated
that administrative authorities should not cooperatewith this infiltration, and
that they had a responsibility in the prevention of organised crime. However,
the report did not provide administrative authorities with any tools to adhere
to this responsibility. It was the Dutch Ministry for Internal Affairs that com-
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missioned a study into the extent to which certain public regulations could
be equipped with grounds for refusal so that the abuse of these regulations
by criminals could be prevented (Struiksma, 1994).29
The awareness of the problem of organised crime and the increase in
unregulated investigationmethods applied by the Dutch police led to a parlia-
mentary inquiry in 1995. To assess the threat of organised crime and its inter-
lacing with legitimate society, the inquiry committee commissioned four
leading criminologists to study the nature and the scale of organised crime
in the Netherlands (Fijnaut, 1998). This study partly focused on its prevalence
in four cities – among which the capital city of Amsterdam – and several
branches of industry. The selection of branches was clearly inspired by Ameri-
can examples: car sales, transport, seaports and airports, waste management,
construction, and the catering business. Based on the findings of this study,
the parliamentary inquiry committee also stressed the importance of admin-
istrative prevention, and it called for regulation of the exchange of criminal
intelligence between law enforcement agencies and public administration, as
well as the possibility to refuse and withdraw licences, grants, and public
contracts on grounds of suspicions of connectionswith criminal activities (PEO,
1996).
The conclusions and recommendations of the parliamentary committee
led to the development of administrative responses to organised crime on two
levels: national, for which the BIBOB Act was drafted, and local, for which city
administrations set up their own action plans.
The goal of the BIBOB Act – which came into effect in 2003 – is to provide
administrative authorities with tools to prevent the facilitation of organised
crime.30 The BIBOB Act allows the refusal or withdrawal of licences and sub-
sidies and the refusal of participation in public tenders or contracts. This is
applicable if there is a serious risk that the favourable decision will also be
used to utilise any benefits that have been or are to be gained through criminal
acts and that have a financial value, or that it will be used to commit criminal
acts. Administrative authorities decide on the refusal or withdrawal after
asking advice from the national BIBOB bureau located at theMinistry of Justice,
which conducts the risk assessment by using confidential data. The application
of the BIBOB Act is limited to a selection of branches of industry, in which one
recognises those branches assessed before the parliamentary inquiry: the hotel
and catering industry, brothels, construction, transport, andwastemanagement.
While the BIBOB Act was being drafted, several initiatives on the local level
were taken. Border towns in particular, such as Venlo, Almelo, andMaastricht,
29 This study was appropriately titled ‘Gewapend Bestuursrecht’, which can be translated
as ‘Armoured Administrative Law.’
30 BIBOB is an abbreviation that stands for Bevordering Integere Besluitvorming Overheidsbeslissin-
gen, which is translated as ‘Law for the promotion of integrity assessments by the Public
Administration’, 216 Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees (2003).
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embraced the idea of taking administrativemeasures against organised crime
problems related to the cross-border ‘drug-tourism’ that is attracted by the
lenient drug policy in the Netherlands. A local project that even received
international recognition as being a best-practice in the prevention of organised
crime was the Van Traa project in Amsterdam.31
The outcome of the study by the parliamentary research group on the
organised crime problem in Amsterdam was the immediate cause for the
administrative approach. The conclusions came as a shock: Amsterdam is a
‘centre’ of both national and international organised crime, and both foreign
groups and native criminal groups, have – mainly in the inner city districts
and especially in the Red Light district– built up economic positions of power
in the hotel and catering sector, the gambling sector, the prostitution business,
and the property sector. Furthermore, it was noted that criminal entrepreneurs
set the boundaries within which the city administration and the police can
still freely operate, and this has apparently occurred without local authorities
having taken the necessary measures to prevent it (PEO, 1996).
A consequence of these findings was that the city of Amsterdam, as an
administrative authority, decided to develop a policy to prevent the facilitation
of organised crime. In 1997, a Red Light District manager was appointed at
the request of the city council with the objective to improve the prevention
of organised crime in the Red Light District. The manager and his team were
asked to develop amethodology for the administrative approach to organised
crime. Since 2000, this methodology has also been used in other city districts
and in specific economic branches. The project was renamed the Van Traa
project, after the aforementioned late chair of the parliamentary committee
(Fijnaut, 1998). After an experimental phase, the Van Traa approach has been
implemented as a regular policy of the city administration (Huisman, 2005).
Themethodology developed in the Van Traa project hasmany similarities
to the BIBOB tool: (1) it provides for a screening by assessing data from several
sources, including confidential data from the police and the tax department;
(2) the outcomes are used to take administrativemeasures; and (3) the applica-
tion of this methodology is also limited to selected areas and sectors in which
a vulnerability to organised crime influences is suspected. However, differences
exist as well. First, the Van Traa approach is more integrated. Different
agencies work together, and so a wider range of measures can be taken; these
vary from the refusal or withdrawal of licences and permits, the levying of
taxes, the closure of certain establishments, to the instigation of a criminal
investigation, and, under certain circumstances, the acquisition of real estate
by the city itself, all in order to prevent criminals from investing their money
in specific objects. Second, it has a more pro-active nature. While the BIBOB
instrument is used when there are specific indications of organised crime
31 Council of Europe, ‘Preventive Legal Measures against Organized Crime- Organized Crime –
Best Practice Survey n°9’ (Strasbourg: 2003) PC-S-CO (2003) 3 E.
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connections in individual cases, in the Van Traa approach, all businesses and
persons in selected areas can be subjected to screening, regardless of whether
there are previous indications of such connections (Huisman, 2005).
A central premise of both the BIBOB Act and the Van Traa project is that
services or facilities of the public administration can be exploited to carry out
criminal activities or to invest illegally acquired capital. When criminal
organisations can be excluded from public contracts or from receiving subsidies
or licences for certain activities, the investment of criminal capital and the
infiltration of the legal economic sectors will be to a large extent hindered.
For this purpose, administrative bodies have become involved in combating
a form of crime that previously had been the sole reserve of the police and
the judiciary. Therefore, this approach can be seen in the light of both respons-
ibilisation and situational crime prevention strategies.
4.1 Defining the crime problem
Although serious organised crime problems were the immediate reason for
introducing both the Van Traa project and the BIBOB Act, the application of
the latter is not limited to organised crime. The goal of the BIBOB Act is to fight
organised crime, but its tools are applicable to the broader notion of ‘criminal
activities’. And although its reach is limited to economic sectors that are
vulnerable to forms of organised crime, in the operationalisation of this vulner-
ability, the explanatory memorandum of the Act states that this not only
involves sectors where organised crime interference has already been observed
but also those that fulfil certain criteria that indicate a vulnerability to crime
in general. This means that the BIBOB Act is initially aimed at organised crime,
yet not to the exclusion of other crime (van der Schoot, 2006). However, the
legislator did not want the application of the BIBOB Act to be open-ended.
Therefore, it aligned itself with the view of the parliamentary research team
on organised crime, which listed as the most vulnerable sectors transport,
waste disposal, construction, hotels and catering, and coffee shops. The
research team based this selection partly on hypothetical criteria for the vulner-
ability of sectors to crime and partly on experiences abroad, particularly in
the US. In addition to this justification of the selected branches, the team
explicitly stated that other branches might have been selected, given other
criteria (Fijnaut, 1998). Furthermore, no indications of organised crime were
found in several of the investigated branches. This has led Van der Schoot
to the conclusion that the basis for the selection is not as solid as it is probably
assumed to be (van der Schoot, 2006). Moreover, the evaluation study report
regarding the application of the BIBOB Act calls for a re-examination of the
criteria for the selection of sectors that fall within the scope of the BIBOB Act.
The result of the selection is that branches of industry in which no clear
indications of organised crime influences were found are brought within the
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reach of instruments that have been designed to fight organised crime. This
also means that these sectors are publicly related to organised crime. In fact,
if the BIBOB instrument had been restricted to the sectors in which penetration
of organised crime was actually observed, the instrument could have been
applied only to the hotel and catering industry, including the involved real
estate. Nevertheless, a survey among all administrative authorities that can
make use of the BIBOB Act found that 24 percent are in favour of expanding
the scope of the BIBOB Act to new sectors, such as public phone booths, employ-
ment agencies, and real estate transactions (de Voogd, Doornbos & Huntjes,
2007).
To conclude, it is plausible that the BIBOB Act has a net-widening effect
and, as a result, a de facto criminalisation effect. The same tendency not to
limit the application of an instrument that aims to prevent organised crime
to situations where its influences are actually observed can be identified in
the Van Traa approach. In the formulation of the target of the Van Traa-project
in official documents, the term ‘organised’ was usually placed between
brackets. According to a statement by the mayor and aldermen during the
presentation of the project plan for the Red Light district to the city council,
this was a deliberate choice.
‘The administrative approach to (organised) crime is aiming at a broader
spectrum: the prevention or repression of crime, excluding high volume crime’.
… For this reason, the word ‘organised’ will always be put between brackets.’
(B&W, 1998).
As a result, the target and limits of the project were not clear and so created
the risk of net-widening. Andwhile the Dutch legislator formulated – although
questionably – criteria for the selection of sectors subject to the BIBOB instru-
ment, no such criteria were formulated in the Van Traa project, thus creating
an even greater risk of net-widening. As a result, the connections to organised
crime remained unclear in some of the selected areas and sectors. And in the
end, no such organised crime was found. (Huisman, 2005).
There are also other reasons that the administrative approach to organised
crime has a net- widening effect. The approach is not aimed at the core activ-
ities of organised crime as it manifests in the Netherlands: the trafficking of
illegal goods and services (Kleemans, 2007). This trafficking occurs in illegal
markets that are not regulated by formal laws. Instead, the approach is aimed
at the interfaces between organised crime and the legitimate environment that
provides services that facilitate criminal activities. This means that the approach
is expanding the struggle of organised crime against this legitimate environ-
ment. Actors from this legitimate environment were theoretically already
subject to criminal investigation, but these white-collar relations to organised
crime were given a low priority in criminal policy (van de Bunt & Huisman,
2007). This has changed through the application of the administrative approach
to organised crime.
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Becausewhole economic sectors are subjected to preventivemeasures such
as BIBOB screening, entrepreneurs in these branches feel criminalised (Huisman,
2005). Entrepreneurs in the Red Light District in Amsterdam even banded
together to publish a half-page ad in the local newspaper complaining about
the proportionality of the administrative measures taken to fight organised
crime and about their sense of being criminalised.32
Interestingly, some of the entrepreneurs who feel criminalised by the BIBOB
and the Van Traa approach work in sectors that have recently been
decriminalised in Dutch criminal policy: namely, prostitution in licensed
brothels and the coffee shops in which consumer quantities of marihuana and
hashish are sold. The intention of this decriminalisation and of the regulation
of these former illegal activities was to deprive organised crime of illegal
markets, and to make these markets accessible to legitimate entrepreneurs
(Brants, 1998). However, in recent policy plans of the city administration of
Amsterdam, based on the reports of the Van Traa team, these branches are
labelled as ‘criminogenic’ and are seen as part of a ‘criminal infrastructure’
that, therefore, has to be suppressed. From a criminological point of view, it
could be naïve to think that legalising markets that have traditionally been
vulnerable to organised crimewould render them crime-free after legalisation
(Naylor, 2007). On the contrary, it could be expected that organised criminals
would transform their business from vices – providing goods and services
in illegal markets – to racketeering – illegally exploiting legitimate markets –
as they are familiar with these markets. Therefore, the analysis of the Van Traa
teammakes sense. However, it is also understandable that entrepreneurswho
were attracted by the city administration’s search for bona fide businessmen,
or thosewho took the chance to blot out the stains of illegitimacy, feel betrayed
by the shift in policy.
In addition, the policy theory of the Van Traa project assumes that run-
down neighbourhoods and marginal economic sectors are breeding grounds
for organised crime. Although this assumption is hardly affirmed by empirical
research, theoretically connecting these neighbourhoods and branches to
organised crime also creates a net-widening effect (Huisman & Nelen, 2007).
Situations and activities that had previously been qualified as ‘marginal’,
‘irregular’, or ‘non-compliant’ are suddenly connected to organised crime. And
they are subjected to far-reaching screening and crime-control measures when
the Van Traa team targets such a neighbourhood or sector for action. And
again, a self-fulfilling prophecy of this de facto criminalisation can be identi-
fied. While one of the goals of the project is to up-scale the selected run-down
neighbourhoods and the marginal economic activities, the media attention
that is – often deliberately – generated by the start of such projects underlines
the dubious reputation of these neighbourhoods or sectors. This leaves the
32 Het Parool (October 6, 2007).
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remaining legitimate entrepreneurs feeling stigmatised and it discourages bona
fide businesses from investing (Huisman, 2007).
4.2 Administrative measures and the execution of criminal justice
The administrative approach to organised crime is a clear example of a re-
sponsibilisation strategy. Administrative authorities are called upon to safe-
guard their integrity by not facilitating criminal activities, thereby – in close
cooperation with other actors – contributing to the combat against organised
crime. This means that the administrative approach should be seen as an
addition to the more traditional criminal law approach. However, the evalu-
ation of the Van Traa project in Amsterdam showed that the judicial authorities
actually used the administrative approach as an alternative to criminal law
enforcement (Huisman, 2007). Cases that were dealt with unsuccessfully by
the police were handed over to the Van Traa team. To a certain degree, the
administrative approach became a panacea for various regulatory problems.
The evaluation of the administrative approach to organised crime illustrates
that responsibilisation is not an easy process. The common interest in fighting
organised crime that is assumed to be present is not experienced by all actors
involved (van der Schoot, 2006). In Amsterdam, the establishment of a special
team responsible for the new approach became an excuse for other agencies
to be less active and aware (Huisman, 2007). A recent evaluation of the applica-
tion of the BIBOB Act still showed that a large percentage of administrative
authorities were reluctant to apply it (de Voogd, 2007).
Furthermore, while the administrative approach is presented as an addition
to criminal law, the success of its application is largely dependent upon
criminal intelligence. The evaluation of the Van Traa project demonstrated
that although the team had the authority to match city administration data
with criminal intelligence, an assessment of the risk of facilitating organised
crime proved to be very difficult. When can indications of money laundering
or other organised crime-related activities be inferred from an overview of
property, leasing and letting, and the financing and exploitation of properties?
It was anticipated that the analysis of databases managed by the city admin-
istration (for instance, the land register) would provide a first assessment of
risks of organised crime-related activities. However, the format and structure
of these databases give only limited insight into the actual property relations.
It was usually information from the police and judiciary concerning the person
involved that was decisive in determining whether an organised crime case
could be assumed. An analysis of the BIBOB cases that have been brought to
court gives the same impression: Criminal intelligence is crucial for assessing
serious risk. Therefore, the result of administrative analysis relies to a great
extent on the availability of criminal information. Administrative authorities
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are unable to check the origin and reliability of this information, but they do
have to act on the basis of it (Huisman, 2007).
Partly as a result of this dependency and partly because of the limitations
of criminal justice to diminish opportunities for criminal opportunities, the
Council of Chiefs of Police decided to introduce an ‘administrative file’ in large
criminal investigations. In such a file, all data that is not directly relevant to
a criminal conviction, but that could be relevant to the making of the decision
to take administrative measures, are stored. After the closure of the investiga-
tion, this file is handed over to administrative authorities for follow-up actions
(Nauta & van Soomeren, 2006).
Due to this dependency upon criminal intelligence and the refocus of
criminal investigation for the benefit of administrativemeasures, the distinction
is blurring between administrative law and criminal law in their fight against
organised crime. Although the impact of an administrative measure can be
quite harsh (e.g. losing a licence and thus being out of business), the person
subjected to such a measure does not enjoy the same rights as a suspect in
a criminal trial. For instance, the principle of presumption of innocence does
not apply to administrative law, and therefore a criminal suspicion is sufficient
to assume there is a serious risk for criminal activity. Moreover, the BIBOB Act
limits the possibilities to receive information about reasons for the refusal or
withdrawal of licences when this is confidential (Bitter & Veldhuis, 2006). For
these reasons, legal scholars argue that a BIBOB decision should be equal to
a criminal charge in the sense of Article 6 of the European Treaty of Human
Rights (de Voogd, 2007: van den Berg & Heijnen, 2007). The first case was
recently brought before the European Court of Human Rights.
Although in administrative law the burden of proof is much lower than
in criminal law, efficiency reasons do not seem to be part of the motivation
for the application of an administrative approach. Rather, the principles of
not facilitating criminal activities and the responsibilisation to contribute in
the fight against organised crime are the primary motivations. However, it
is interesting to see what effects the administrative approach could have on
the efficiency of the administration of justice.
It is difficult to assess whether the administrative approach has a ‘staying
out of court’ effect, since that was not one of its aims. On the one hand, such
an effect could be predicted. In contrast to Dutch criminal law, in Dutch
administrative law no judge is needed to issue a measure or a sanction. This
would reduce the number of court cases when suspicions of organised crime
connections are not dealt with by criminal law but by using administrative
measures. After all, an administrative authority does not have to initiate court
proceedings to obtain approval to impose a measure. On the other hand,
appeal procedures are open to the decision to issue such measures and fines:
in the first instance, to the administrative authority that took the decision, and
in the second instance, to the administrative court and finally to the Council
of State. However, up until September 2007 only twenty BIBOB cases had been
46 Chapter 2
brought to court. In all of these cases, the contested decision of the administrat-
ive authority was confirmed.33
The administrative approach might not have led to an increase in formal
court procedures, though it did generate efficiency costs in the form of
increased bureaucracy. Screening and auditing instruments inevitably lead
to more bureaucracy. This was also observed by Anechiarico and Jacobs in
New York City (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996). They concluded that all instru-
ments installed to safeguard the integrity of government operations had serious
downsides in the form of costly inefficiencies. The evaluation study of the
application of the BIBOB Act points to a considerable increase in the admin-
istrative burden due to extra paperwork that requires additional manpower
and that also leads to longer periods needed for decision making (de Voogd,
2007). In Amsterdam, the collection and analysis of data relevant to taking
administrative measures proved to be highly time-consuming. As a result,
in some projects the participants seldom got round to actually takingmeasures
(Huisman, 2007).
Perhaps because of this administrative burden the number of BIBOB cases
fell short of expectations. Before the Act came into force, it was expected that
500 cases annually would be brought to the central BIBOB bureau. However,
in the first three years, only 193 cases were filed (de Voogd, 2007). Perhaps
because of this the application of the administrative approach has not resulted
in many cases being brought before the administrative courts.
5 CONCLUSION
The administrative measures discussed above have been introduced as instru-
ments for tackling deviant behaviourwithout applying criminal law.Neverthe-
less, these recent reforms and policy proposals can have unexpected and
paradoxical consequences.
The objectives of the administrativemeasures reviewed are different from
the outcomes. The primary principle of the introduction of the ASBO was to
protect those people in society who are most vulnerable to the effects of human
disorderly behaviour. The objective of the administrative approach seems to
be twofold: on the one hand, the principle aim is to protect the integrity of
the public administration by preventing the facilitation of organised crime;
on the other hand, it is because of this prevention that the administrative
approach is also being presented as a tool for combating organised crime.
Another objective of both instruments is themobilisation of administrative
authorities in order to take preventive measures. Although administrative
approaches to crime are officially sold as preventative strategies, they appear
33 <http://justitie.nl/onderwerpen/criminaliteit/BIBOB/wet-BIBOB/Jurisprudentie/>
(accessed 2 February 2008).
Administrative measures in crime control 47
to have a repressive side. Measures are individualised and are based on
information (suspicions of) regarding previous behaviour. The consequences
of these administrative measures can also be more far-reaching than those of
criminal sanctions, while the safeguards of due process are considerably less
so. In 2004, the Commissioner for Human Rights, A. Gil-Robes, expressed
concern about ASBO practice34 (Koffman, 2006). Furthermore, Dutch legal
scholars have predicted that the BIBOB measure will be viewed as being equal
to a criminal charge, and that as a result the procedural rights of criminal law
should apply. However, the first case still has to be brought before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.
Rather than being autonomous instruments of crime control, the admin-
istrative measures discussed in this paper should be viewed as an extension
of criminal justice. The British ASBO and the Dutch restraining order are re-
spectively a civil and an administrative order, but to breach either one is a
criminal offence. And although the application of the BIBOB tool is an admin-
istrative decision, the motivation is strongly dependent upon data obtained
by means of a criminal investigation.
The ideas behind ASBO and BIBOB legislation appear popular across nations.
Moreover, many similarities in political rhetoric can be identified. In the case
of anti-social behaviour, run-down neighbourhoods and irregular or marginal
economic activities are automatically linked – with little debate – to criminal
behaviour. However, a direct causal relationship is difficult to identify. More-
over, the empirical sturdiness of this assumption and the effectiveness of
administrative measures on organised crime or antisocial behaviour have yet
to be tested.35 Therefore, it is striking that the newly developed administrative
approach to organised crime is being sold as a success internationally, and
just as easily as was the British ASBO measure.
Furthermore, the definition of behaviour, activities, and situations that the
measures aim to counteract is often vague, which can lead to a net-deepening
and a net-widening of the law. In addition to these problems, in the UK the
trend of staying out of court has resulted in certain paradoxical situations.
Dutch politicians are also eager to stress that new administrative measures
are necessary to fight the problems of inner city areas because existing tactics
are not sufficient. These measures will increase the power of the state in
controlling the public domain as well. In the end, one might wonder whether
34 A. Gil-Robes, the Commissioner for Human Rights, strongly criticised the anti-social
behaviour strategy of the British government (Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, on his visit to the United Kingdom, 4th-12th November 2004,
The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe, 8 June 2005, pp.
34-37 He was especially concerned about the use of the ASBO for children
35 ASBOs appear to become less popular in England. Recent Home office figures for 2006
show a drop in ASBOs issued by a third. (Home Office, May 2008) available at http://
rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/horrpubs.html.
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this form of crime prevention is a Trojan horse, in the sense that the new
measures increasingly criminalise what can be seen as everyday behaviour.
Political discourse

3 The war on street terror. Why tackle
anti-social behaviour?
Abstract
This article examines the rationales of Dutch politicians for tackling the per-
ceived pressing problem of anti-social behaviour (ASB) and the question did
they copy the British approach? The first part will describe in short the concept
of policy transfer and the recent British fight against ASB. The focus will be
on the introduction of the Anti-social Behaviour Order.
The second part is an empirical study into the Dutch retreat from condoning
ASB, consisting of interviews with Dutch politicians focusing on their ideas
for tackling ASB. Those are compared with the British’s rationales. This kind
of comparative elite ethnography is not common in criminology, but this article
aims at providing evidence of its benefits. By answering the research question
an insight into the origins of policy in the sphere of criminal justice can be
obtained.
1 INTRODUCTION
On September 14, 2008 the problem of anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB)
became front-page news in the Netherlands. In Gouda1 several bus drivers
refused to drive through a certain neighbourhood any longer, because of the
ASB they encountered on their daily rounds. Especially youngMoroccanswere
accused of terrorising the public transport routes. Their ASB in the form of
yelling, spitting at other passengers and intimidating the bus drivers was no
longer tolerated. The situation escalated when television journalists were
threatened by the youngsters. A Dutch politician claimed the neighbourhood
had turned into a no-go area.2
As a result an emergency debate in Dutch parliament on the problem of
ASB was called. During the heated political discussion, nuisance in the public
Published: Koemans, M.L. (2010). The war on ’street terror’. Why tackle anti-social be-
haviour? Crime, Law & Social Change, 53(5), 477-491.
1 A small city of 70.845 inhabitants (www.gouda.nl).
2 MP Mark Rutte in De Telegraaf (October 3, 2008).
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domain3 was labelled an ‘acute problem’ that pressed for ‘a quick and harsh
response’. ThisGouda-debate generated some remarkablemedia quotes; ‘ASO-
terror damages public transport’, ‘Send the army’, ‘tough actions needed
against street terror’, ‘tackle street terror today, not tomorrow’, and ‘anti-social
behaviour wreaks serious havoc in many Dutch cities’.4 Although the per-
ceived problem of ASB by Moroccan youth has been on the Dutch societal
agenda for the last six to eight years, now (after recent incidents like Gouda)
it appears more acute.
Of course ASB is hardly a new phenomenon (VanWeringh, 1978; Ramsay,
2008). Twenty years ago nuisance in the public domain was a reality as well.
But in those days, the byword was to condone (turning a blind eye) (Devroe,
2008). But nowadays ASB has become a major policy preoccupation and it is
directly connected to the problems of young immigrants fromMorocco (Punch,
2005). For many Dutch politicians it is now self-evident that the government
should act firm against ASB (Pakes, 2005; Van Stokkom, 2007; Van Swaaningen,
2008; Koemans, 2008).
In this article the Dutch retreat from condoning ASB is examined by identi-
fying the underlying principles offered by politicians for tackling this kind
of behaviour. These Dutch rationales are compared to the British ones.
First stage of the empirical study consists of a content analysis of British
and Dutch key government and parliamentary documents (debates, votes,
reports).5 In order to produce a brief narrative of the process of policymaking,
the focus will be on the development of the Anti-social Behaviour Order
(henceforth ASBO). The ASBO as a case study is an easy choice because of its
political attraction. Dutch politicians often cite this English measure and refer
to the ASBO as a recipe for success (Huisman & Koemans, 2008). It will be
interesting to find out why the ASBO is so appealing for Dutch politicians.
The second stage consists of a series of interviews with key participants
in the policy process.6 The actors involved are Dutch elected officials, Dutch
spokesman of political parties and British andDutch civil servants. TheDutch
political landscape is quite diverse. In total eleven different political parties
are represented in parliament. Interviews were conducted with the nine
biggest. Furthermore four members of city councils of Amsterdam and
3 Both anti-social behaviour and nuisance in the public domain are contested concepts.
Defining what is currently meant by them is not straightforward and is context-specific.
In this article the concepts refer to persistent, un-acceptable non-criminal orminor criminal
behaviour of young people in a public order context.
4 Debate on the 25th of September 2008, after incidents of anti-social behaviour in the city
of Gouda lead to widespread public outcry (AD, Telegraaf, NRC).
5 Key documents are those papers that concern the tackling of ASB after the publication of
the Dutch government paper To a safer society (2002). This document has been chosen as
a point of departure because as also Pakes (2004) argues, this appears the formal beginning
of the tougher approach on ASB.
6 The research has been conducted from July till November 2008.
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Rotterdam and five high ranking policymakers were interviewed.7 The inter-
views resulted in rich first hand-accounts of the Dutch policy process and of
the perceptions of key actors.8 Why is this kind of elite comparative ethno-
graphy useful for the study of policymaking in the sphere of criminal justice?
2 POLICY IN THE MAKING
There are different macro views on the international component of the origins
of crime policies. Some scholars stress the differences in policy interventions
between countries (Tonry, 1999; Melossi, 2004). A strong theme within this
body of work is the focus upon the so-called American distinctiveness in the
area of crime control (Jones & Newburn, 2007). One of the limitations of this
approach is that some highly important globalising effects in policy making
are overlooked.
On the other hand, there is a substantial body of academic work that
stresses the similarities of criminal justice policies (Ericson, 2007; Edwards &
Hughes, 2005; Furedi, 2005; Garland, 2001; Hudson, 2003; Pieterman, 2008).
These academic works argue that the spread of democratic institutions and
parallel social and economic forces have shaped related public policies. They
highlight the emergence of a common risk society or a Culture of Control.
To illustrate, Garland (2001) argues that crime policies in the UK and USA have
become increasingly similar.
Indeed there is much in the Western cultures of control that appears to
be in common. But again there are limitations to these studies.9 In general
there is a tendency to overemphasize the trends that confirm this thesis and
to downplay divergent developments.
The point of this article is not to deny a general trend of a culture of control
or to suggest that differences between countries do not exist. This study does
not focus on identifying macro developments. It aims at providing an addi-
tional perspective by means of exploring the process of policymaking on a
meso-level.10
Policy represents the outcome of a complex set of processes. It is acknowl-
edged that copying or (consciously) overlooking polices from abroad is part
of this. But the significance of individual decisions and actions of political
actors in this process is often underrated. That is why in this article their views
will be studied.
7 In general I was successful in gaining access to senior politicians and policy-makers.
Nonetheless at their request, their quotes have been impersonalized.
8 In total N = 18.
9 Most writers are aware of the problems of a broad perspective but aimed at understanding
macro trends in penal policy (Jones & Newburn, 2007).
10 In this article the meso-level concerns the role of political actors in the policy make-up of
their countries crime policies.
54 Chapter 3
The concept of policy transfer can be useful in this study because it concerns
individual political decisions. Policy transfer is defined as a process by which
knowledge of policies, administrative measures, institutions and ideas in one
political system, are consciously used in the development of policies, admin-
istrative measures, institutions and ideas in another political system (Dolowitz,
2003).
It is interesting to see whether policy transfer between the UK and the
Netherlands has taken place or not. Thereby establishing a difference between
soft transfer (including ideas, concepts, lessons and attitudes) and hard transfer
(including actual policy instruments and legislation) (Evans, 2004).
Of course with this approach there are limitations as well. For example
overemphasizing the degree of individual rationality in policymaking process.
The respondents can be rationalising their choices after they were made, but
during the process of policymaking they perhapswere less conscious of them.
Furthermore it is difficult to separate external influences from domestic
policy developments and external examples can simply serve to confirm an
already decided approach. Pollitt (2001) points out that labels are frequently
borrowed (because of their legitimating power) but in actual action, policy
can differ. And there is a tendency of exaggerated claims, assumed from
similarities in policy rhetoric. Therefore it is important to look for evidence
of non-transfer as well.
3 ENGLISH MEASURES AND RATIONALES IN SHORT
In 1998 the ASBO was introduced in England and Wales.11 The then Prime
minister, Tony Blair, stated that if traditional criminal law processes in cases
of antisocial behaviour continued to abide, the rights of victims would be
allowed to be routinely trampled upon and would leave courts fighting 21st
century crime with 20th century methods. He claimed that the use of control
orders was the best available means for protecting the public from ASB.12
ASBOs have a minimum duration of two years, can last indefinitely, and
contain prohibitions considered necessary to prevent the repetition of a per-
son’s anti-social behaviour (Brown, 2004). In the law, the conduct is defined
as ‘behaviour which caused or was likely to cause alarm, harassment, or
distress to one or more persons not of the same household as him or herself’
(Home Office, 2008).
In most cases an acceptable behaviour contract (ABC) is issued first. It’s
a written agreement made between a person who has been involved in ASB
and their local authority/landlord or police. ABCs are not legally binding and
there does not have to be an ABC in place before an ASBO application is made
11 The crime and disorder act (1998) introduced ASBOs.
12 <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11769.asp>.
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(Home Office, 2008). Then when the agreement is breached in most cases it
can be followed up with an ASBO (Burney, 2005).
The ASBO is a civil order. Restraints of certain behaviour are imposed by
a civil court and breaching is a criminal offence (Ashworth, 2004). It is a multi
step prohibition, a civil order backed up by a criminal penalty (Crawford,
2008).13 As Millie (2008) pointed out, within a relatively short period of time,
the ASBO became in regular usage and is now part of the common lexicon.
In the UK, the government is clear on the question why ASB should be
tackled; “Anti-social behaviour ruins lives: It does not just make life un-
pleasant; it prevents the renewal of disadvantaged areas and creates an en-
vironment where more serious crime can take hold,” as can be read in several
governmental documents (Home Office, 2006).
So much is said in one sentence. Jacobson (2008) spotted three answers
in this single sentence. They argued that this alone may suggest that there
is ‘room to take a critical view of the different rationales for tackling ASB’.14
Their study combined empirical researchwith a review of policy and research
literature. They identified among others, the following rationales;
· Quality of life; ASB should be tackled because it is a serious problem that
makes people miserable and fearful.
· Broken windows rationale; ASB should be tackled because if left unattended,
it leads to serious crime.
· Regeneration rationale; action on ASB should contribute to the social and
economic regeneration of local areas.
These British findings formed the starting point of this study. By comparing
the English rationales with the underlying reasons of Dutch politicians it will
become clear whether policy transfer has taken place or not.
4 DUTCH MEASURES
Recently, as was described in the introduction, Dutch authorities have stepped
up their focus of attention for the problem of ASB. Nuisance in the public
domain is coupled with war rhetoric and addressed with strong measures.
But not so long ago the Dutch were famous for crime policies with a strong
social-character (Punch, 2005b). This was combinedwith the earliermentioned
13 The two-step prohibition structure can be placed in the tradition of the Statutory Nuisance
Abatement Notice. It dates back into the 19th Century and would have been a familiar
power to the local housingmanagers who invented the original proposal for the Community
Safety Order (Ramsay, 2008).
14 Page 37.
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Dutch practice of condoning (gedogen) also defined as regulated tolerance
(Brants, 1999; Buruma, 2007).
But this history of tolerance was one of the first in 21-st century Europe
to collide with the on-street realities of young Muslim immigrants (Vinocur,
2008). In particular around the rise of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn in
2001 there was an increasingly critical public reaction towards this idea of
regulated tolerance especially towards young Muslims (Pakes, 2004). The
general view was that gedogen had gone too far and that authority has lost
authority (Punch, 2005a).
The Dutch government reacted with the publication of the paper To a safer
society (Ministry of BZK, 2002). This document appears as also Pakes (2004)
argues, to be the formal beginning of the tougher approach on ASB. It was for
the first time that ASB was directly linked to crime and feelings of unsafety.
In brief, the government aimed at more police on the street, tougher enforce-
ment of existing rules and where necessary introducing new measures
(Ministry of BZK, 2002).
Later on in October 2004, the Dutch Government was further pressurized
to address the problems in the public domain. This heat developed due to
a widely publicised case in which a couple had been forced out of their house
by harassment from a group of Moroccan youths (Koemans, 2008). In short,
the couple no longer felt safe in theDiamantbuurt in Amsterdam because they
were tormented and called all sorts of names by these youngsters (Van
Stokkom, 2007; Van Swaaningen, 2008). The group had ended up throwing
stones through the couple’s window, and the two moved out of the area. In
a reaction several politicians called for tougher measures to tackle street
terror.15 The Minister for Justice considered adopting the ASBO, but after
counter-advise from the chief prosecutor the Minister decided against it
(Burney, 2005). In stead the later discussed ABC-pilot in Rotterdam was intro-
duced.
In 2007 after more incidents of ASB by young Moroccans,16 discussions
in the Dutch parliament of addressing ASB were rekindled. In June of that year,
two chairpersons representing local boroughs in Amsterdam17 suggested
introducing the ASBO in the Netherlands. They stated that in the UK it was
successful in reducing ASB in inner-city areas. “The ASBO helps in the fight
against young people terrorising the streets, before criminal law comes into
the picture,” said local council chairman Arco Verburg.18 He referred to the
15 0405tkkvr381. Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004-2005 (vraag 381).
16 In Amsterdam neighbourhoods (Slovervaart) in Utrecht (Kanaleneiland) and the Hague
(Transvaal).
17 Resp. Slovervaart and de Baarsjes.
18 <http://www.nicis.nl/nicis/dossiers/Zorgenwelzijn/Jeugdzorg/verrijktdossier/
Jongerenoverlast_1132.html> (accessed May 30 2008).
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new British laws ‘as the best way to respond to problems in the public
domain’.19
In the last three years, there have been several pilots in Rotterdam,Utrecht
and Amsterdam copying the ideas of the ASBO. For example the ABC-project
in Rotterdam called, knock off .20 This pilot was based, just like the ASBO, on
a multi step approach. The first is an intervention in the form of a contract,
issued by a welfare officer or street warden (stadsmarinier) and signed on a
voluntary basis by the problemmaker. When the contract is breached, an order
is issued by the mayor. As soon as this order is violated the culprit will be
brought before a criminal court. This is in line with the already existing article
184 Sr (criminal code) that prescribes ignoring an official order constitutes a
criminal offence andmay lead to a penal sanction. During one case in the pilot,
a police court judge issued a fine, because a youngster breached a restraining
order.21 The ASBO was a direct inspiration for this pilot, as can be read in
the evaluation report.22 Some high ranking policymakers traveled to the UK
and visited the Home Office to get information on the ASBO.
In addition to this pilot, the Dutch government is preparing to enact new
administrative legislation that provides local authorities with more legal
instruments (often called administrative sanctions) to react to and prevent ASB
(Lippens, 2008). For instance there is a new law in the making; titled severe
anti-social behaviour that in many ways is similar to the ASBO.23 The proposed
law24 gives more power to local authorities. Mayors can issue restraining
orders to people who have displayed anti-social behaviour without the inter-
ference of a judge and for a longer period of time than the current law allows.
This new law is designed so that the mayor can act quickly when he
considers the ASB to be a serious problem. A precise definition of ASB is not
given in the proposal, but it declares that the behaviour should be persistent
and grave. Information on the case can come from partners in the judicial
system, like the police, but also from administrative authorities, like social
services and the local Department of Education. The restraining order can be
issued for a year and must be revised every three months.25 If the order is
19 As stated in the Volkskrant (June 13, 2007).
20 Translated as ff kappe.
21 The evaluation rapport concluded that the effects of the Pilot could not bemeasured. (Letter
to parliament Evaluatie Doe-Normaal pilot, Ministerie van Justitie and Minister van BZK,
(5554663/08)).
22 See notes in the Letter to parliament Evaluatie Doe-Normaal pilot, Ministry of Justice and
the Home Office (5554663/08).
23 Others are, the ‘minor nuisance at municipal level act’ (still in draft), (Albers, 2006) and
‘the public prosecution service settlement act’ (Devroe, 2008).
24 Official title in Dutch; Maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast
(31 467).
25 Or one can be ordered to report at certain times.
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breached, it becomes a criminal act (on the basis of the already existing article
184 Sr) and the case can be brought before a criminal court.26
Although the ASBOs are measures under civil law (with a local judge issuing
the order) and the Dutch proposal is based within administrative law (mayor
can issue order), the ideas behind it are very similar. Like the English counter-
part this proposed Dutch law is a multi-stage approach, containing of two
different elements (contract and order). Furthermore, breaches of the orders
constitute a criminal offence andmay lead to penal sanctions (including prison
sentences).
In the Netherlands, mayors have more power in this respect than their
British counterparts. According to current law, they can also issue restraining
orders, but with the new law they can prolong this period and couple it to
a duty to report. In addition, the public prosecutor has more authority as
well.27
So one can conclude by the measures taken that the English approach
appears enormously attractive for Dutch politicians. Although this is not
entirely a one-way traffic. In Britain the earlier discussed Dutch-style street
wardens were copied (Burney, 2005). But still the attraction is for the most
part one-sided. Especially the ASBO is seductive. This is remarkable because
British scholars regularly criticise the ASBO (Hirsch & Simester, 2006; Garret,
2006). For instance, it has been condemned for potentially criminalising more
day-to-day behaviour (the so called net-widening effect) (Brown, 2004; Hudson,
2003; Ashworth, 2004; Cobb, 2007; Donoghue, 2008). Furthermore because it
has become a so-called badge of honour. Some teenagers are proud of their cool
ASBOs (Matthews, 2007).
Tonry (2004) also criticised the ASBO sharply; ‘by making ASB into a major
social policy problem, and giving it sustained high visibility attention, Labour
has made a small problem larger’ (Tonry, 2004 p.57).
Also outside the academicworld, there is criticism (MacDonald, 2003). For
instance the European commissioner for Human rights expressed his great
concern.28 In Great Brittan ASBOs can be imposed on children as young as
ten. The European commissioner feared young children can be detained for
breaching ASBOs and can incur a criminal record without actually having
committed any recognisable offence (Bakalis, 2007; Crawford, 2008).
An other point of interest is the sharp decline in the use of ASBOs in Eng-
land and Wales in 2006 (Burney, 2009).There appears to be a growing dis-
illusion, on a political and practitioners level, with the measure.
26 A prison sentence up to three months or a fine can be the end result.
27 For example; Restraining order, duty to report, contact injunction.
28 Report byMrAlvaroGil-Robles, Commissioner forHuman Rights, on his visit to the United
Kingdom, 4th-12th November 2004, The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights,
Council of Europe, 8 June 2005, pp. 34-37.
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It will be interesting to figure out why these negative effects of the ASBO,
academic criticism and recent developments appear not to be relevant for
Dutch politicians and what the rationales are for the retreat from regulated
tolerance.
5 DUTCH POLITICAL RATIONALES
To get a picture of the underlying reasons for tackling ASB, members of parlia-
ment (MPs) and members of the city councils of Amsterdam and Rotterdam29
were interviewed. Theywere questioned on the basis of a topic list.30 Address-
ing issues like the definition of ASB, the enforcement of current and new
measures and reasons for tackling ASB. Subsequent to analysing the results,
five rationales for addressing the problem of ASB have been identified.
1. The assumed link between disorder and crime
The often cited idea by the respondents is that ASB should be tackled because
left unattended it leads to crime.Many respondents state that if minor incidents
of ASB are left untouched, disorder can provoke fear, and fear in itself helps
to create the physical and social environment inwhich real crime can develop.
When people observe that ASB is not addressed, people will feel afraid and
withdraw from public spaces; “they will not intervene when they observe
crime”, as one MP stated.
The idea of a cycle of ASB, fear and crime is often mentioned. The Broken
Window Theory is stated as the theoretical idea behind this. One of the MPs
directly referred to this theory; “The Broken Window Theory has proven that
minor nuisances in the public domain should be addressed by the government
to prevent things from getting worse”.
Other respondents, upon being asked, say they are familiar with this theory
but appear unaware that there is only a weak amount of evidence for this
effect. They often state ‘this idea is very logical’. So the Broken Window Theory
has a very intuitive appeal. In general ASB is perceived as a seedbed of a
persistent criminal career; “If politicians do not treat ASB seriously this will
definitely lead to problems in the future”.
Although some MPs state that the current arsenal of measures is enough
to address the problems, the ASBO-approach of New Labour is often (85%)
mentioned as the best way forward. One MP directly cited Labour’s vision;
‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. He claimed that; ‘We can learn
from Labour’s ideas, because they have the same problems but on a larger
29 The respondents represent various political parties, only when there are notable political
differences between the statements is this mentioned.
30 Topics on the list were; ASB definition, currentmeasures, causes of ASB, reasons for tackling
ASB, future, extent of ASB etc.
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scale. So if the ASBO works there it will definitely work here’. Four politicians
underlined the idea of the ASBO but argued that it should be coupled with
existing social policies addressing the roots of the problems.
2. Economic reasons
The general idea among the respondents is that by tackling ASB, the cycles
of economic and social decline in a neighbourhood can be reversed. Some MPs
suggest that ASB threatens house prices and discourages investment. They argue
that social disorganization and the associated lack of informal social control
can lead to a spiral of neighbourhood decline: ‘Social cohesion is declining,
that is a cause of the increasing problem of ASB’.
It is not surprising that politicians mention this reason for tackling ASB.
The economic theme is an important political issue for the current Dutch
administration; they want to turn around the so called deprived Neighbour-
hoods into better-to-do areas.31 This urban renewal project is known as the
40 districts approach.32 Over a thousand million Euro is invested to establish
this turnaround.33
The ideas of collective efficacy and its close relative the concept of social
capital are of importance here. “Peoplemust feel connected to their neighbour-
hood. Tackling ASB will help in restoring community feelings”, as a respondent
explained. The ASBO ismentioned in this context although several respondents
explicitly state that new measures for addressing ASB should be coupled with
a social approach as well.
The ideas of Robert Putman appear especially alluring for the Christen
Democrats; they often emphasize the importance of social cohesion in relation
to ASB. One MP cited from Putmans book Bowling alone (2000); “Social capital
can help to mitigate the dangerous effects of socioeconomic disadvantage”.
3. The idea of the quality of life
All respondents state that ASB is a serious problem that makes peoplemiserable
and fearful. Regardless of their political background the politicians say that
ASB makes people feel unhappy and unsafe. Quotes like ‘security is a necessity
31 Translated in Dutch as prachtwijken or Vogelaar-wijken.
32 Objectives of GSB Urban Policy Programs are
· To improve objective and perceived security
· To improve the quality of the built environment
· To improve social cohesion within society as a whole
· Bind middle and higher income groups to the cities
· Enhance the economic performance of Dutch cities see http://www.nicis.nl/kennis
centrum/binaries/nicis/bulk/publicaties/2008/10/engelstalige-factsheet-gsb3-en-kracht
wijken.pdf
33 Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 28 684, nr. 130, te vinden op <www.minbzk.nl//onderwerpen/
veiligheid/veilige-samenleving/nieuws--en/110943/kabinet-en-gemeenten>. And http://
www.nicis.nl/kenniscentrum/binaries/nicis/bulk/publicaties/2008/10/engelstalige-
factsheet-gsb3-en-krachtwijken.pdf
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of life’ and ‘ASB can make people feel threatened’ are mentioned more than
once. So ASB has to be addressed because of the unhappiness it causes. “Even
small incidents of ASB can spark a general feeling of insecurity. These incidents
have signal value,” as one respondent reacted.
Although this is generally a popular theme, someMPs question the feelings
of unsafety, suggesting that maybe the attention for ASB is increasing and not
so much the actual problem itself. And that the complaints of people are only
evidence of an increasing intolerance of young people and minorities. This
more sceptical idea is not restricted to one political party, but is mentioned
by left wing as well as right wing MPs.
4. ASB is closely linked to the problem of minorities
The politicians generally emphasize that in inner city areas mostly young
immigrants from Morocco are responsible for the nuisance in the public
domain. It cannot be a big surprise that especially far right wing parties
mentioned this problem, claiming that ‘young Moroccans make the streets
of big cities unliveable’. And that harsh measures like ‘sending them back to
Morocco’ are the best solution.
However these ideas are not restricted to conservative politicians. All
political parties link ASB in some way to the problem of minorities. A number
of the MPs argue that because of low levels of social integration young
Moroccans terrorise the streets. “Addressing their behaviour with strong
measures like restraining orders, a curfew, or behavioural contracts could break
the cycle of isolation and alienation of young immigrants”, as one respondent
suggested.
Also the respondent of one of the country’s biggest left-wing party stated
that politicians had for too long failed to acknowledge the problems of the
integration process. “We focused too long only on welfare. Now is the time
to introduce effective punishment for trouble-making young people”.
Other politicians approached this subject in a more subtle way and raised
the issue of enforcing morals. They state that concepts like responsibility,
respect and tolerance and shared understanding of what kind of behaviour
is and is not acceptable in Dutch society, should be promoted in general.
Among the different parties there is a universal belief that ASB is getting
worse by the day. And that this kind of behaviour is starting at a younger
age now, even 12-miners. “Above all, young Moroccans are a large part of
this younger group. We have to tackle their ASB with for example contracts
coupled with orders, at an early age to prevent things from getting worse.
They have to be told that this kind of behaviour is not accepted in the Nether-
lands”, as a member of the government party reasoned.
5. Legitimacy of the government
Broadly cited by politicians is the idea that ignoring the rising problem of ASB
would undermine the credibility of the government. One MP described this
62 Chapter 3
idea as follows; “ASB must be addressed, otherwise people will ask; ‘Why is
this kind of behaviour accepted? And if the police do not act, people will’”.
Different respondents refer to the ideas of Pim Fortuyn and claim that after
his murder people lost their faith in the government.34 That is why it is
believed the government has to act firmly when confronted with problems
in society. It is generally accepted among the respondents that ignoring the
problem of ASB can eventually lead to vigilantism. So tackling ASB is deemed
necessary in order to keep the confidence of the people.
Some MPs question the reasoning that Dutch citizens only want hasher
measures to address ASB. They are familiar with the results from recent
research that once people were asked what there biggest ASB concern was,
35 % stated dog dirt.35 But the MPs still thought that addressing ASB more
firmly was a right route to follow. “No harm done when making the streets
safer”, as one respondent reasoned. “ From my own experience I know that
stronger measures help”, reacted another.
Three politicians were familiar with a recent report on the effects of punish-
ment. It concluded that there was no proof for the assumption that harsher
measures will reduce levels of ASB (van Noije &Wittebrood, 2008). These MPs
stressed the importance of social policy. “The government cannot act on every
form of nuisance in the public domain. We must not create the expectations
that wewill. It is more important that the root problems of the troublemakers,
like truancy are addressed”.
However in the end almost all respondents said that they still believed
it to be true that harsher measures will tackle ABS. “I just know that addressing
ASB is necessary and that the government should act firmly. I do not need
scientific arguments to back up these facts”, as a respondent ended his inter-
view.
6 DISCUSSING RESULTS
To sum up, the interviews confirm the earlier observation that the ASBO is
extremely attractive for Dutch politicians. The same reasoning (measures are
needed, ASB is increasing), the same ideas (quality of life, broken window,
economic reasons) and the same solutions (behavioural contracts) are used
in political arguments. In combination with the earlier described exchange
of ideas (Dutch policymakers traveled to the UK to get information on the ASBO)
and references to the ASBO in policy documents, it can be concluded that
undeniably a soft transfer of policy took place.
Also the intention for hard transfer appears apparent. Both the pilot in
Rotterdam as well as the new law in the making (severe anti-social behaviour),
34 Thereafter a so-called revolt of the voters.
35 Veiligheidsmonitor Rijk 2007.
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refer to the example of the ASBO and the supposed success of the English
approach. Although a milder version of the ASBO has been adopted (the ABC
in the pilot), at least a form of hard policy transfer indeed did take place
(Burney, 2005).
These results appear to confirm the idea of a common culture of control
or risk society (Ericson, 2007; Furedi, 2005; Garland, 2001; Hudson, 2003;
Pieterman, 2008). In short, indeed the two countries faced comparable problems
that gave rise to similar (partly copied) solutions and politicians argued along
the same lines (see rationales 1, 2, 3).
However these analyses can be misleading. As I stated earlier, in comparat-
ive research there is tendency of exaggerated claims, assumed from similarities
in policy rhetoric. Therefore in order to get a complete picture, it is important
to look for evidence of non-transfer as well. In the sense that dissimilarities
in the policy rationales can be identified.36
In contrast with the parallels, the empirical data also illustrate that Dutch
society faces its own particular problems (see rationales 4 and 5). These own
rationales can elucidate the Dutch retreat from the policy of turning a blind
eye. All respondents coupled young Moroccans with the problems of ASB in
inner city areas.
In Dutch inner cities there are troubled community relations with young-
sters fromminority groups. Especially theMoroccan youth groups are believed
to behave in an anti-social manner. Ethnographic fieldwork in Amsterdam
showed that this often concerns intimidating group behaviour. De Jong (2007)
who followed a group of Moroccan youngsters over several years stresses their
harsh street culture. Being part of a so-called ‘Moroccan’ street culture stresses
their identity and their position in society, which is in turn reinforced bymedia
attention and political worries. In the UK ASB is less coupledwith the immigra-
tion issue. Perhaps this is not so surprising considering the English class
society. The social problems in British inner cities are of a different order. On
the notorious housing estates unemployment, crime and ASB trouble all sections
of the population; British and immigrants alike. As also Lippens (2008) points
out, the Dutch problems are not that severe as in the UK.Most Dutch politicians
agreed that the British situation in British cities is worse. “But if the ASBO
works even there, it certainly will here”, as a city councilor argued.
Furthermore this comparative research shows thatDutch politicians stress
‘legitimacy of the government’ as a reason for tackling ASB. For the UK this
appears a less acute problem. This difference is interesting because in their
statements the respondents often use the ASBO as a legitimating power. The
supposed success37 of the ASBO operates as a useful myth that can work in
the advantage of the politicians (Pakes, 2005). The fact that up until now there
36 Besides the most apparent that there are two different judicial systems.
37 There is not yet prove of positive effects of the ASBO. Ipsos MORI a research company
will publish an evaluation at the beginning of 2009.
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has been no objective evaluation report on the introduction of the ASBO avail-
able does not seem to influence the ideas of the Dutch policymakers. Parlia-
ment recently agreed to prolong the pilot in Rotterdam.38
It is often debated that after the ‘Pim-Fortuyn’ revolt there is tendency
amongDutch politicians to swiftly pick up new trends and catchphrases from
abroad (Punch, 2005; Van Swaaningen, 2008; Pakes, 2005). Almost all the
interviewees confirmed this idea of following trends in crime control. They
feel that in order to keep (or restore) the faith of the people, new actions against
crime and ASB are vital. This could be an explanation for the popularity of
the ASBO as well. The British measure functions like a sort of policy umbrella
that promises something new and effective. It furthermore legitimises the shift
in Dutch policies from social to more repressive measures.
The ASBO is interpreted by the respondents the way they see fit. For
instance some describe the ASBO as a preventive measure for ‘avoiding things
getting worse’ or for ‘the problems of immigration’, others see it as a repressive
measure for ‘teaching them a lesson’. It is remarkable to see that the ‘soft’
practices of a strong social policy in neighbourhoods is not completely
abandoned. The more left-wing politicians attempt to combine the ASBO with
more ‘social community work’, stressing that the ASBO can only work when
social agencies work together to address the root problems as well.
Equally striking is that most politicians do not need real evidence for the
effectiveness of the ASBO. The myth of its success is enough. An explanation
for this line of reasoning can be the idea of precautionary logic. As also Squires
(2008) points out, the zero tolerance approach of ASB appears to be inspired
by a precautionary principle,39 where the lack of scientific evidence is not
an excuse of inaction. Also Pieterman (2008) advocates such a view, arguing
that the precautionary principle has become a governmental rationality inmany
Dutch policy processes. It is a perfect way of doing politics because you do
not have to prove anything. Just as Squires (2008) argues, the success of the
ASBO is not influenced by scientific research but is more an instinctive
response.40
The data presented in this article indeed suggest that the ASBO has in
essence an emotive appeal for Dutch politicians as well. But does this confirm
the idea of the precautionary principle as a dominant governmental rationality?
It could be, but is it not equally true that the policy processes were never really
backed up by scientific evidence? Tony Blair himself reflected upon the use
of scientific research. “You can argue about statistics until the cows come home
38 Vote on motie Anker, 11-11-2008 (Tcm118-175522).
39 This is based on the precautionary principle used in environmental policies “Where there
are threats of serious irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall no be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation
(United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992: principle 15).
40 Earlier Morris (2000) also argued that scientific research is often not the bases for new
policies.
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and there is usually a very great credibility gap betweenwhatever the statistics
put out and whatever people actually think is happening, but the real point
is not about statistics, it is about what people feel.”41
Also the interviewees confirmed the preference for action above thorough
scientific research. In general they argued that tackling ASB both embodies
a common-sense understanding and an appeal to popular sentiments. And
that there was no time left for inaction. “Something has to be done to tackle
street-terror”, as a MP stated. “And science is often inconclusive, so we cannot
wait”.
Furthermore, the ASBO has simply a practical appeal. Some respondents
claimed it basically fits the already existing set of instruments. For example
if the proposed behavioural order is breached, it becomes a criminal act on
the basis of the already existing article 184 Sr.
So the established policy transfer of the ASBO can be explained by many
different factors. Ranking from the need for symbolic communication with
the Dutch people after the populist revolt, being a convenient policy umbrella,
to economic reasoning and problems with minorities. A common Culture of
Control is just one of them.
7 CONCLUSION
This article empirically tested how much proximity in Dutch and UK policies
towards ASB can be explained by intentional efforts to follow the UK Model.
And after analyzing the results indeed it can be concluded that a form of policy
transfer between the UK and the Netherlands occurred. But what does this
mean? What is the relevance of the origins of policy ideas? Why should it
matter if inspiration is drawn from another jurisdiction?
As concluded earlier, in criminology there is notmuch focus on the process
of policymaking. This lack in policy research on a meso-level does sometimes
lead to assumptions on a macro-level that are not empirically founded. For
example in our era of globalisation it is often assumed that similar circum-
stanceswill almost inevitably lead to similar outcomes, and that similar policies
have their roots in similar rationales.
But this article did not only look at the surface of apparent similarities,
it also investigated potential for dissimilarities. By identifying elements of non-
transfer it illustrated that the human agency is an important element in ex-
planations of contemporary crime control trends.
This research showed translation of policies is not so straightforward and
that it is embedded in a cultural context. It demonstrated that policy-making
41 Speech at a conference 10 February 2006, available at www.number10.gov.uk (last visited
15 December 2008).
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is a messy result of intuitive appeal, traveling myths and unintended con-
sequences. This approach of policymaking is also known as the policy of
muddling throug’ (Parsons, 2002; Hogwood, 2001; Colander, 2004).
Although politicians often call for evidence-based policies, in this article
it becomes clear that research evidence is often not a base for policies. More
often assumed positive effects from abroad, assumed feelings of citizens and
assumed proven crime theories form the basis of the policy. Policy transfer
appears to be more a form of gaining inspiration, rather than real lesson
drawing. This makes the policy making process, unpredictable and not evid-
ence based. This article identifies a form of hyper activity of the Dutch govern-
ment in creating new measures to tackle ASB. The question is, is such a messy
policymaking process a bad thing for society?
The research shows that pilots and laws have advanced in such a frenetic
pace as to leave too little space for considered reflection. I would like to argue
that more time is needed to reflect on the normative and social implications
of legal reforms and their effectiveness in regulating behaviour. The evidence
from the UK suggests that the ASBO may end up being counterproductive,
alienating young people who feel unfairly treated and stigmatised by such
measures. A hard policy transfer of the ASBO can have a boomerang-effect;
alienating young Moroccans from Dutch society. This could and should not
be the desired result of new Dutch crime policies.
Media discourse

4 White Trash versus Moroccan Street
Terrorists
An Analysis of Dutch and British Discourses
on Ethnic Minority Immigrants and Antisocial
Behaviour
Abstract
The Dutch press often associates antisocial behaviour withMoroccan teenagers.
Based on a comparison of Dutch and British political and media discourses
starting around 1990, this article demonstrates that the British media do not
systematically link anti-social behaviour to ethnic minority youngsters, but
to white teen-agers. The question then is how this issue of anti-social behaviour
and ethnicity is constructed in political and media discourses in the Nether-
lands and the UK. And does this construction differ in accordance with the
actual problems?
‘We need to send in the troops to deal with that Moroccan scum on the streets.
Then they can finally be arrested and kicked out of the country’ (De Telegraaf, 15
September 2008, p.1). If Freedom Party (Partij Voor de Vrijheid1) politician Geert
Wilders had his way, the Dutch authorities would be a lot tougher on kids hanging
around on street corners. The Freedom Party politician commented to this effect
in September 2008 when bus drivers refused to take their fixed routes in a neigh-
bourhood in Gouda because youngsters had been giving them such a hard time
there.
Although his drastic solution is not widely supported in the Dutch Parliament,
Geert Wilders is not alone in his call for a tough approach to the Antisocial
behaviour (ASB) caused byMoroccan teen-agers.2 On the contrary, mostMem-
bers of Parliament view the ASB of Moroccan teen-agers as a serious problem
requiring severe measures. The repressive tone of the political discussion is
evident from headlines like ‘Parliament Favours ToughApproach toMoroccan
Trouble-makers’ (Algemeen Dagblad (AD), 18 October 2008). In a letter to
Published: Koemans, M.L. (2010), ‘White trash’ versus ‘Marokkaanse straatterroristen’.
Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 52(2), p. 201-217.
1 The Dutch political landscape is divers. Mentioned in this paper are PVV (populist anti-
immigration party), VVD (right-wing party), CDA (party in themiddle) and PvdA (Labour
party).
2 When references are made to Moroccans in the Netherlands, they often also pertain to the
second generation.
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Parliament, Wim Cornelis, Mayor of Gouda, wrote that politicians tend to be
overly negative about how Moroccan teen-agers in his city terrorize people
on the streets, and the media publish ‘increasingly alarming’ items on the
problems (letter dated 7 October 2008). Mayor Cornelis wrote that he would
much prefer to hear a different tone ‘with more normal proportions’ in the
public debate.
These statements evoke a number of questions. Has the Dutch media
discourse on ethnic minority immigrants and ASB really become that much
more negative? How do politicians feel about the link between ASB and
ethnicity?3
As is noted below, the British media do not predominantly link ASB to
ethnic minority youngsters, but to poor white teen-agers. Is the problem
essentially different there, or is it constructed differently?
These sub-questions lead to the main research-question: How is the issue
of ASB and ethnicity constructed in political and media discourses in the
Netherlands and the UK and does it differ in accordance with actual prob-
lems?4 In an effort to answer this question, the political and media discourses
in the two countries are analysed and compared andwherever possible, backed
up by statistical data.
1 METHOD
Before to the main question can be answered, several terms need to be speci-
fied. Firstly, ASB. As various authors note, it is not easy to define objective
criteria for ASB (van Swaaningen, 2008; van de Bunt, 2003; Devroe, 2008; Pakes,
2005). After all, the definition of the term depends in part on the level of
tolerance in a society, which changes in time (Koemans 2008). The inevitable
result of ambiguity about the definition is that ASB on the streets includes a
wide range of acts such as refusing to curb one’s dog, aggressive conduct,
graffiti and littering. In this article, the definition formulated by the European
Commission (2000) is used as the guideline. It pertains to behaviour that in
itself is not punishable by law, but its cumulative effect can generate a climate
of tension and danger on the streets.5 In the discourse comparison here, the
Dutch term overlast is translated as ASB. Although it is not a literal translation,
3 The term ethnicity is used here to refer to an identity based on shared social and cultural
norms, ideas and practices.
4 References to the UK also pertain to Wales. This is also the case in the British literature
on the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO). In Scotland, efforts are being made to cope
with anti-social behaviour but several of the measures are different. This is why Scotland
is not included here.
5 Anti-social behaviour in public space might be more correct, but the media refer to anti-
social behaviour on the streets.
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which would be nuisance, in practice it is the term used in similar situations
(Koemans, 2009).
In view of the dimensions of the concept of ASB, a discourse analysis is
relevant. Whatever different meanings it might have can be addressed this
way. In short, a discourse analysis is a method that examines the discussions
and views in society, or in part of society, on a specific topic (Althoff, 2002).
But for this concept as well, an unambiguous definition is no simple manner
(Hijmans, 1996). The term discourse analysis is regularly a topic of discussion
and has become a container concept that covers various forms of quantitative
and qualitative research methods and techniques (Wester, 2006; Levi, 2006;
Krippendorff, 2004). Some researchers see a discourse analysis as part of a
content analysis, and others see it the other way around (Neuendorf, 2002;
Gubrium & Holstein, 2000; Hammersley, 1997). The latter view has been
selected here, in other words a content analysis that is a quantitative as well
as qualitative text analysis. In this connection, the choice of words is examined
and the structure of the text is analysed (Blommaert & Verfaillie, 2009).
A common denominator is that in a discourse analysis, the focus is on
reconstructing the meaning structure of a problem. In this context, what needs
to be investigated is the natural material of the actors representative of the
meaning structure. In short, these are the actors of the politics-media-public
triangle (Reiner, 2007; van Gestel, 2006; Althoff, 2002). Any distinction between
these actors is basically artificial, since in the construction process of a concept
like ASB, they constantly react to each other. The interaction and power re-
lations are not part of this study. However, working from the idea that media
and politics are the most dominant actors, this article focuses attention on these
two actors.
In this article, first the media discourse is analysed.6 Since it is digitally
so accessible, this is done by studying the written word. This can be justified
by noting that although it is diminishing, the press still occupies a dominant
position in the media landscape (Beunders & Muller, 2005). A quantitative
(how often does the term ASB occur?) as well as a qualitative (what is the tone
of the news item?) analysis are conducted.
The Dutch media discourse is studied based on 22,000 newspaper articles
in two nation-wide daily newspapers, De Telegraaf and de Volkskrant. These
daily newspapers have been selected in part for practical reasons and in part
because they represent the Dutch political spectrum.7 To examine how the
situation developed, the analysis focuses on five different years (1990, 1993,
1998, 2002 and 2008). The year 1993 has been selected because that is when
6 The research has been conducted with the help of G. Claessen, A. van Eijk, A. van den
Enden,M.Heemskerk, T.Waasdorp,M.Wensveen, undergraduate students at the Univer-
sity of Leiden.
7 Daily newspaper on the right are De Telegraaf and AD, in the centre NRC and more on
the left de Volkskrant and Trouw (both of religious origin).
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the first Integral Safety Report (Integrale veiligheidsrapportage) was presented,
introducing ASB as a safety problem. The year 1990 serves as starting point,
making it easier to see whatever changes in tone there might have been after
1993. In 1998 a new Purple Cabinet II (Liberals and Social Democrats without
Christian Democrats) was appointed to replace Purple Cabinet I, and although
therewas no essential change in its political composition, therewas nowmore
of a focus onmatters of safety. The year 2002 is a watershed because as is clear
from a study by van Noije and Wittebrood (2008), from then on the Dutch
start to perceive ASB as less serious. Lastly, 2008 has been selected because
that is when the incident occurred in Gouda.
The question remains as to whether this content analysis grants sufficient
insight into the underlying processes shaping the image of the anti-social
immigrant in the media. This is why in addition, three reporters and three
editors-in-chief at three nation-wide daily newspapers (NRC, Trouw and de
Volkskrant) are interviewed.
The Dutch media discourse is then compared with a somewhat similar
situation in the UK. This type of comparative study produces supplementary
data that not onlymake it possible to describe the discourse but also to explain
it. In the case of ASB on the streets, it is relevant to look at the situation in the
UK. Ever since 1998, the approach to ASB has been a spearhead of the British
government. Particularly after the introduction of the ASB Order (ASBO) in 1999,
a great deal of attention has been focused on the issue of ASB. After Gordon
Brown became Prime Minister in 2007, there was less of a focus on it (Dono-
ghue, 2008).
To get a picture of the Britishmedia discourse, for purely practical reasons
a different plan of action has been adopted. The quantitative as well as qualitat-
ive content analysis was conducted from 2000 to 2009, since that was when
digital archives became available via various search engines. The largest
number of articles on ASB in general (N = 1,000) was published in 2004. Since
not a single link was drawn with ethnicity in all those years, no comparison
has been drawn over time. The study has however been expanded to include
The Guardian, Times, The Sun and The Independent to do justice to the British
newspaper landscape, which is characterized by greater extremes. In view
of the limited scope of the study, unfortunately it was not feasible to conduct
supplementary interviews with reporters there.
When the results of the two media analyses turned out to be so different,
the decision was made to also analyse the political discourse in the hope of
explaining the observed difference in the media discourses and gaining greater
insight into the construction of the problem.
The information on the Dutch political discourse is based on a qualitative
literature analysis of Parliamentary documents, Cabinet plans and speeches
made in Parliament covering the period from 1993 (starting with the first
Integral Safety Report) to 2009. To gain a complete picture, nine Members of
White Trash versus Moroccan Street Terrorists 73
Parliament from nine different parties were interviewed in 2008.8 They were
each their party’s spokesperson on the ASB of youngsters. So the entire Dutch
political spectrum got to have a say. What is more, interviews have been
conducted with two City Council members, one from the People’s Party for
Freedom andDemocracy (VVD) in Amsterdam and one from the Labour Party
(PvdA) in Rotterdam, and two policy staff members, one from the Ministry
of Justice and one from the Ministry of Home Affairs. They were selected
because of their regular contributions to the public debate and central role
in the policy-making on this topic. Other City Council members in other cities
were also approached for an interview but either refused or failed to respond
altogether. The topics discussed in the semi-structured interviews include how
to define ASB on the streets and how the problem developed in the course of
time.
The British political discourse is constructed on the basis of British academic
literature andWhite Papers from 1998 to 2008. Government policy is elaborated
upon in these public documents, as in the plans of action of the Dutch govern-
ment (e.g. Lower House 2007-2008, 28 684, no. 130).
Unfortunately, British Members of Parliament are not as easy to approach
as Dutch ones. Their assistants referred us on to the ASB Unit of the Home
Office. The head of the unit, the official government spokesperson on this topic,
was interviewed in June 2008. The opinions of various British politicians have
been studied by examining official press releases. To supplement this informa-
tion, therewere conversationswith various policy staff members at the national
research conference Situating ASB and Respect in London on 22 April 2009.
After a comparison of the discourses in the two countries, the available
statistical data have been studied. It is possible that the problems in the two
countries really do differ, so it is only logical that the reactions should differ
as well. To fill in the gaps in the statistics, semi-structured interviews have
been held with fourteen academics, policy staff members and police chiefs.
These respondents were selected via a snowball method.
2 THE MEDIA DISCOURSE
2.1 The Netherlands
In 422 of the 22,000 newspaper articles that mention ASB, the ethnicity of the
individuals is registered or a link is drawn between ethnicity and ASB. This
is only the case in 5% of the cases in 1990; by 2008 the percentage increased
to almost 35%. However, in more than 60% of the cases, no mention is made
of ethnicity.
8 Anonymity was agreed upon and they were all immediately willing to do an interview.
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Press coverage on ethnic minorities and ASB has also become harsher. In
the course of time, articles on ethnic minorities have more frequently come
to have a negative headline, and the tone of the contents is nowmore negative.
The contents are categorized as negative if a link is drawn between ASB and
words like fear, degeneration, danger and crime, perhaps in combination with
negative value judgements such as calling the people involved scum or trouble-
makers. What is more, it is increasingly common for the articles to be illustrated.
These results are relevant because the importance the reading audience
attributes to a subject has to do with the articles’ tone, headline and illustration.
In establishing a certain image, it is also important where an article is placed
in the newspaper. According to this study, the placement has remained more
or less the same, with 10% on the first page and about 30% on the third page;
these are the most prominent pages, where the most important domestic news
is reported.
The qualitative analysis shows that in most cases, specifications of the
ethnicity of perpetrators of ASBmainly pertain to people ofMoroccan descent.
Only three explicit references are made to youngsters from the Netherlands
Antilles. In 2001 references are mainly made to ethnic minority youngsters
in general without any further specification. A link can easily be made to the
events around September 11 and the rise of anti-Islamic feelings (European
Monitoring Centre, 2005). As Snel notes (2003), ever since then the debate on
integration has become harsher. Particularly regarding incidents like those
in the Diamant Street neighbourhood in Amsterdam and the Oosterwei neigh-
bourhood in Gouda, explicit references are made toMoroccan youngsters, often
in combination with comments about a tough approach and a zero-tolerance
policy.
After the content analysis, supplementary interviews have been conducted
with three reporters and three editors-in-chief.9 In concrete cases, they are
the ones who decide whether or not to mention the ethnicity of people who
engage in ASB. Generally speaking, in principle the respondents do not specify
the ethnic descent of any individual in the articles. In Trouw, the rule is that
ethnicity is only specified if it is an indispensable part of the story. The editor-
in-chief gives examples such as race riots or honour killings. The style book
of de Volkskrant states that ethnic descent is not specified unless it is necessary
for the proper understanding of a story.10 As the editor-in-chief of de Volks-
krant notes, ‘This policy of ours implies that not specifying someone’s back-
ground does not automatically mean that person is of ethnic minority descent.
A person’s ethnic descent is only mentioned if it is relevant.’ But as the chief
reporter atNRC Handelsblad rightly comments, ‘What is relevant? In a society
with relatively limited ethnic tensions, there won’t be much reason to specify
someone’s ethnic background.’ According to her, one possible explanation
9 These were the editors-in-chief who responded affirmatively to a request for an interview.
10 Public handbook for de Volkskrant reporters, stipulating spelling and linguistic rules.
White Trash versus Moroccan Street Terrorists 75
for references being more frequently made to ethnicity in 2008 than in 2009
could be that greater ethnic tensions in Dutch society have indeedmade ethnic
specifications more relevant. The chief reporter atNRC Handelsblad notes that
in an extremely mixed society, like in New York for example, there is often
no reason to state a person’s ethnic background since it does not add anything
to the story. Most respondents see the danger of a vicious circle, with media
references to ethnicity leading tomore tensions in society. In decidingwhether
or not to include references to ethnicity, reporters take this into consideration.
2.2 The UK
What is immediately striking about the British media analysis is that not a
single link is drawn between ASB on the street and ethnic minorities. The
people exhibiting the ASB are ‘lost boys’ (Guardian, 2005), ‘white hoodies’ (The
Sun, 2009), ‘thugs’ (Independent, 2007) and ‘council scum’ (The Sun, 2005). If
any ethnic background is mentioned at all, it is white.
Even in an article on a study showing that a fifth of the ASBO (ASB Order)
recipients are of ethnic minority descent, the ethnic background of the trouble-
makers is not specified (Times, 2006). An article in the tabloid The Sun notes
that the names and faces of ASBO recipients have appeared on posters and it
is clear to see that they are all black, but this link is not drawn in the article
(The Sun, 2009).
Flint (2006, p. 333) also notes that ‘much of the imagery and discourse
around antisocial behaviour has focused onwhite working-class communities’.
Although several specific references are made to white youths, no continuous
link to lower-class whites is evident from my analysis. Here again the failure
to specify ethnic descent does not automatically mean the person in question
is native British. It should be noted that ethnicity is also a concept that is
difficult to categorize, which might be why no specification is noted (Prior
& Spalek, 2008). A 16-point classification system has been in effect in the UK
since 2003, though use is often made of the informal 5-point scale black – white
– Indian – Chinese – mixed.
Although crime is not exactly the topic of this study, a quick scan of the
digital archives shows that a link is not often drawn between crime (in this
case the gun crime frequently in the news) and ethnic minorities. For example,
in an article headlined ‘Gun Crime Soars’, The Sun does not make anymention
of the statistical over-representation of young black perpetrators (The Sun,
2002). This over-representation is however evident from The British Crime
Survey (Moon, 2009).
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3 POLITICAL DISCOURSE
3.1 The Netherlands
Documents fromTheHague irrefutably show that combating the ASB of young-
sters on the street was a spearhead of the Balkenende IV Cabinet (which is
no longer in power). Early in March 2008, Ministers Vogelaar, Hirsch Ballin,
Rouvoet and Ter Horst published a joint action plan called Bad Behaviour
and Degeneration (Overlast en verloedering). ‘Come down hard on bad be-
haviour’ was the accompanying slogan supporting the Cabinet’s intention to
reduce ASB by 25% in 2010 as compared to 2002 (Lower House 2007-2008, 28
684, no. 130).
Although ASB is not defined as a form of crime, the Cabinet does link it
to the growing problem regarding safety in the large cities (Proposed bill:
Measures to Combat Soccer Vandalism and Severe ASB, Lower House 2007-
2008, 31 467). It is also striking that wherever mention is made in the action
plan of the ASB of inner city youngsters, the issue is linked to underlying
integration problems and specific references are made to Moroccan and
Antillean youngsters (LowerHouse 2007-2008, 28 684, no. 130, 5). ANOS /NIPO
survey conducted in 2008 in 23 municipalities shows that in two thirds of the
municipalities, youngsters of Moroccan descent are over-represented in cases
of ASB. The survey is based on a questionnaire presented to the Mayor and
Aldermen Boards of nineteen medium-sized and four large municipalities.
It should be noted that the questionnaire was sent to the respondents in the
autumn of 2008, in other words at the time of the problems in Gouda. This
might have influenced the responses.
Since ethnicity is not registered separately, these statements are based on
estimates.11 A reduction in ASB is however noted in seventeen municipalities,
though half of them do speak of a small anti-social core group becoming even
more problematic.
Almost all theMayor andAldermen Boards that were approached caution
against the stigmatization of the Moroccan community and emphasize that
the problems occur in all the segments of the population. It is specifically noted
in tenmunicipalities that the tone of the political debate on the bad behaviour
of youngMoroccans has been unnecessarily harsh. TheMayor and Aldermen
Board in Amsterdam says for instance that ‘all kinds of claims are made in
the Parliamentary debates on the ASB ofMoroccans’. The Board in Leiden feels
the problems are always exaggerated in the debates in The Hague to make
them seem far more serious ‘than the actual situation warrants’.
11 There is evidence of this problem in the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Statistics
Netherlands) figures on anti-social behaviour, which also do not separately register ethnicity,
though the Veiligheidsmonitor (Safety Monitor) does.
White Trash versus Moroccan Street Terrorists 77
InterviewswithMembers of Parliament from nine different political parties
confirm in part the observation of local politicians that a small core group of
Moroccan trouble-makers is getting tougher. Although the interviews explicitly
pertain to the broader problem of ASB on the streets, it is striking that all the
interviewed politicians start talking about Moroccans and bad behaviour
themselves. Regardless of their political affiliation, theMembers of Parliament
draw a link between ASB and Moroccan youngsters. As one of them says, ‘I
read in the mail I get from my constituents that groups of Moroccan kids on
the street make them feel unsafe. As MP you have to speak to that, otherwise
you undermine your own credibility.’
All the respondent note that it is no longer taboo to link ASB and ethnic
minorities and it is time to call things by their name. One said; ‘For a long
time we tried to gloss over it, but young Moroccans really are a specific
problem group. Let’s not beat around the bush any more.’
The views on how to approach the problem are however politically tinted.
As a right-wing Member of Parliament notes for example, ‘It is important to
register ethnicity in cases of ASB so the approach can be designed accordingly.
Moroccans expect a more repressive approach, because otherwise they’ll just
think the police are a bunch of wimps.’
Some MPs qualify the exaggerated picture of ‘Moroccan street terrorists’ and
refer to groups of white Lonsdale kids and soccer hooligans, who also exhibit
ASB. But as oneMember of Parliament states, ‘The role ofMoroccan youngsters
in the problem of ASB is sizable. This is also because we pay more attention
to it now. We have given it a name. The integration policy has been a failure.’
Another MP explicitly accuses the media of stirring up problems. ‘There is no
leniency any more in the discourse on Moroccan youngsters and ASB. The
media present a distorted picture.’
A few years ago Jan Stikvoort, Police Chief in Central Holland, accused
Parliament of blowing up the problems with Moroccans. ‘When people in-
cluding politicians make rash statements without any qualifications and are
quoted in the media, a whole unwarranted media hype is created. Things are
improving and there has been a decrease in the number of criminal charges
that are filed. We are not denying there is a problem, but it is not nearly as
serious as people say (de Volkskrant, 4 October 2008).
3.2 The UK
As is noted above, ASB has mainly become an issue in the UK since the intro-
duction of the ASB Order. The ASBO is a restraining order enforced via a civil
judge for a maximum period of two years (Burney, 2005). If the ASBO is
violated, the case comes before a criminal judge, who can sentence the per-
petrator to a fine or a prison sentence of a maximum of five years (Squires
& Stephen, 2005). As is the case in the Netherlands, ASB is viewed in the UK
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as an urgent social problem that affects urban liveability and makes people
feel unsafe (van Stokkom, 2007). This similarity is also evident from the interest
on the part of Dutch politicians in the British measure. Various Dutch muni-
cipal and national politicians cite the success of the ASBO in combating ASB
(Huisman & Koemans, 2008). The ASBOs are however regularly criticized in
the UK, where references are made to ‘violations of human rights’ and ‘en-
couragement of intolerance’ (Pakes, 2004;Millie, 2006). Up until 2007, ASBOs
were nonetheless issued in about 7,000 cases (Newburn, 2008). But it is unclear
whether this means they are indeed effective (Harradine, 2004). Despite regular
requests from Parliament, no large-scale evaluation research results are avail-
able on the ASBO (Waiton, 2008). Local differences in implementation and faulty
registration make research into the effects of the ASBO extremely difficult to
conduct (Prior & Spalek, 2008).
In the further study of the British political discourse, it is once again clear
that nowhere in the documents is a link drawn to ethnicity. In the study by
Jacobson (2008) on what motivates British politicians to address the issue of
antisocial behaviour, not a single reference is made to problems pertaining
to ethnic minority youngsters. They cite a need to improve the quality of life
and renovate certain neighbourhoods. They also speak of problems pertaining
to inner city youngsters and the danger of youngsters degenerating from anti-
social to criminal behaviour. But the question of integration is not mentioned
once in any of the political or policy documents (Garret, 2006). To supplement
this information, the head of the ASB Unit is interviewed. She confirms that
ethnicity does not play a role in any way in the political debate on ASB. The
only way she can account for this fact is by noting that no data is available
on ethnicity and ASB. It is clear that there are considerable differences between
the British and theDutch discourses on ASB. But as is noted above, theremight
well be differences in the problems themselves, so it is only logical that the
responses should differ as well. And there is more than enough reason for
a closer look at the figures on ASB.
4 REALITY CHECK
4.1 The Netherlands
The question remains as to the relation between the media and the political
discourses described above and the available statistical data. Earlier studies
on four national daily papers in 2001 and 2004 show that Moroccans are more
frequently and more prominently referred to in the press in connection with
crime than is justified on the basis of the police figures (Sibon, 2004). But does
this also hold true for ASB?
The Integral Safety Monitor (Integrale veiligheidsmonitor, Netherlands
Statistics et al. 2008) indicates a fall in the number of cases of ASB in the Nether-
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lands since 2002. The figures have remained the same in the past two years.
Ethnicity is not mentioned separately in this connection. In cases of anti-social
and criminal behaviour, the police and the courts solely register a person’s
place of birth and nationality, so there is no way of identifying second and
third-generation immigrants born in the Netherlands and with the Dutch
nationality. And they are precisely the ones the media focus on the most.
Several studies conducted by the Research and Documentation Centre of the
Ministry of Justice (e.g. Blom, 2005; Jennissen & Blom, 2007) and combining
various files12 confirm that first and second-generation immigrants from
Morocco are more frequently crime suspects than the native Dutch. But they
also show that generalizing statements about the link between ethnicity and
crime like ‘people form ethnic minorities are more apt to be criminals’ are often
incorrect (see also Engbersen, 2007). These research data pertain to crime and
do not include any specific information on ASBs.
In a supplementary long-term qualitative study, de Jong (2007) focuses
on Moroccan boys who hang out on street corners and exhibit ASB. He con-
cludes that they view their stigma as fuckingMoroccans as something they will
never be able to escape. This is why they develop a kind of heroic identity
as boys who are tough andwild.With anti-social and criminal behaviour, they
reinforce the sense of us against the rest of the world. Other studies show though
howwell integrated these boys often are and how strongly they identify with
the Netherlands (Stevens, 2009).
After a talk with the Mayors of ten municipalities with many residents
of Moroccan descent, Minister Ter Horst acknowledges that in general, there
has been a reduction in the ASB ofMoroccan-Dutch youngsters (De Gelderlander,
22 October 2008). However, a smaller group has turned from anti-social to
criminal behaviour. This picture is also confirmed in the NOS/NIPO survey
referred to above (2008).
In conclusion, ASB does appear to be linked to young Moroccans in the
national Dutch political discourse. At the municipality level, the discourse is
more differentiated and notes that ASB occurs among all the segments of the
population. In the media discourse, Moroccans are more frequently referred
to as trouble-makers nowadays than in the past. And these references are
deliberate on the part of editorial boards. How much truth this construction
of Moroccan trouble-makers has to it is not easy to say based on statistical
data. But it does not appear to be a well-balanced reflection of the complex
issues at hand. According to the figures, for instance, ASB is decreasing, though
the number of news items continues to grow. As is noted above, in addition
12 This report describes for the first time the background features of people registered nation-
wide by the police as crime suspects. The data are the result of a joint research project by
the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice (Wetenschappelijk
Onderzoek- en DocumentatiecentrumWODC) and Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau
voor de Statistiek CBS).
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to a comparison with the official figures as a way of testing the present-day
discourse, a comparison can also be drawnwith the somewhat similar situation
in the UK. What is most striking about the British statistical data on ASB and
ethnicity is that they are non-existent (Garland, 2006).
4.2 The UK
Isal (2006) also notes the absence of any data on ethnicity in the registration
of ASBOs. It is clear from the qualitative research on various police forces that
they do record the age and sex of suspects, but not their ethnicity. In itself,
this is striking because ever since 1999 (Race Relations Amendment Act), the
government has been obliged to record the effects of its policy on various
ethnic groups. Concern is expressed in the report about the possibility that
ASBOs might be issued disproportionately often to members of ethnic minor-
ities. An explicit reference is made in the report to the danger of police racism.
Here trouble-makers are thus referred to as potential victims. A completely
different approach than the one in the Netherlands, where the emphasis is
on members of ethnic minorities as trouble-makers.
Prior and Spalek (2008) cite the possibility of an over-representation of
ethnic minorities in the ASBOs that are issued. According to them, this might
well be indicative of institutional racism. They feel it is something that should
definitely be noted and a cause for concern that no statistical data is available
on the ethnicity of people who file complaints ormight exhibit ASB themselves.
They have conducted interviews with experts and official agencies to address
the question of whether official measures are used disproportionally on ethnic
minorities. For example, because their different or erratic behaviour might be
viewed as anti-social and measures can be taken without really being war-
ranted. In view of the earlier accusation of institutional racism within the
British judicial system (MacPherson, 1999) and their own results, the re-
searchers deem it possible that measures against ASB may have further crim-
inalized ethnic minorities. Since there are no statistical data, this line of reason-
ing can not however be empirically supported. This is why the researchers’
conclusions, as they are quick to note themselves, are rather hypothetical. Based
in part on data from the British Crime Survey, Fitzgerald and Hale (2006) note
that members of ethnic minorities are more frequently stopped and searched
and disproportionally over-represented in British prisons. Whether this is also
the case for ASB is not recorded (Moon, 2009). In the Offending, Crime and
Justice Survey, which does record cases of ASB, they are similarly not classified
according to ethnicity. There has been a decrease though in the amount of
what is perceived as ASB (Roe & Ashe, 2008).
One of the few statistical studies conducted on the ASB of ethnicminorities
pertains to the King’s Cross neighbourhood in northern London (Young, 2006).
It is clear from this study that 37% of the ASBOs there were issued to men of
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African or Caribbean descent, although they only constitute 8% of the popula-
tion. The study does not show however whether this disproportional repres-
entation is due to discriminatory practices or simply to the fact that thesemen
do indeed exhibit proportionally more ASB. A study by the Youth Study Board
(see National Audit Office, 2006) examining the ASBOs issued in one year shows
that 22% of the ASBO recipients are black or Asian, so they receive ASBOs 2.5
times as frequently as the rest of the British population. In summarizing, the
over-representation of blacks in the British judicial system is statistically
demonstrated and there has slowly come to be more of a focus on the possible
problems involving ethnicity and ASB.
Several of the police mangers who are interviewed note that in certain
ethnicminority communities, ASB is perceived differently than inwhite neigh-
bourhoods. ‘They are more tolerant of ASB,’ the head of the Safety Division
at Leeds City Council notes. ‘The kind of conduct people file complaints about
in white neighbourhoods, they simply do not see as anti-social.’
The senior police officer of the West Yorkshire police has a different ex-
planation for the lack of complaints filed about ASB. ‘Some ethnic minority
groups have absolutely no faith in the authorities. They have had traumatic
experiences with the authorities in other places and would never file a com-
plaint because they would not expect the police to actually be able to do
anything.’ This is why there are now cold spotswhere no complaints are filed,
but it is unclear whether there really are no problems with ethnic minorities
in these neighbourhoods. As the head of the Birmingham ASBO Unit notes,
‘Very few complaints are filed about ASB inmost ethnicminority communities,
but we simply do not know whether this means there is no bad behaviour
there or the tolerance level is lower or there is less faith in the police. This
situation cannot go on any longer. Research is called for. Also to see whether
there is any evidence of police racism.’
Another explanation is given by the former head of the Leeds ASBO Unit,
who notes that in the British discourse, the ASBO itself is such a controversial
measure that it is attracting negative attention. ‘There simply is not any space
for a discussion on the possible problems related to ASB and ethnicminorities.’
5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
What is immediately striking in the comparison is that in the UK and the
Netherlands alike, politicians and the media view ASB as a big problem that
is on the rise, even though the ASB that is actually experienced is decreasing
or remaining at the same level. What is more, ethnic minorities are over-
represented in the judicial systems of both countries, but there are no clear
figures on a comparable situation regarding ASB. The studies that are available,
particularly the qualitative ones, do indicate an over-representation. Of course
it is true that the data given here have not all been collected using the exact
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same methods. Due to practical problems (time and money) and differences
in registration, one-on-one comparisons are not feasible but an effort has been
made to create situations that are as comparable as possible. Daily newspapers
of the same kind have been selected and whitepapers and plans of action in
the political discourse have been compared. Supplementary triangulation
(interviews and content analyses supplemented by available statistical material)
has made it quite feasible to illustrate a certain discourse.
It is still striking how different the approach to ethnic minorities is in the
two countries in the press as well as among politicians and policy-makers.
In the British media and political discourse on ASB, ethnic minorities do not
play any role at all. Instead a link is drawn between ASB and poor white
youngsters. In the Netherlands though, the recent focus onMoroccan ruffians
has mushroomed in the press and among national politicians.
This is very puzzling indeed. How can there be such a sizable difference
between the British and Dutch discourses on ASB and ethnic minorities when
the problems and policies are so similar? In the Netherlands, the explanation
given by various local politicians, policy-makers and researchers is that the
image that has emerged of ASB in the media and political discourses is an
erroneous one. Moroccan youngsters are associated with ASB with dispropor-
tionate frequency.Moreover,Minister TerHorst herself has observed a decline
in the ASB of this group, although a small group has only become tougher.
The British respondents also been asked to explain the difference. All of
them indicate that British institutions and media are afraid of being accused
of racism. The reasons why are the above-mentioned report on institutional
racism at the London police force and the British colonial history. Due to the
collective sense of guilt about the plight of ethnic minorities in British society,
trouble-makers from this group are treated more like victims than as a kind
of folk devils, as is the case in theNetherlands according to some respondents.
What is more, there is not a lot of focus on this issue in British politics or the
media because the ASBO measure is controversial enough in itself and tends
to attract most of the attention.
Of course there is nothing new about this observed sense of guilt. In the
past, various researchers (Isal, 2006; Matthews, 2007; Mille, 2006; Spalek, 2006)
have noted the great sensitivity in the UKwhen it comes tomatters of ethnicity
and crime and ASB. Frank Bovenkerk makes the same observation in an inter-
view in de Volkskrant (6 June 2009): ‘In the UK as well, political motivations
determine what criminologists measure and what they don’t. Because of the
colonial past, they have an enormous sense of guilt towards anyone who is
black. If there are figures that demonstrate a connection between ethnicity and
crime, the only interpretation is that it is due to police racism.’
This explanation is interesting because of course the Netherlands has a
colonial past aswell, be it amore recent onewith different flows of immigrants
than the UK. So don’t we have a sense of guilt any more, or didn’t we ever
have one? Racism barely plays a role of any importance in the Dutch debate
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on crime and ASB. Only in very rare cases, like the judgment of the Running
coloured man (1976), has a suspect been released because police officers at the
Warmoesstraat police station were not permitted to apprehend him on the
basis of the colour of his skin. Sometimes, for example with the expansion
of preventive searching, the possibility is mentioned that youngsters who hang
around street corners and look like they might be Moroccan are more apt to
be checked than youngsters who look like they are native Dutch. A report
by Jansen & Janssen, an agency that critically follows the police, devotes
attention to this possibility (www.bureaujansen.nl). But this agency also
observes that the Dutch police behave more properly than for example the
British.
Another explanation can be that the British situation in the inner cities
cannot be compared with the Dutch. In what has traditionally been a class
society in the UK, the socio-economic differences between the neighbourhoods
are much greater than in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the structure of the
problems is not the same (Nicholas, 2007). There is a larger group of white
people whose socio-economic position is poor. This is due in part to the de-
industrialization of certain shipping and mining towns, resulting in mass
unemployment. Another factor is that British cities are more segregated than
Dutch ones. This leads to problems that go beyond ASB, as is evident from
the race riots in the summer of 2001 in Coldham, Bradford, Leeds and Burnely
(Waddington, 2007). Perhaps British institutions andmedia are aware of how
explosive the situation can be in the cities and exercise a form of self-censor-
ship. Or has the UK become such a mixed society that it is no longer relevant
to mention ethnicity, as the editor-in-chief of a leading Dutch daily once said
of New York? Although this seems unlikely since the European electoral
success of the extremely right-wing British National Party in June 2009. It is
clear from the vehement reactions that in The UK as well, immigrants and
ethnicity are still important themes.
Having said this, it is still odd that the media and political discourses in
the two countries differ so much. A riddle like this deserves further investiga-
tion. The study of less formal channels such as Internet forums gives a broader
picture of the discourses. A comparison of the Dutch discourse with those in
other European countries such as Germany or France could have an added
value. It could enhance the clarity as to which of the two is unique, the Dutch
or the British discourse. The additional information would bring us closer to
a theoretical explanation of the mystery. Up until then, it is important to be
aware of the Dutch barometer. Because the mercury might not be showing
the right stand of today’s society.

Public discourse

5 Down these mean streets. Tackling
antisocial behaviour: local Dutch
support?
1 ADDRESSING ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR IN DUTCH URBAN AREAS
Public bus drivers who refuse to travel through certain residential, urban areas,
terrified of misconduct by young immigrants, or people who are forced to
move out of public housing after being frequently threatened by yobs. Incidents
like these dominate Dutch headlines. Media reports in the Netherlands paint
a notably grim picture of urban neighbourhoods in which social life is
threatened and street life is impossible. Residents of these areas are quoted
as fearful, desperate and calling for repressive government actions (Koemans,
2010). Their views on this kind of antisocial behaviour also referred to as ‘street
terror’, is often used by politicians as a justification for tougher crime policies.
In this article, we will analyse this public discourse on ASB in order to be able
to figure out the extent of local support for these new policies. To what extent
do residents of inner city areas demand a tough approach towards antisocial
behaviour on the street?
According to the influential urban planning guru Jane Jacobs, a neighbour-
hood’s social safety depends on its street life (Jacobs, 1961). Because of the
incidents mentioned above, this behaviour, which is often dubbed antisocial
behaviour, appears to be a pressing concern in the Netherlands. This applies
evenmore since the government putsmore energy trying to influence subject-
ive safety or feelings of safety rather than focusing solely on enhancing ‘object-
ive safety’ or decreasing registered crime as such. As criminological research
shows, it is not only the actual crime rate that determines subjective safety,
other signs of disorder like graffiti or intimidating yobs are often more in-
fluential (Markowitz, 2001; Vanderveen, 2004).
In addition, more than in other countries, the problem of antisocial be-
haviour in the street (henceforth also ASB) in the Netherlands is blamed openly
on immigrants and their offspring. Over the last years tensions arose, resulting
from the persistent weak socioeconomic position of certain (ethnic) groups
combined with public concern with the feasibility of the prevailing tolerant
approach to immigration (Pakes, 2004; Engbersen, 2007). Due to the fact that
ethnicminorities are far fromdistributed evenly across space, tensionsmanifest
(Under review) Koemans, M.L. & J.P. van der Leun (2011). Down these mean streets.
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themselves earlier and more intensely in specific urban areas than elsewhere
in the Netherlands. Many of these urban neighbourhoods contain a relatively
high share of low-income families including ethnic minorities and are also
plagued by disorder and crime as well as by feelings of unsafety. Already in
1995 the Social andCultural Planning Bureau concluded that themere presence
of ethnic minority groups in areas increased feelings of unsafety among the
traditional neighbourhood residents and gave them the impression that the
neighbourhood was deteriorating (SCP, 1995; Uitermark, 2003). Tapping into
these fears, politicians claim that ‘street terror’, which has become a common
term, has grown out of hand in deprived areas and effectively call for more
repression.
There is very little evidence, however, to support the claims that (a) the
situation with respect to ASB has gone out of hand and (b) that the call for
repression is dominant amongst local inhabitants. The regular quantitative
surveys among the public cannot fill this gap, as we will demonstrate below.
Research in disadvantaged urban neighbourhoodswhich includes perceptions
on policies of inhabitants and local key figures has so far been very limited.
The role of chief actors in the national and local political domain, like
politicians and policymakers, who are responsible for promoting tougher ASB
policies in the Netherlands has already been analysed elsewhere (Koemans,
2008, 2010a). Yet, more detailed insight into the situation on the ground is
severely lacking and we aim at making an attempt to fill this void. On the
basis of a series of intensive qualitative case studies in eleven problem areas
in the four largest Dutch cities, this paper seeks to contribute to the knowledge
of (and perceptions on) ASB and the degree of support for repressivemeasures
to tackle it within the neighbourhoods concerned.
The qualitative study reported here is part of a broader research project
in which the shift towards repression in the field of ASB (a form of sub crime)
is studied in the context of recent criminological debates on shifting crime
policies. In different terms, influential criminological theories, notably those
of Garland (2001), Young (2003) and Simon (2007) all point to a marked rise
of more repressive and controlling policies towards deviant behaviour, crime
and sub crime. Therefore Koemans (2009, 2010a) investigated the policy level,
political and media discourses and makes a comparison to the UK. Here we
zoom in on the public discourse, because views of the public are often used
as a justification for crime policies but are rarely studied.
After briefly discussing definitions of ASB, we will discuss recent policy
developments and the rationales behind the policy transfer of the British Anti
Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) to the Dutch context (section 2). With a sum-
mary of the scholarly debate, we will conclude that there are gaps and dis-
crepancies in the debate on ASB (section 3). In section 4, the research questions
and methods will be discussed. Thereafter, the results and conclusion will be
presented (section 5 and 6).
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1.1 Defining ASB on the street
Antisocial behaviour is not a Dutch invention, but a cause of concern across
nations (cf. Burney, 2005; Hörnqvist, 2004). According to British law, ASB is
defined as “acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment,
alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as [the
defendant]”(Home Office, 2003 p. 14).1 In the United States it is defined as
“a cluster of related behaviours, including disobedience, aggression, temper
tantrums, lying, stealing, and violence” (Eddy & Reid, 2002 p. 20). In the
Netherlands, the term ASB is relatively new and is imported from the UK. It
is primarily linked to disorderly behaviour on the street and ‘problem accumu-
lation areas’ within cities. The Dutch authorities do not provide a definition,
but describe ASB as “behaviour systematically severely impacting on the
wellbeing, andwhich is specifically targeted at specific persons” (Kamerstuk-
ken, 2007). Examples given in the policy memorandum, however, do not
confirm the latter. Hanging around and littering which are common com-
plaints, are in most cases not targeted at persons in particular. In 2000, the
European Commission (2000, p. 4) concluded that ‘antisocial conduct is conduct
that without being a criminal offence can by its cumulative effect generate
a climate of tension and insecurity’. In this article we adopt the latter definition,
because it discerns between crime and antisocial conduct, although, in practice,
those dividing lines are less clear (see paragraph 2).2 We note that in many
discussions, vague boundaries are drawn between crime and antisocial be-
haviour if they are drawn at all.
2 THE REGULATORY CONTEXT
For decades, Dutch politicians turned a blind eye towards the (perceived)
problems of disorder or ASB. This tied in with the traditionally strong social-
character of crime policies. The Netherlands has often been characterised as
a liberal and tolerant society, with an emphasis on pragmatic compromising
and practices of gedogen, also dubbed regulated tolerance or condoning
(Buruma, 2007). In 1985, a governmental committee explicitly advised the
Dutch cabinet not to address nuisance or disorder in the public domain with
criminal law, in order to avoid over-criminalisation and escalation.
Times have changed, however. In recent years. there has been a resurgence
of interest in neighbourhood disorder as well in social sciences as in public
debates (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Although street terror as a pheno-
1 This is the most widely used definition form the Crime and Disorder Act (1998). New
Labour in the UK introduced ASBOs under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act and these
were enforced in 1999.
2 For a more thorough discussion see Koemans (2009, 2010).
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menon and a term are, in fact, not that new as nowadays is assumed, it is
equally true that during the last decade society has perceived this kind of
behaviour as a more serious and pressing problem than before (Pakes, 2004;
van Swaaningen, 2005; Tonry, 2004; Garland, 2001; Devroe, 2008). The media
discourse is also changing, as a quick glance into the national newspapers
demonstrates. In 2009, eight times more newspaper articles were published
in the Netherlands on ASB compared to 1998. In line with the general increase
in (openly) anti-immigration sentiments among the Dutch public, these articles
more often explicitly connected ASB to young immigrants (with a 35% increase).
2.1 Urban policy
The policy turnaround is most evident in the encompassing urban renewal
strategy in 40 problem neighbourhoods, known as the 40 districts approach.
The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment compiled
a list on the basis of indicators of severe social problems (VROM, 2008). In order
to turn around the deprived urban areas into more liveable areas, over a
thousandmillion euros have been invested in urban policies which are geared
towards these 40 problem districts. The urban policy programs are legitimised
on the basis of a regeneration policy rationale (social and economic regeneration
of local areas can reduce ASB) converged with the Quality of life (ASB should
be tackled because it is a serious problem that makes people miserable and
fearful) and the Broken windows rationale (ASB should be tackled because if left
unattended, it leads to serious crime) (Koemans, 2010). First reports with
respect to outcomes of this new program demonstrate mixed effects. Social
investments like supporting residents’ associations and community parties
and community barbeques showed no measurable results. On the other hand
physicalmeasures such as regeneration projects (cleaning the streets, installing
new street furniture) and building of new privately owned homes and putting
social rent properties on sale did decrease the reported ASB in the areas The
most recent evaluation also has a positive tone. The level of trust among
inhabitants has risen because of the improvements they observe and ASB has
again decreased (Marlet, Poort & van Woerkens, 2009).
2.2 Criminalisation
Simultaneously with these local urban policies, ASB has been criminalized at
a national level. Criminalising not only in the sense of penalizing behaviour
but of also labelling behaviour as criminal. Inspired by British initiatives, the
Dutch government of Prime Minister Rutte is preparing to enact new admin-
istrative legislation that provides local authorities withmore legal instruments
(often called administrative sanctions) to react to and prevent ASB. For example,
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extending the term of a restraining order from three months to two years (as
is the case with ASBOs).
Earlier in 2010 a new law has been enacted; titled Severe anti-social behaviour
which in many ways is similar to the British Anti-Social behaviour Order
(ASBO).3 The ASBO is a civil order. Restraints of certain behaviour are imposed
by a civil court and breaching is a criminal offence (Ashworth, 2004). It is a
multi step prohibition, a civil order backed up by a criminal penalty. AsMillie
(2008) pointed out, within a relatively short period of time, the ASBO became
popular and is now part of the common lexicon.
Although the British ASBO was new in the sense of multi step prohibition,
in the Netherlands this construction already existed. In the Netherlands,
mayors have more power in this respect than their British counterparts. Ac-
cording to current law, they can also issue restraining orders, but with the
new law they can prolong this period and couple it to a duty to report.
The introduction of stronger measures is coupled with war rhetoric and
a repressive stance (Koemans & van der Leun, 2010). Several recent debates
in Dutch parliament on ASB produced quotes such as; ‘Send the army’, ‘tough
actions needed against street terror’, and ‘anti-social behaviour wreaks serious
havoc in many Dutch cities’.4
Although recent publications (Nixon, 2010) show that British policies are
currently shifting away from an enforcement-focused approach to policies with
a more communitarian approach, Dutch measures in this field are often
legitimised on the basis of (a) their perceived success in the UK and (b) the
fact that people in deprived areas want the government to act. The latest
measures are evidently meant to sooth the sense of anxiety felt by the public
(CCV, 2010). For many Dutch politicians, it is self-evident that national and
local government should act firm against forms of ASB because it is a pressing
issue (Pakes, 2005; van Stokkom, 2007; van Swaaningen, 2008).
3 DISCOURSES AND DISCREPANCIES IN THE DEBATE ON ASB
It is difficult to support or contradict the claims made by Dutch politicians
who called for ASBO-inspired policies. Surveyswith respect to disorder clearly
do not paint a picture of increasing street terror or street wars. Between 2001
and 2005, the number of registered complaints about public nuisance even
decreased, and since then it remainedmore or less stable (CBS, 2010; SCP, 2009).
Reported problems mainly concern dog dirt, litter on the streets, vandalism
3 Others are, the ‘minor nuisance at municipal level act’) and ‘the public prosecution service
settlement act’ (Devroe, 2008).
4 Debates, after incidents of ASB in the city of Gouda lead to widespread public outcry see
for quotes national newpapers Algemeen Dagblad, De Telegraaf, NRC Handelsblad; 25th of
September 2008).
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and graffiti rather than bullying or intimidating behaviour by youngster on
the streets.
In a recentmunicipal-level survey (Gemeentelijke Belevingsmonitor, 2009),
these outcomes were confirmed, with the exception of traffic nuisance being
a top priority. It is well known that people’s perception of the level of ASB
varies by gender, area and age, with peoplemost likely to perceive high levels
of ASB in areas of greatest social deprivation. Indeed, people in cities report
higher levels of nuisance than those outside cities and people in deprived
neighbourhoods report higher levels than those inmore well to do urban areas;
71 percent, as opposed to 55 percent (CBS, 2010). Although the largest differ-
ences in reported experiences concern littering and vandalism and not street
terror or related issues. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP),
a government agency which conducts research into the social aspects of all
areas of government policy, asks citizens specific questions about social
nuisance. These surveys show a decline in the reporting of social nuisance
between 2002 and 2006, in particular in derived neighbourhoods (SCP, 2009).
So in sum: available data are ambiguous, but rather contradict than support
the claims of politicians in this field with respect to rising street terror.
3.1 Explaining discrepancies
Several scholars agree that ‘statistically unfounded’ feelings of unsafety among
the public and politicians alike can be accounted for by the general malaise
in society and a lowered tolerance threshold (Terpstra, 2010; Boutellier, 2002,
2010). The government acts less tolerant towards ASB because actions to tackle
this behaviour are demanded by the public (Koemans, 2010a). Although
statistics and survey outcomes as mentioned above, show a decline since 2001
in both social disorder and crime, people became less tolerant and, therefore,
demandmore action. Rising expectations and risk avoidance are in the centre
of these explanations (Pieterman, 2009). It cannot be denied that although these
trends have often been observed, a certain level of circular reasoning seems
to be present. The government acts less liberal towards ASB because actions
to address this behaviour are demanded by the public, while at the same time
statistics show a decline which has already started ten years ago. Still, because
people became less tolerant, they appear to demand more action.
Moreover, certain elements are missing from the debate. Even though, in
discussions about issues of disorder and ASB, issues of immigration and integra-
tion come to the fore quickly, these issues are not touched upon in most
surveys. So it might as well be that worries about immigration and failed
integration play a bigger role than worries about disorder or antisocial be-
haviour in general. Yet, alsowith respect to opinions onmigration and integra-
tion, surveys do not clearly confirm the concerns which are often taken to be
omnipresent. Even in a time with strong support for Wilder’s anti-immigration
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party (who received 20% of the national votes in 2010), in surveys with respect
to international migration, the population is highly divided (Sopemi, 2010)
and not overly negative.
It cannot be denied that the problems with ASB and integration are hot
political topics and receive massive media attention. What exactly is going
on the ground, in the relevant inner-city areas is difficult to decipher. As
Garland (2004) argues, studies of local discourses are crucial for theory building
because small-scale studies can find evidence of structural patterns. By study-
ing the construction of the phenomenon in detail, variation and complexity
of the studied problem become more visible. So, in order to analyse how
people in the so-called problem neighbourhoods talk about and construct views
on ABS, a discourse analyses is the most suitable method.
There are more reasons for studying the different discourses more
thoroughly. Garland (2004) argues that the level of influence of the media and
political debate on the policy developments is high. This argument and
Garland’s basic assumption in his influential Culture of control (2001) that ‘high
crime rates becoming a social fact’, are difficult to judge on an empirical level.
Therefore first, the discourses on street-level are analysed. Then attentionwill
be given to the consequences at a theoretical level. The above-mentioned
discrepancies and blind spots already indicate that Dutch scholarship on this
subject is constrained by data availability and reliability. This concerns in
particular the absence of direct observation of disorder in the relevant neigh-
bourhoods and the difficulties of reaching certain parts of the population. In
large surveys, the non-response within deprived neighbourhoods is usually
high and selective (Stoop, 2005). Moreover, Taylor (2001) has argued, that in
areas with high levels of actual disorder and crime, there is a higher threshold
to be crossed before disorder is perceived as a problem, which can also in-
fluence survey data (vanNoije &Wittebrood, 2009). Inmanyways, those urban
areas appearing at the top of the list of a good quality of life bear little relation
to those at the bottom in terms of demographic make-up, levels of local de-
privation, size, and local infrastructure which makes survey outcomes hard
to interpret (cf. Ipsos Mori, 2010).
Thirdly, worries about migration, integration and related issues whichmay
influence survey outcomes are usually more implicit than explicit. In sum,
it is very well possible that population surveys on disorder do not picture how
ASB is perceived in different neighbourhoods. In response to these limitations,
we have taken on the suggestion made by British scholars Donoghue (2008)
and Jacobson (2008) argued that further research is required to establish the
ways in which individuals, communities, housing practitioners and other
professionals are experiencing ASB. According to them, local accounts of ASB
should be fundamentally concerned with understanding and explaining
individuals and communities lived daily experiences and realities. In particular
in the Dutch case, it seems to be critical to conduct this research in deprived
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urban neighbourhoods. These areas have the highest degree of immigrant
population and are designated problem areas.
4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH APPROACH
4.1 Research questions
In line with the observations above, we aim at making two contributions in
this paper. We have conducted extensive research directly in the context of
disadvantaged neighbourhoods, with an emphasis on a low threshold with
informal interviewing in the streets. Firstly, these primary and rich data enable
us to answer the questions: how do local inhabitants and key informants
perceive the problems in their neighbourhoods? To what extent do they
observe different forms of ASB? A sub question is also to which social groups
respondents link ASB, is it mainly to (certain groups of) immigrants? How does
this compare to survey outcomes and to claims made by politicians, in parti-
cular with respect to street terror? Drawing on earlier local studies on feelings
of unsafety conducted by Elffers andDe Jong (2005) we can expect local issues
to influence opinions of inhabitants of urban neighbourhoods. In some neigh-
bourhoods, these concerns relate to a local drug scene, in others to youth
hanging around, or to communication barriers between autochthonous in-
habitants and inhabitants with a migrant background. If, however, in dis-
advantaged areas street terror is indeed the pressing issue that national politi-
cians claim it is, this will be disclosed through our research strategy.
Our second contribution will be to attempt to respond to recent discussions
about the call for repression. Politicians time and again claim to step in for
‘ordinary people’ in deprived areas who call for repression. Questions which
so far are left unanswered are: to what extent are stronger measures indeed
called for by the public and if so by whom and in reaction to which societal
processes? How do residents and key figures perceive present measures and
who do they hold responsible?
4.2 Research Approach
We have selected eleven research sites in the four largest cities (Amsterdam,
Utrecht, Rotterdam and The Hague) from the official list of earlier discussed
40 districts approach. By way of quota sampling we have explicitly included
some neighbourhoods which have caught most of the negativemedia attention
and some who did not. We have focused on the largest cities because they
play a prominent role in the political and media debates. The areas can be
seen as extreme cases where a concentration of ASB problems is expected to
be found. Interviews with social workers, policemen, troublemakers themselves
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and residents of eleven so-called problem neighbourhoods in fourmajor Dutch
cities were conducted and analysed, as explained in more detail below.
We aimed at collecting rich data on the (local) public discourse. In line
with Hajer (2006), a discourse is defined as an ensemble of ideas, concepts
and categorisations through which meaning is allocated to a social pheno-
menon. A discourse analysis can, therefore, be considered a research tool,
providing insight to a confusing situation or development. Of course, it would
be wrong to assume the existence of a single and omnipotent discourse
(Uitermark & Gielen, 2010). Our goal is not to describe just one debate, but
to investigate the different views. A discourse analysis is the appropriate
method to figure out the complex construction of ASB on the street. The results
can reveal to which extent a certain policy includes people views.
When conducting a discourse analysis subjectivity is a concern, since the
method often requires one researcher to pass judgments on possible moti-
vations and interpretations (Coffey, 1996). In this paper we partly resolved
this issue by working with 55 Master students of Criminology who assisted
us with the research and with whom we discussed the findings.
While analysing discourses, it matters not only what actors say but also
how and where they say it. Actors in the public discourse in this article are
field experts, social workers, residents, local businessman, government per-
sonnel (local policemen, school teachers, street wardens) and offenders with
hands-on local knowledge. These actors were approached in the selected
neighbourhoods through:
· Semi-structured interviews with individuals concerned with ASB in the
selected areas.
· Informal interviews with inhabitants, often held in the streets.
Observations took place during differentmoments of the day, night andweek
in neighbourhoods. Under supervisions of the authors, the student- researchers
conducted the observations and interviews over a period of three consecutive
autumn months in 2008. The fieldwork resulted in 48 expert interviews, 257
interviews with local retailers and members of the public and 32 interviews
with offenders (337 in total). Furthermore, researchers carried out observations
in all selected neighbourhoods during tenweekswith aminimumof two times
per week at different hours. Observations lasted between one and four hours,
includingweekends and nights, resulting in an estimated 500 hours of observa-
tions. Students were free in deciding where to go and what threads to follow.
Although this may have resulted in a certain bias, an open approach is crucial
in exploratory research.With this studywe do not adhere to statistical notions
of representativeness. Criticism has been levelled at ‘convenience surveys’ for
their lack of representativeness and not without reason (Couper, 2000). The
present study is an exploratory one, which aims at counterbalancing serious
problems in the form of selective non-response in sample surveys of population
frames (Stoop, 2005), which are otherwise less recognised. Therefore, a certain
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extent of potential subjectivity is accepted as a trade-off for in depth know-
ledge.
Another drawbackwith the chosen research strategy could be that especial-
ly people who are the most fearful, seldom leave the house and are, therefore,
difficult to reach. To overcome this selectivity we decided on various research
locations, for instance shops, playgrounds, community centres and public
transport shelters. We specifically instructed students to put energy into con-
tacting hard-to reach categories of respondents.
Because of the relatively young population in the selected neighbourhoods,
deploying students, – in many cases female students –, appeared to be an
advantage in the research project. Most students were not familiar with the
neighbourhoods concerned. They were aware that they had to act street wise
and avoid dangerous situations. They usually went in pairs or small groups,
but they were also stimulated to be open minded and use every opportunity
to make contact. They often felt uneasy at the beginning of the research and
they were widely noticed as not belonging in the selected neighbourhoods
on the basis of their appearances. In most cases, they were quickly able to
overcome barriers, especially when they had made clear that they were not
journalists looking for sensational stories. A group of researchers experienced
intimidation on the streets when were subjected to verbal abuse and physical
threats by angry youngsters, but in the end gained trust. In one instance,
another group decided to refrain from conducting a neighbourhood survey
as a result of threats. Many students noticed that they had been looked up
throughHyves or other social networks. Several students used the social media
as well in order to contact respondents which they could not contact otherwise.
5 RESULTS: THE LOCAL PUBLIC DISCOURSE
In general, researchers noticed neighbourhoodswhich paid little resemblance
to their expectations based onmedia coverage. The environment in these ‘mean
streets’ looked far better than usually depicted and street life seemed lively
in many places. Numerous people in the streets expressed their satisfaction
with their living environment. When speaking to them about the fact that their
neighbourhood was a designated ’problem area’ people often seemed a bit
surprised. Onewoman suddenly understoodwhy her parents and some friends
did not want to park their car in her area.
A woman who lived with her family in one of the most infamous parts
of Rotterdam said: “When I stroll through the area, I know all the neighbours,
they know me, I stay around a while, speak to people, yes. You know; every
city has its positive and negative sides.”
Many respondents do not ignore the problems, but simultaneously stress
the liveliness and heterogeneity of their environment, what they appreciate.
Respondent: “I like it that there is some noise; I do not want to live in a quiet
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area.” In a way, these respondents seem proud to be coping in a situation that
others look down upon. Some respondents aremore complacent: “I fear I have
to stay here till I meet my end. Not really something to look forward to but
it can always be worse.” It must be noted, however, that many respondents
take steps to adapt their daily routine through fear of antisocial behaviour
or crime, for instance by avoiding certain streets or not going out at night or
even during day times. Being street wise is considered both normal and
necessary.
One aspect, which was observed, by researchers in many cases, was a
domination ofmen and boys – often with an immigrant background – in public
spaces and a high degree of group formation in the streets. Not only during
the night, but also during daytime, men seemed to dominate public spaces.
Although this was not something the research was actively aimed at, this
gendered public space was persistently noticed by the research assistants and
appeared to be an underestimated but potentially defining aspect of living
in the selected neighbourhoods. Another recurrent and less anticipated theme
was the media attention, or rather media obsession with antisocial behaviour
in the neighbourhoods concerned. Respondents continuously mentioned this
phenomenon which was a finding in line with earlier results from Elffers and
De Jong (2005). These two researchers asked youngsters in problematic urban
areas their response to this unwantedmedia attention and they were told that
some of them had started to ask for money when being interviewed.
In this study many respondents did not seem to have a clue about how
they could use the media attention in simple ways that would benefit them
more. They responded rather cynically to questions about attempting to use
the media to express their own opinions. The media are predominantly seen
as looking for sensation and reinforcing the negative stereotypes of the neigh-
bourhoods.
5.1 Discourses on ASB
During all conversations we tried to find out how local inhabitants and key
informants perceive (potential) problems in their neighbourhoods, and to what
extent they observe and experience different forms of ASB. It is known to be
a highly confusing concept and experiences of people will be combined with
what they have heard from others, what they have seen, heard or read through
the media, as well as with their more general outlook on life. When spon-
taneously providing examples of different forms of ASB, respondents listed
a wide variety of behaviours such as hanging around, abusive language,
pestering the elderly, junkies, vandalism, graffiti, road rage, loud noise, trash-
ingwindows, intimidating behaviour, cursing, car thefts, shoplifting and setting
fire to cars. Evidently, experiences differ widely. Respondents all had ideas
about it, and a first observation is that many of them mentioned criminal as
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well as sub-criminal behaviour under the same heading. A resident replied;
“ASB? Once in a while a window is broken, and some houses are burglarised.
But the biggest problem is the yobs hanging around.”
Others focused on criminal behaviour. “Just now, before you came, a
foreign boy hit a police man in the face. Their was a fight with the police. This
looked really sensational. Last week the same incident occurred. Those things
happen every week.” Another respondent added; “A few months ago they
drove through the neighbour’s front window and took the TV.” In sum, there
is no clear distinction made between crime and ASB, but people living in more
deprived areas seem to associate the term ASB with more extreme forms of
behaviour, such as intimidation, abusive behaviour, and violence.
5.2 Street terror?
Although we explicitly selected areas where problems were expected to be
highly pressing, respondents in eight (out of eleven) neighbourhoods did not
spontaneously mention street terror or related terms and issues in their
accounts. Only in three neighbourhoods ASB strongly dominated the conversa-
tion. In these areas respondents warned researchers and urged them to be
careful. An older woman related ASB to fear of victimisation: “At night you
should not walk here all alone, gal!” In one instance researchers were guided
by the police when going through certain streets, and occasionally they felt
threatened by groups of young people. In several cases, people referred to
the fear of intimidation or repercussions, which has stopped them from report-
ing antisocial behaviour and others have experienced intimidation or threats
in the past.
So, although we selected eleven extreme cases, street terror was only seen
as a pressing issue in a minority of the studied areas. For many local re-
spondents, ASB in the sense of street terror was not an issue to be at the fore-
front of their concerns. On the other hand, in three neighbourhoods there are
reports of problems that severely affect the quality of life.
In these three areas, inhabitants and key figures for instance reported a
struggle for power between rowdy youths and the police which echo concerns
about street terror. A school headmaster: “By way of reprisal they set fire to
cars, terrorised people and wrecked parks. The residents are really afraid and
keep quietly to themselves. The youngsters are no longer confrontedwith their
acts. Even a local police man said: “Fear reigns and the boys are in control”.
Residents tell how they learned to stay silent. “The community does not speak
out. There are a few troublemakers, my son had a row with them, but if you
interfere, your windscreen will be broken the next day (...). And then the next
time you will keep quiet.” Many respondents talked about these situations
in a resigned manner. They seemed to accept the situation, to some extent,
as normal or at least unavoidable. Yet, they also referred to the fact that
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problems like these have their own dynamics and after a while the problems
will shift to another place, or another issue will come to the fore.
5.3 Identifying trouble makers
The interviews and conversations highlighted how people associate the term
ASB with a range of factors, including wider cultural and societal issues (such
as lack of respect and education, moral decline and lack of community spirit),
as well as with particular types of individuals, cultures and perpetrators, often
focussing on young people as trouble makers. Interviewees generally touch
upon the issue of small children who are not properly raised and not sufficient-
ly supervised. For example: “According to me, the main problem is people
having too many children. They cannot control them. The children get bored
and misbehave. They cause distress. Sometimes I feel: the younger children,
worse the problems. I was spat in the face by a ten-year old boy, for no
reason.”
A second recurrent theme is youngsters hanging around in groups in public
spaces. In more than half of the neighbourhoods, immigrants are said to be
the main problem makers with the emphasis on Morrocan youngsters. “The
boys hanging around are not waiting for the tram. (…) Especially the
Moroccans I find scary. They are shouting.”
In three areas with many Moroccan teen-agers, their behaviour is con-
sidered normal juvenile behaviour and the streets are believed to be safe. A
manwho lived in his ethnic, diverse neighbourhood for 25 years said: “People
think it is dangerous here (…) but that is not true.” On the other hand, many
respondents were young people from all backgrounds, who felt wrongly
accused. They agree that they spend a lot of time in the streets, and they
complain about feeling bored. They feel disconnected from the rest of the
residents and like to defy the police. According to different youngsters the
police react aggressively at the slightest provocation. AMoroccan social worker
describes it as follows: “Especially the younger policemen, well, they really
act like they are in the army, like they are at the Gaza strip or so.”
Summarizing the local discourse on ASB, we can conclude that the assumed
state of street war was not depicted by the majority of the inhabitants and
key figures, although some policemen act like they are working in such a
condition. In three out of eleven neighbourhoods, discourses do echo concerns
on street terror, in the other eight to a much lesser extent. In most cases,
problems with youngsters played a dominant role. In half of the neighbour-
hoods, including those with the strongest complains, problems are associated
primarily with Moroccan youth.
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6 RESULTS: LOCAL SUPPORT FOR TOUGHER MEASURES?
Apart from studying perceptions, the next research question was how re-
spondents expect the government to react. A first observation is that awareness
of existing measures to tackle ASB tends to be high, with many respondents
mentioning that so much is done already. They bring up CCTV (closed-circuit
television) and more police supervision and often stress that there is enough
government interference. Many of them also mention improvements which
they have experienced themselves. A local inhabitant states; ‘In the past there
were troubles yeah, and that bad reputation stuck, but that is not correct
anymore.’ Our findings are in contrast with English research done by Ipsos
Mori (2010) where awareness of measures to tackle ASB tends to be low, with
most survey respondents (59%) saying they do not feel informed about what
is being done to tackle ASB in their area. This rises to 64% among those who
think ASB is a problem in their local area.
Overwhelmingly, the English survey respondents believe that it is the police
who are (solely or jointly) responsible for dealing with ASB (90% of the re-
spondents mentioned this), with the local council coming a distant second
(36%). After the police and the local council, it is felt to be the responsibility
of families, local communities and individuals themselves to deal with ASB.
In the Dutch study at issue here, respondents see a less dominant role for
the police. This is not the same as a lack of support for repressive policies or
strict policing. For example, there is some sense among respondents that, in
practice, the police and municipal agencies pay more attention to administra-
tion than to prompt responses to antisocial behaviour in the area. In the
public’s eye, the police do not always command enough respect in daily
encounters. On the other hand respondents also mention effective police
measures and refer to crucial intermediaries between the public and the
authorities, such as street coaches: “Street coaches are the eyes and ears of
a neighbourhood. When late at night there are small children on the street,
a street coach escorts them back home, to their parents.”
Although the police and other agencies are seen as being (partially) re-
sponsible for successful reactions, many interviewees also point to parental
responsibilities. A local school teacher: “So many things go wrong because
of bad parenting. Parents are often not even interested. It is not difficult to
predict that their child will take the wrong path.”
Even though, some social workers address the issue of nature as opposing
nurture (‘It is all about character and predisposition to ASB’), the majority
agrees that focusing onwelfare provisions and social measures, like preventing
truancy, are more effective than repressive measures. As one respondent
explained: “More police interference can lead tomore stigmatisation of young-
sters, especially those of Moroccan descent.”
In two areas, respondents mentioned explicitly that social cohesion was
low, and that it should be improved to counter ASB. A local teenager expressed
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this idea as: “When I do not know the guys on the street I am afraid, but if
I know at least one of them, then it is okay.”
Of all categories of respondents, retailers favour repressive measures the
most, but they also stress the effectiveness of already existing instruments like
dispersal powers and in some cases doubt if more instruments are needed.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Given our selection of extreme cases of deprived urban neighbourhoods, and
given the intensity of the research it is remarkable that only in a minority of
the research sites respondents see severe antisocial behaviour as a pressing
problem. Other than we expected, only in three out of the eleven neighbour-
hoods we came across more persistent stories of intimidation and threats that
seem to be in line with the much more general claims made by politicians.
Reviewing the eleven research sites we must conclude that findings and
experiences in the selected neighbourhoods were highly diverse and in many
cases, far less dramatic than frequently described. Taking into account the
nuanced picture that arises from the observations and interviews, both formal
and informal, we can conclude that – contrary to what we expected – we did
not unveil a major hidden issue. The popular image of deprived urban areas
that resemble war zones in which the streets are terrorised by groups of
immigrants has not been corroborated. This is not the same as denying certain
problems, as observed in three out of eleven research sites, but, which were
to amuch lesser extent also recognised elsewhere. A certain level of acceptation
of social problems and disorder that would not be accepted inmore well-to-do
areas has also been noticed, in line with earlier findings. Furthermore the
feelings towards ethnic minority youngsters as the main perpetrators of ASB
are mixed. Some inhabitants blame them for the troubles others downplay
their role and warn for the danger of stigmatisation.
Secondly, we looked at local support for repression. When summarizing
the highly diverse accounts of respondents in our research, the attraction of
repressive measures was considerably lower than expected. Although there
was a certain level of support for ASBO-inspired laws and regulations, in
particular, with retailers and shop owners, the attraction appears far greater
for national politicians than for most people locally concerned. Surprisingly,
many residents were well aware of existing policies andmany claimed to have
witnessed improvements rather than deterioration over the years prior to our
research. In contrast to British findings (Ipsos Mori, 2010) where the English
public overwhelmingly points to the police as the institution to deal with
antisocial behaviour, many of the Dutch respondents framed solutions in
general welfare state terms and terms of family responsibilities. Educational
support and community centres were often stressed and street coaches acting
as intermediaries between the police and communities were highly praised.
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The view that things already turned in the right direction as a result of in-
tensive policy making was not an exception. We can even hypothesise that
going further down the road of ASBO-style repression and intensifying the role
of the police, might threaten or even erase these feelings of collective responsib-
ility. In the UK, there is a growing awareness of this counter-effect of the ASBO
even to the point that in July 2010, Home Secretary Theresa May announced
her intention to reform or even abolish the ASBO in favour of alternative
’community-based’ social control policies (BBC, 29 July 2010).
Although we started our search with the intention to shed light on the
discrepancies between the available quantitative data – which does not show
an increase in ASB- and the public debate which paints a grim picture, we came
across another pressing discrepancy. Our research disclosed a wide gap
between the cluster of media/political debate on the one hand, and community
experiences on the other. If we would use our study as an indicator for the
public discourse and public demands within the neighbourhoods concerned,
we can conclude that the public voice is often represented in a highly biased
and incomplete way. Many national as well as some local politicians claim
that ‘something must be done’, without knowing against ‘what’ or ‘who’ the
actions should be taken according to whom.Without having clear ideas about
what ‘something’ amounts to, the debate becomes highly dependent onmedia
representations and stereotypes.
Many inhabitants see their neighbourhoods problems being used both for
political gain and for the search for sensationalism by themedia and the public.
Symbolic policies, which treat immigrants and street youths in a harsh way,
are thought to appeal to autochthonous voters (cf. BodyGendrot, 2000).When
politicians respondprimarily to sensationalmedia representations, a spiralling
dynamic of media-attention and politicians tapping into that will not help to
solve the actual problems in these neighbourhoods.We found that many local
agencies and actors are far from happy with these developments and point
to their downside. They favour a combination of several strategies over a one-
sided tough approach. This shows that next to differences between countries,
which are often recognized in the literature, differences between policy levels
(in this case national versus local) can also be salient. These unexpected out-
comes call for even more in-depth knowledge of local experiences and per-
ceptions. This information will help improve the effectiveness of government
and public agencies inmaintaining social order in disadvantaged urban areas.
Not only to supplement traditional quantitative surveys but also to counter-
balance skewedmedia representations and to include local policy experiences.
6 Assimilation of results and Conclusion
1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
When studying crime polices, an analysis of governmental rationales under-
pinning them, should be inevitable (Rose, 2006). This thesis examines the
implicit reasoning behind the measures fighting the so-called antisocial be-
haviour by youngsters on the street (in this thesis ASB in short). At first sight,
there appears to be a consensus on certain developments concerning this kind
of ASB. New and often more repressive policies are introduced to tackle the
assumed problem. These policies often presuppose rising crime rates, more
ASB and more public anxiety, as also Garland (2001) identified.
It is important to scrutinise these patterns concerning crime and ASB. After
all, patterns are easily taken for granted. Particularlywith respect to regulating
youthful behaviour, underlying rationales appear to go unchallenged. In this
context, ASB is believed to wreck communities and to constitute a pathway
to criminality (e.g. Burney, 2009; Crawford, 2009). Increasingly, deviant sub-
cultures are thought too robust to be changed by means of rehabilitative
strategies (Young, 2007; van Stokkom, 2007). The introduction of the ASBO in
the UK is an example of this frame of mind.
In this thesis, the rationales underlying the policies to address ASB were
identified within the Dutch discourses and compared on critical points to the
British situation. Both the British and Dutch discourses (legal, political, media
and public debate) on ASB were analysed. The objective of this study is to
discuss these rationales of ASB policies, within the context of a Culture of
Control. Analysing the discourses helps explain the emergence and construction
of a problem. In other words, analysing howwe talk about policy (in politics,
media and public) and how certain conduct is socially built. As the summary
of the discourse analyses will show, this mixture of rationales is far more
complex than is frequently assumed.
1.1 Rationales in legal discourse
In Chapter 2 the questionwhat kind of laws and measures were introduced to tackle
ASB in the Netherlands and the UK and what are the possible effects,was examined.
First, the debate around the implementation of the new measures like the
British Antisocial Behaviour Order (ASBO) has been analysed. In short; ASBOs
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have a minimum duration of two years, can last indefinitely and contain
prohibitions believed to be necessary to prevent repetition of the behaviour.
A civil court, -via, for example, the Social landlord- imposes the ASBO; and
breaching is a criminal offence.
Secondly, the recent Dutch law (Measures to Combat Soccer Vandalism
and Severe Antisocial Behaviour; henceforth law to combat severe ASB) address-
ing ASBwas studied (see appendix II and III). This law also grantsmore power
to local authorities. For instance, mayors can issue restraining orders, without
the interference of a judge and for a longer period of time than before.
The analysis demonstrated, that, although the ASBO is a mixture of civil
and criminal law rather than administrative and criminal law, as is the case
in the Netherlands, the policy rationales behind them are very similar.
First, in both countries, improving the living conditions for inhabitants
of rough urban neighbourhoods was said to be the starting point of the ASB
policies. The ASBO and the recent Dutch law was introduced to make these
areas more liveable and raise the feelings of security in the public domain.
Secondly, in both cases, local authorities are accorded more responsibilities.
This is in line with Garland’s responsibilisation strategy, in which community
agencies complement and extent the more formal control of state agencies in
the fight against crime. The primary objective of this approach is to spread
responsibility for crime control onto agents outside the criminal justice state.
The recurrent message is that the state alone is not, and cannot, be responsible
for controlling crime and ASB.
Furthermore, the measures are presented as an administrative (civil) not
a criminal weapon against crime, ASB and feelings of insecurity. The idea is
that by avoiding criminal law it is easier (faster) to address the problem.
The discourse analysis in Chapter 2, illustrated that the reforms and policy
proposals have come under heavy criticism because of unexpected and para-
doxical consequences. For instance:
I In the UK, the strategy of off-loading the judicial system had a reverse
effect. Ashworth (2004) and Steventon (2007) argue that it did not diminish
the power of the state, but rather enhanced it. They refer to this effect as
the net widening of the law. They motivate that more ASB is being
addressed by the law, instead of by social policies. Indeed, research showed
that, social measures addressing the root causes of ASB, such as parenting
orders, are less likely to be used (Donoghue, 2008; Burney, 2009;Matthews,
2007).
II The British ASBO and the Dutch restraining order are respectively a civil
and an administrative order, but to breach either one is a criminal offence.
The analysis demonstrated that in the UK this two-step approach had been
fiercely criticized (in theNetherlands this method already exists). Especial-
ly, the idea of admitting hearsay evidence in the criminal proceedings has
come under heavy criticism. As a result, researchers argue, these British
administrative measures can be more far-reaching than those of criminal
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sanctions, while the safeguards of due process are considerably less so
(Burney, 2009). In 2004, the Commissioner for Human Rights Gil-Robes,
expressed concern about this ASBO practice.
III Another point of critique is that the ASBO in practice is not the silver bullet
for the complex social issues that determine the living conditions in rough
neighbourhoods. The day-to-day-reality is far more complex than the policy
motivations suggested. For example, some teenagers wore the ASBO as a
badge of honour. Theywere proud of this confirmation of their toughness.
In addition, social workers complained youngsters are criminalised (seen
as criminals by the neighbourhood) for otherwise typical juvenile be-
haviour.
IV Furthermore, the definitions of the behaviour, activities, and situations that
the measures aim to counteract are often vague, which can lead to a net-
deepening of the law. In the UK, more behaviour that is otherwise lawful
can be criminalised when the term of an ASBO is breached. A range of
examples of how ASBOs have been applied confirm this thought. Such as
restraining orders preventing prostitutes from standing on a street corner
or carrying condoms, two young people banned from walking their local
streets which effectively prevented them from attending school (e.g.
Ashworth, 2004; Burney, 2009). The issue of legal certainty was also
addressed by the Council of Europe on Human rights and the members
considered the ASBO a cause for concern.
For Dutch politicians these points of critique could lead to the conclusion that
‘the grass is not always greener on the other side of the fence’. As Chapter 3
demonstrated, the majority of interviewed politicians do not seem to take these
issues into consideration.
In Chapter 2, not only a comparison between the UK and the Netherlands
was made. In addition, a parallel within the Netherlands was drawn, with
the application of the BIBOB tool1 addressing organized crime. This tool, an
administrative decision, is also said to be an effective method to reduce levels
of crime, in this case organized crime, without bringing criminal law into play.
The analyses demonstrated that the same paradoxical net-widening results
came up and that rather than being autonomous instruments of crime control,
the tools can be viewed as an extension of criminal justice. Thus the case of
‘reactions to ASB’ is not so unique in the current crime policy climate.
1 The BIBOB Act allows administrative authorities to refuse and withdraw licenses and
subsidies.
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1.2 Rationales in political discourse
The analysis of the Dutch political discourse (the breeding ground of policies)
in Chapter 3 presented one very dominant rationale; the need to cater to the
inferred anxieties of the voter. This is similar to the UK discourse. Almost
identical ways of reasoning (see following rationales 1-5) and the same solu-
tions (behavioural contracts) were observed in the political discourse. These
rationales for addressing ASB can be grouped as:
1. Measures are needed because the present arsenal is not effective enough.
2. ASB is increasing. The problem is getting worse by the day.
3. Quality of life argument. ASB makes people fearful and miserable and
therefore should be tackled.
4. The broken window theory. If ASB is left unattended, it leads to serious
crime.
5. Economic reasons. By addressing ASB, the cycles of economic and social
decline in neighbourhoods can be reversed.
These results appear to confirm the idea of a common Culture of Control.
However, as stated in Chapter 1, in comparative research there is tendency
of exaggerated claims, assumed from similarities in policy rhetoric. This
discourse analysis shows that there are remarkable differences between the
two countries as well.
I Other than in the UK, in the Netherlands the motivations for introducing
ASBO-type measures are tied up with difficulties with ethnic minorities.
Interviewees from all political parties (left and right wing alike) link ASB
to particularly (second generation) Moroccan youths. In the UK, ASB is less
coupled with immigration issues. As stated in Chapter 3, a reason for this
could be that the social problems in British inner cities are of a different
order (considering the English class society). On the infamous housing
estates unemployment, crime and ASB trouble all sections of the population;
British and immigrants alike. However, ethnic and/or racial minorities
are over-represented in the judicial systems of both countries. In paragraph
1.3 more attention will be paid to this issue.
II Furthermore, the comparative research shows that most Dutch politicians
stress ‘legitimacy of the government’ as a reason for tackling ASB. They
feel that in order to keep (or restore) the faith of the people, new repressive
actions against crime and ASB are vital. For the UK politicians this appears
a less acute problem. This difference is significant because, in their state-
ments, the Dutch respondents often use the ASBO as a legitimating power.
The disparity between the British and Dutch discourses on the issue of legit-
imacy of the government could originate from the so-called Pim-Fortuyn revolt
in the Netherlands. Several scholars debated that after his murder and after
attacks like 9/11 (and within the fight against terrorism) there is tendency
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among Dutch politicians to react to crime problems with strongmeasures (e.g.
Punch, 2005; van Swaaningen, 2008; Pakes, 2005). Almost all the Dutch inter-
viewees confirmed this idea of following trends in harsher crime control, in
order to keep the credibility of the government.
On the other hand the political discourse analysis showed that the soft
practices of the historic strong social policies in Dutch neighbourhoods are
not completely abandoned. Two left-wing politicians argued that the new
stricter laws should be combined with more social community work, stressing
that ASBO-inspiredmeasures can onlyworkwhen social agencieswork together
to address the root problems as well. However, nowadays in general, Dutch
politicians focus more on repressive measures.
The discourse analysis demonstrated further that most politicians, Dutch
and British alike, do not need real evidence for the effectiveness of the ASBO.
Tackling ASB both embodies a personal gut feeling and an appeal to popular
sentiments. Themyth of its success is enough. Dutch policy transfer of anti-ASB
measures, appears to be more a form of gaining inspiration than real lesson
drawing. An explanation for this line of reasoning can be the idea of pre-
cautionary logic, as among others suggested by Pieterman (2008), where the
lack of scientific evidence is not an excuse for inaction (see Chapter 3). Further-
more, this result is in line with Garland’s ideas on the proces of politicisation
of crime policies, inwhich criminological knowledge is downgraded and ideas
originating from individual experiences become the norm. In paragraph 2.2.
these identified political rationales will be discussed further within the context
of a Culture of Control.
1.3 Rationales in media discourse
In Chapter 4 it became clear that the media can be the prime movers of new
policies but at the same time can also be the interpreter of political views (the
seeds of the policies). The question how the discourse on ASB developed in the
British and Dutch media, was addressed. The comparison between media dis-
courses in the UK and the Netherlands showed that in both countries ASB is
seen as amajor problem that is on the rise, even though the ASB that is actually
experienced is decreasing or remaining at the same level.
However, there is a blatant difference in the discourses as well. Although
ethnic and/or racial minorities are over-represented in the judicial systems
of both countries, the media approach to ethnic minorities is strikingly differ-
ent. In the British media discourse on ASB, ethnic minorities hardly play any
role at all. Instead, a link is drawn between this kind of behaviour and white
youngsters from problem neighbourhoods. In the Netherlands though, the
recent focus on ruffians with a Moroccan background has mushroomed in
the press and among national politicians.
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This outcome raises another question; how can there be such a sizable
difference between the British andDutchmedia discourses on ASB on the street
and the role of minorities when the problems and policies are so similar? In
the Netherlands, the explanation given by various local politicians, policy-
makers and researchers is that the image that has emerged of ASB in themedia
and political discourses is an erroneous one. Youngsters from Moroccan
background are associatedwith ASB with disproportionate frequency and they
are often better integrated than suggested.
Several studies (e.g. Blom, 2005; Jennissen & Blom, 2007) confirm that first
and primarily second-generation immigrants fromMorocco aremore frequently
crime suspects than nativeDutch youngsters. The authors did not include any
specific information on ASB. However, although they show that there is a
problemwith some youngMoroccans, generalising statements about the link
between ethnicity and crime are often incorrect or flawed (e.g. Engbersen,
2007). According to additional figures, on the whole ASB remains the same
(or in some cases is decreasing) though the number of news items on ASB
continues to grow.
The British respondents have also been asked to explain the difference.
All of them indicate that British institutions and media are afraid of being
accused of racism. Due to the collective sense of guilt about the plight (as a
result of the colonial past) of ethnicminorities in British society, troublemakers
from this group are treated more like victims than as a kind of Folk Devils
(Cohen, 1973), as is the case in theNetherlands, according to some respondents.
Certainly, there is nothing new about this observed sense of guilt. Various
researchers (Isal, 2006; Matthews, 2007; Millie, 2006; Spalek, 2006) have noted
the great sensitivity in UKwhen it comes tomatters of ethnicity and crime/ASB.
This description of guilt is interesting because of course the Netherlands has
a colonial past as well, but Dutch media nowadays exercise less restraint.
Another explanation can be that the British situation in the inner cities in
essence, cannot be equated with the Dutch. Due to a mixture of reasons – as
discussed in Chapter 4 – the socio-economic differences between the neighbour-
hoods are much greater than in the Netherlands. There is a larger group of
white peoplewhose socio-economic position is poor and British cities aremore
segregated thanDutch ones. As suggested in Chapter 4 perhaps British institu-
tions and media are aware of how explosive the situation can be in the cities
and exercise a form of self-censorship on this subject. Considering the, in
general, aggressive British tabloids, this form of restraint is less likely.
1.4 Rationales in public discourse
The measures of regulation to fight the so-called street terror are often
legitimatised with a supposed public anxiety, as also Garland identified. The
study in Chapter 5 showed a more nuanced and mixed local public debate
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on this shifting policy landscape than politicians would like us to believe. The
research took place on eleven sites in the four largest Dutch cities (Amsterdam,
Utrecht, Rotterdam and The Hague) from the official list of the so-called 40
districts approach. The focus was on these largest cities because they play a
prominent role in the political and media debates. The areas can be seen as
extreme caseswith an expected concentration of ASB problems. Although these
problem areas were explicitly selected, only in three urban areas ASB strongly
dominated the public debate. The popular picture of neighbourhoods that
resemble ghetto’s where groups of immigrants terrorise the locals, has not
been supported. This is not the same as denying problems of disorder, but
only in three out of the eleven neighbourhoods more persistent stories of
intimidation and threats that seem to be in line with the claims made by
politicians, rose to the surface.
When summarising the highly diverse accounts of respondents, the
attraction of tough and repressive measures was considerably lower than
expected beforehand. Although, there was a certain level of support for ASBO-
inspired laws and regulations in particular with retailers and shop owners,
the attraction appears far greater for national politicians (see Chapter 3) than
for most people locally concerned. Many residents were well aware of policy
measures that were taken already andmany claimed to havewitnessed impro-
vements rather than deterioration over the years prior to the research.
This is in line with earlier research that demonstrated the well established
position of the Dutch government in disadvantaged areas (Burgers, 2009). On
the other hand it was in contrast to British findings, where awareness of
measures to tackle ASB tends to be low, with most survey respondents (59%)
saying they do not feel informed about what is being done to tackle ASB in
their area. This rises up to 64% among those who think ASB is a problem in
their local area (Ipsos Mori, 2010).
Chapter 5 showed awide gap between the cluster ofmedia/political debate
on the one hand and local experiences on the other. It became clear that the
views of the public (the roots of the policies) that are frequently used as a
justification for crime policies are translated by politicians. The analysis of
the public discourse and public demands within the neighbourhoods con-
cerned, shows that the public voice is often represented in a biased and incom-
plete way. Several inhabitants explained this gap by claiming their neighbour-
hood is being used for political gains.
1.5 Overview of the rationales found in the discourses
The above discussed analyses presented a construction of the problem of ASB.
In every separate discourse specific assumptions underlying the policies were
recognised. In order to asses these rationales within the context of a Culture
of Control, an overview is presented. The six main rationales as identified in
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Chapter 3 serve as a guideline for this summary, with further motivations for
ASB policies as found in the four discourses, completing the picture.
Table 6.1 – Summary of presented results
Dutch political rationales for tackling ASB as
identified in Chapter 3
Additional results found in the discourse
analyses of this thesis
1. One loud public call for tougher action The public discourse is more diverse than
politicians appear to believe. The media do
articulate this call for necessary action.
2. Individual experiences are important in
political debate
Politicians and media downgrade
criminological findings.
- a. ASB is a growing issue Politicians and media dismiss the research
that shows ASB on the street is not rising.
Some (local and national) politicians
suggest that maybe attention for ASB is
increasing, not so much the actual problem.
- b. especially tough measures are necessary Politicians and media dismiss the research
that shows that repressive measures alone
are not effective. In day-to-day practice the
more ‘soft’ approach still exists.
3. New and more action is necessary,
otherwise the credibility of the government
will be undermined
Respondents in deprived urban
neighbourhoods mention so much is done
already.
4. Close link ASB and particularly Moroccan
youths
Confirmed by all politicians, regardless of
their political affiliation. Equivocal statistics
on possible over-presentation of young
Moroccans regarding ASB. Several local key
figures (police and politicians) claim ASB
problems get disproportionate amount of
attention. In general, the figures on ASB
remain the same, but number of news
items keeps growing.
5. Close link ASB and crime The legal discourse showed ASB definitions
are vague and sometimes include criminal
behaviour. More ASB than before is
criminalised2 and more (young) people are
stigmatised.
6. Cycle of economic and social decline
should and can be reversed
Is politically linked with ideas on restoring
community feelings and importance of
social capital.
2 Criminalising not in the sense of penalising behaviour but of labeling behaviour as criminal.
Assimilation of results and Conclusion 111
2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
In order to answer the overarching research question,which rationales underlying
the policies to address antisocial behaviour by youngsters on the street can be identified
within the Dutch discourses and how can these rationales be assessed within the
context of a Culture of Control, the following step is to combine these identified
rationales within the context of a Culture of Control.
Intrinsic to this research question and chosen research methods, are com-
plex and detailed results. This complexity is sometimes overlooked in publica-
tionswhich confirm the Culture of Control, althoughGarland stressed before,
the field of crime policies is multifaceted, and often has a contradictory char-
acter. This thesis, as will become clear in following paragraphs, undeniably
identified a complex network of policy rationales. This is in part in line with
Garland’s so-called schizophrenic crime control complex. To prevent any lack
of clarity in discussing these complicating and sometimes conflicting results,
first an overview of the primary observations will be presented.
Table 6.2 – Overview of assessing rationales within the context of a Culture of Control
Garland’s observations of selection of
changes (as addressed in Chapter 1)
In relation to rationales as identified in the
Dutch discourse analyses in this thesis
Changes in emotional tone of crime policy
discourse.
Identified in political and media debate, but
public is less angry and fearful than
Garland described (see I in following
paragraph).
Protecting the public as a perennial concern of
crime policy.
Indeed public fear is presented as motif by
politicians (although more often in practice
the media is their main concern) (see I ).
Politicization of crime policies and the new
populism.
ASB appears a tool for political gain (I & III)
Criminological knowledge is more and
more ignored, populism in politics is still
rising although public more nuanced (II).
Expanding infrastructure of crime prevention
and community safety (including civil society).
Partly identified in local areas (VII).
A continuous sense of crisis. In political and media analyses a strong
rise in attention for ASB is identified (IV).
Policy responses to change according to
Garland (Chapter 1)
In relation to rationales as identified in the
Dutch discourse analyses in this thesis
1. adaptation
- responsibilisation strategy. In line with Garland; community agencies,
other than the state agencies, help to fight
crime (V).
- defining deviance down. Policy discourse showed more ASB than
before is criminalised (III).
- focus on effects of crime rather than its
causes.
In the four discourses causes for ASB appear
less relevant.
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2. non-adaptive responses
- denial of described predicament and
reinstate myth of strong state (net-
widening).
This process occurs, although ASB policies
in some respect also more socialised (for
instance, parental support) and are in
practice often not that tough (V & VII).
- government acting out (symbolic policies;
in relation to concept of moral panic).
Politicians introduce measures as new and
tough (acting out) but often policies are not
brand new but fine-tuned. Although
elements of concept of moral panic are
present; there is not a massive call for tough
action (VI).
In Chapter I identified discrepancies in
Garland’s analyses of Culture of Control
(CofC)
Thesis results
1. Actors in policy process did not get
equal attention in his study.
By addressing four discourses a more
complete picture of differing reactions and
views on ASB policies arose; also
undercurrents in the CofC identified. Not-so
rational rationales come into view (I – IX).
2. Assumption new social fact of high crime
rates difficult to judge on empirical level.
Judging the results, high (sub) crime rates
have not become a social fact in all
discourses, especially in the public
discourse a more subtle approach to the
problem was identified (I-IX ).
3. Empirical evidence for statement on level
of influence of the media is poor.
It is not so much the supposed rising rates
of ASB and crime that changed how people
think, but more the media and politicians
that produced these changes.
4. Not many comparisons between Anglo
Saxon situation and European countries.
Different divergences (more populism and
social exclusion) than Garland expected
(IX).
In Chapter 1 identified discrepancies in
possible Dutch version of CofC
Thesis results
1. Uniqueness of role of young immigrants
is not questioned.
Dutch media and politicians pay more
attention to ASB & young immigrants
(compared to the British situation) and
attention is of a different, more
stigmatising, nature (VIII).
2. Little empirical research on the role of
media and politicians in construction of the
problem of ASB.
Media discourse analysis demonstrated that
intensive media attention for ASB leads to
policy changes and introduction of new
laws (i.e. law to combat severe ASB).
Politicians consider the media to be the
spokespersons of the public, only the public
and local politicians do not feel represented
by the media (IV & VIII).
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Of course this summary can not be complete. To identify the reasons behind
the policies for and construction of ASB, the results in the above presented
overview will be discussed in more detail in the next two paragraphs. This
approach makes the necessary differentiations possible and will shed light
on the different shades of meaning.
2.1 Discrepancies in the debate on the Culture of Control
As was argued in Chapter 1 and presented in table 6.2, it is difficult to support
or contradict some claims made by Garland. Several ideas such as the
reemergence of punitive sanctions, expressive justice, the return of the victim
and politicisation of crime issues are widely supported. Others, like for
instance, the level of social acceptance of high crime rates are criticised. Gar-
land himself makes critical remarks on his own study too. He acknowledges
that he focuses more on the established policies than on the one that failed
to gain support and that a study of patterns in defined locales could provide
more evidence for the structural developments he identified (Garland, 2004).
Some of his statements are indeed difficult to judge on an empirical level.
For example, Garland did not provide much empirical evidence for his state-
ment on the level of influence of themedia and politics. Also his basic assump-
tion of ‘high crime rates becoming a social fact’3 is actually not so explicitly
grounded. He did not clarify the term ‘social fact’ and left questions like
whether the crime rates were ever doubted or were just assumed to be true,
unanswered. He also did not study in detail the construction process of this
problem becoming a social fact.
Furthermore, his idea on the Culture of Control having a wide appeal for
countries besides the USA and the UK, was not empirically tested. This study
of the Dutch situation unraveled the way people, politicians and media talk
about, discuss and construct views on ASB on the street, outside the Anglo
Saxon world. Analysing these British and Dutch discourses shed light on the
possible (dis) similarities in responses to ASB in the two different countries.
2.2 Complex policy patterns within the context of a Culture of Control
I
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the distinction between discourses is a heuristic
device; in reality, discourses are not that uniform. The actors involved do not
form the same views, along the same lines. It is therefore not surprising to
find a variety of ideas within one particular discourse. However, this study
showed that politicians tend to ignore this diversity of opinions within the
3 For more discussion see paragraph 4.2.
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public debate. They claim, or at least suggest, that there is one loud call for
tougher action, especially in crime-ridden urban areas.
Although Dutch politicians– at least the one’s that were interviewed–
motivate their repressive approach to ASB with reference to widespread public
opinion, in fact the public discourse is far more diverse than politicians appear
to believe. This disceprancy is one of the more salient results of the discourse
analyses in this present study.
The political rationale of ‘acting tough because the public asks for it’
confirms Garland’s observation of the changes in the emotional tone of crime
policies. He identified a fearful, angry public that has a direct impact on
politicians and policy- and lawmaking.
However, in this study it became clear that the public debate, at any rate
in the Netherlands, displays a wide range of opinions. Even in rougher neigh-
bourhoods, many respondents do not take an extreme position on how to
tackle the problem. The attractiveness of tough and repressive measures was
considerably lower than expected beforehand. Across the board these reactions
do not resemble Garland’s picture of a fearful, angry public. In the political
discourse in the Netherlands, these nuances within the public discourse do
not trickle through. In the interviews, Dutch politicians explained that they
feel they have to respond to outcries in a) the media– although in essence the
media are a second-hand source of information, they are often the primary
source for politicians; and b) to the requests of voters who email them. Forms
of direct contact with neighbourhood residents is limited.
This information gap could be the reason for a rather limited political
understanding of the public debate, and allows political motives to gain the
upper hand in the construction of the problem. For example, respondents from
the more conservative parties (VVD and PVV) claimed young Moroccans are
the biggest problemwhere ASB is concerned. Although they were not the only
politicians to say so, one of them explicitly linked this to their political issue
of restricting immigration, stating that for those troublemakers sending them
back to Morocco was an option.
In short, the analyses of the public and political discourses demonstrated
that in some cases, the problem of ASB is framed in a way that makes it
possible to exploit it as a tool for political gain. This charged political climate
surrounding ASB creates an opportunity to further inflate the problem. Garland
and other criminologists (Loader & Sparks, 2010; Simon, 2007) observed that
crime politics and the policy debate around crime in general are heating up.
However, the results in this study showed that not only the debate is heating
up, but also the problem itself is actually getting warmer. Thus, by framing
a problem in a certain way– in this case ASB – the problem actually does
increase, because of themedia and political attention it receives. Here the well-
known principle of the sociologist William Thomas (1928) comes to mind: ‘If
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. This does
not imply that the problem of ASB does not exist but that the political inter-
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pretation and the media’s framing of the problem act to accelerate the action.
This process will be explicated further in the following analysis.
II
Garland argued that in this process of politicising crime policies, criminological
knowledge is downgraded and commomplace notions become the norm. This
was unmistakably true for the political discourse in question. Both British and
Dutch politicians rejected the importance of thorough scientific research and
confirmed their preference for action. Accordingly, they dismissed research
showing that the problem of ASB on the street is not growing, and that re-
pressive measures alone are not effective. The respondents value political
advantage over the views of experts and the evidence of research. Themajority
of the politicians argued that they know from their own experience that ASB
is a major problem that has to be addressed.
This political undervaluation of research is relevant in the context of public
criminology; that is, in the debate about what role criminologists can play in
pursuing a better (in the sense of better informed) politics of crime (Barak,
2001; Braithwaite, 2005; Uggen & Inderbitzin, 2006; Tittle, 2004; Burawoy, 2005;
Groombridge, 2007; Loader & Sparks, 2010).
According to this idea of a public criminology, criminologists are supposed
to supply ready-to-use information on how to deal with crime and ASB. Public
criminology, from this perspective, is not a debate about whether criminologists
should try to engage a broader non-academic audience, but whether and how
criminological knowledge can contributemore successfully to the public debate,
given the hot climate in which it must operate. Thus, Loader and Sparks (2010)
see public criminology as a possible cooling device for the hot political climate.
Tonry (2010) rightly points out that certain kinds of criminology research have
evidently had influence on crime policy. For example, governments have
clearly followed findings of research that focused on crime prevention (parti-
cularly situational prevention).
However, the analyses in this thesis demonstrated that even if the informa-
tion on crime developments is accurate and available, politicians only tend
to use it for their own political goals. The hot political climate surrounding
crime is not cooled down effectively by (fairly) credible statistical evidence
(for example the not proven effect of ASBOs or figures that do not endorse the
general idea of a major problem of ASB).
In general, the effort to rationalise politics ignores the cultural sources of
crime politics, such as the potential political benefits and the role that media
attention plays for politicians. It simply assumes that crime and ASB are what
they are, rather than being attentive to how ASB is constructed and framed
as a social subject in the different discourses.
From an evidence point of view, ASB on the street is a relatively minor
threat (in the sense of growth and scale) and one that is already targeted by
various crime-reducing policies. However, the heated media reports and
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political discourses on the effects of the ASB have little to do with the facts,
and cannot easily be cooled down bymore facts. For example, when confront-
ing the politicians in the interviews with more evidence on the unchanging
status of ASB, they simply dismissed it with the argument that from their own
experience they know it is a growing problem and that social science is often
inconclusive. They argued that not reacting to the problemwould undermine
the credibility of the government and therefore the introduction of the new
law to combat severe ASB was justified.
What do these results mean for public criminology? In theory, crimino-
logists should probably take the more ‘emotional’ elements of politics into
account in their efforts to cool down the hot crime issues. But this is easier
said than done. It is nearly impossible for researchers, when presenting
research results, to deliberately weigh their potential effect on the construction
of the problem. It could even undermine the academic impartiality of crimin-
ologists if they do consider the effects of their research.
A more effective approach could be to enhance the public role of crimin-
ologists. They should not onlymakemore knowledge available for politicians
and policymakers but also provide facts and data on crime to the media. In
other words, they might educate the media so as to contribute to a cooler
politics of crime; for example by organising special crime issue groups where
scientists and media representatives come together to discuss outcomes of
recent criminological research. Consequently, the media will be better
positioned to interpret the results and to contribute constructively to policy-
making.
Although in essence perhaps a somewhat naive suggestion, this may still
prove a more effective way to influence the course of events. After all, as
emerged through the discourse analyses, the media appear to be primemovers
in this debate.4
III
To sum up I and II, Dutch politicians base their arguments on a) a public
outcry that is more diverse (as the field work showed) than they seemwilling
to acknowledge and b) a feeling of urgency that is not corroborated by statist-
ical data on increasing ASB problems. This is a relevant observation, especially
because – as the legal discourse analysis revealed – deviance is defined down,
as Garland also identified. More behaviour is being criminalised5 than before
and more (young) people are stigmatised as a result. Garland described this
4 In the US, a start has been made by founding an organisation (The Campbell Collaboration)
devoted to collecting relevant evaluation research (not only on crime) and making this
available to policymakers andmedia sources. In the Netherlands this initiative was followed
with the founding of the Erkenningscommissie Gedragsinterventies Justitie.
5 Criminalising, not in the sense of actually penalising behaviour but of labeling behaviour
as criminal.
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adaptive response to these (sub) crimes as well; only he did not relate this to
the political rationales as discussed above. If the two observations, a) more
behaviour is criminalised on b) ill-foundedmotivations are combined, a rather
bleak picture of Dutch policy processes and political motives in the field of
ASB emerges.
The picture is clouded further by the fact the majority of the interviewed
Dutch politicians (regardless of their political orientation) stick to the view
that more repressivemeasures are still necessary to tackle ASB and at the same
time right-wing politicians in the UK acknowledge the undesirable course that
ASB policies have taken and are suggesting a return to a more rehabilitative
and restorative approach (all the more remarkable since it is generally the
leftist political parties that advocate this ‘softer’ approach to crime). It should
be noted that the reason for these differences between the two countries could
be that the UK embarked on its anti-ASB policies much earlier, and that these
policies have simply worn out. This idea will be discussed further in para-
graph 6.3.
Garland’s observation that a tough approach to (sub) crime policies is no
longer restricted to right-wing political parties can in part be derived from
the political discourse analysis as well, although this is evenmore ambiguous
than Garland already presumed. Left-wing politicians still indicated their
preference for policies with a social character but explained that these had
to be coupled to more repressive measures, such as the new law to combat
ASB; again a demonstration of the so-called adaptive responses to crime.
IV
The analysis of the media discourse has theoretical implications as well. As
was mentioned earlier, in both countries ASB is seen as a major problem that
is on the rise, even though the ASB that is actually experienced is decreasing
or remaining steady. Amajor disparity between the two countries is themedia
approach to ethnic minorities. In the British media discourse on ASB, second-
generation immigrants do not appear on the front-page. In the Netherlands
however, media attention for rascals from Moroccan backgrounds has
exploded.
Garland explicitly desists from only pointing the finger at media attention
for the complex system of crime policies. He states that the media did not
produce this change but tapped into it. Garland blames ‘the social fact of high
crime rates’, that is, the social acceptance of supposedly higher crime rates,
for the schizophrenic crime policies. According to his line of thought, high
crime rates are interpreted as signs that crime control is based on a model
that is inadequate to its tasks. Consequently, he argues that the public has
lost confidence in the criminal justice system and in the politicians that are
responsible for it.
Nevertheless, in the case of ASB (and of crime, for that matter) the general
picture is one of unchanging figures; so this is probably not the primary cause
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of the above-identified political rationales. It thus looks like the Dutch media
play a bigger role in the described political climate than Garland assumed
in his theory. A letter to Parliament from Wim Cornelis, Mayor of Gouda, a
city with much publicised cases of street terror, confirms this line of thought.
He states that the media are overly negative about how Moroccan teenagers
in his city terrorise people on the streets, and that they are publishing increas-
ingly alarming articles on the problems (letter dated 7 October 2008). As a
result of this alarmist tone in the media, political reactions are ‘out of pro-
portion’, according to Cornelis. Police Chief in Central Holland, Jan Stikvoort,
similarly accused Parliament of blowing the problems with Moroccans out
of proportion; ‘When people including politiciansmake rash statementswith-
out any qualifications and are quoted in the media, a whole unwarranted
media hype is created. Things are improving and there has been a decrease
in the number of criminal charges that are filed. This is not the same as deny-
ing there is a problem, but it is not nearly as serious as people say’ (de Volks-
krant, 4 October 2008). These quotes (among others see Chapter 4) point to
a mediatisation of politics, as will be discussed further in the next paragraph
(3). Earlier criminological research already revealed that the media indeed
tend to exaggerate the proportions of crime (e.g. Jewkes, 2004; Carrabine, 2008;
Greer, 2010). It is generally acknowledged that the risk of crime as portrayed
in the media is both quantitatively and qualitatively more serious than the
official statistically recorded picture (Matheson, 2005; Vasterman, 2005;
Scheufele, 2007). The analyses of the media discourse demonstrated that
intensivemedia reactions can have far-reaching policy consequences. Politicians
consider the media to be the spokesperson of the public; even if the public
and local politicians do not feel represented by the media.
V
These latter observations of local politicians echo earlier findings on the tension
between national and local politics. Local practitioners translate national
policies in a variety of ways. This result relates to Garland’s claim that national
crime control strategies are accompanied by on-going, low-key local efforts
to build up the social control within neighbourhoods. He attributes this adaptive
(acknowledging the changes and adjusting to them) policy response more to the
administrative machine of the state (for example, the street level bureaucrats
who are faced with various forms of deviance on an everyday basis and have
more pragmatic approaches to crime control) (2001, p. 112).
Other researchers (Jacobson, 2008; Crawford, 2009) also identified this gap
between policy intent and its implementation on the ground. Crime policies
are set at the national level but the actual fight against nuisance and insecurity
takes place at a local level. This process is also referred to as local governance
of crime (van Swaaningen, 2005). Local authorities have continued to pursue
social policies in spite of their tough rhetoric. This is not surprising, as also
Uitermark and Duyvendak (2005) argued, since new policies are introduced
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within the context of the former ones. Despite the fact of a shift in politics,
at the actual implementation level policies are far more practical, for example
at the level of local civil servants. This is particularly so because the old
programmes are not disqualified officially and seem to work in practice.
Thus, although the interviewed national politicians want to expand the
options in tackling ASB, local practitioners and politicians tend to stick to the
already available possibilities. This is probably due to the fact that the day-to-
day local problems are far more complex than the policymakers at national
level (can) take into consideration. Although several local politicians do not
deny that there are problems with these groups, they also state that numbers
are decreasing.
With this inmind, some respondents argued that more repression in small
urban communities could lead to more ASB problems (see Chapter 5). To some
extent local authorities fear that the new measures and laws like to one to
combat severe ASB, may undermine police-community relations and leave
young people feeling resentful and unfairly stigmatised, and theywill therefore
prefer to stick to the old ones.
VI
In this present study, politicians claim they heed the wishes of the people,
but as became clear, they appear to be conditioned by the alarmist media
reactions. This is in line with Garland’s argument that there is a tendency to
focus on politicians as the prime movers in bringing about penal change, but
in reality they are often the final movers rather than the primary ones. In this
situation the concept of amoral panic, as Garland also suggested (2008), comes
to mind. The literature around this issue has many dimensions and not all
are important for this study (e.g. Cohen, 1973, 2002; Waddington, 1986;
McRobbie & Thornton, 1995; Thompson, 1998; Ungar, 2001). Furthermore,
although this concept is often more an observation than an explanation and
has attracted a number of recurring criticism (e.g. Goode& Ben Yehuda, 1994)
it still can be relevant for this study. Especially because several respondents
claimed that the size and tone of the reactions to ASB contain elements of a
moral panic (see chapter 4 and 5).
However, one of the main conditions of a moral panic, a moral public
outrage as described by Stanley Cohen (1973; 2002), was not found in the
analyses. Undeniably, dissatisfaction with various forms of ASB was noted in
the public discourse, but a massive call by the Dutch public for tough action
was not detected. Consequently, other qualities of exaggeration and alarm,
often provided by moral panic analyses, are also not relevant for this study.
Because when a problem is all in all not perceived as alarming the often
discussed question of (dis) proportion of the reaction is beside the point. In
other words when the public does not feel the extent of the conduct or the
threat it poses is a major predicament, the reaction can never be an exaggera-
tion.
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Nevertheless other defining elements of a moral panic do flow from the
analyses. For instance, the relevant behaviour, in this case ASB;
1) has existed for some time but suddenly appears in the limelight.
ASB has always been a part of daily life but now is at the centre of political
and media attention (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4).
2) becomes defined as a threat to societal values and interests.
ASB is politically linked to crime, economic and social decline, the credibil-
ity of the government and problemswith the integration ofminorities (see
Chapter 3).
3) is presented in the mass media in a stereotypical fashion.
The analyses of the media discourse illustrated that ASB was often dubbed
‘street terror’. ASB became a symbol of societal decay. Media reports left
little room for differentiation or counter-voices (see Chapter 4).
4) leads to real changes in legal and social policy.
Several new measures and laws, were introduced to tackle ASB, although
some older forms of policies were left relatively unchanged (see Chapter 2).
These last four points are more or less true for the Dutch case of ASB. But again,
one of the main conditions of a moral panic, a wide public outcry, in the sense
of a massive outrage over the scale of ASB, could not be detected in the public
discourse. The media and the politicians (triggered by media reports) claim
a public moral outcry, but the public itself leaves more room for nuances and
mixed approaches to the problem of ASB. The public reaction is less consensual,
and more or less divided. These mixed views do not always trickle through
in the media, which could lead to a distorted picture of events, with several
politicians believing that some Dutch streets are terrorised by youngsters.
To conclude, on the one hand the broad social reaction can not be described
as a classic consensual moral panic, and as Garland (2008) mentioned, these
are perhaps decreasingly common in complex contemporary societies. While
on the other hand, the social reaction in a limited sense (restricted to the
political andmedia reaction) does containmany qualifications of a classicmoral
panic. Thus, one can argue that for the establishment of a moral panic an
outraged public is not longer a necessity.
VII
Another noteworthy result from the analyses is that the policies tackling ASB
are not as tough as the political rhetoric suggests. The various continuities/
discontinuities in crime policies that have been identified not only exist at a
general level between different policy domains, but also out on the street, in
their implementation. On the one hand, the results demonstrate how social
policy is becoming criminalised, in the sense of ‘using’ social institutions, such
as social services and local departments of education, in the fight against crime
and ASB (see paragraph 2.2.2).
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On the other hand, there is evidence of crime policy becoming socialised.
This means that what is defined by the political and media discourses as a
crime problem (ASB), is also addressed through strategies and technologies
associatedmore with social policy. For example, the approach of the ‘Founda-
tion to Address ASB in Amsterdam’ (Stichting Aanpak Overlast Amsterdam;
SAOA) combines street surveillance (essentially a crime-fighting instrument)
by especially trained locals (straat coaches) with house visits by official care
providers (originally social services). These two strategies are also the spear-
heads of official policies introduced by the collaboration of 22 city councils
to tackle problems with Dutch Moroccan youths (Ministerie van VROM, 2009).
What is more, several Dutch policies to tackle ASB did not intrinsically
change, but weremore or less fine-tuned. For instance, the new law to combat
severe ASB givesmore power to local authorities. Mayors can issue restraining
orders for people who have displayed ASB, without the interference of a judge
and for a longer period of time than the current law permits. The restraining
order can be issued for a year and must be reviewed every three months.6
If the order is breached, it becomes a criminal act (on the basis of the already
existing article 184 Sr) and the case can be brought before a criminal court.7
This is more about expanding the possibilities of tackling ASB than introducing
entirely new measures. These adjustments were presented in the media and
political discourse as necessary and significant changes. The existingmeasures
were dismissed as ineffective and insufficient. The general idea is that ‘poli-
ticians have to do something’, and that this acting out emphasises the capacity
of the government to control crime.
VIII
The Dutch public discourse analysis illustrated that the groups that are most
affected by the newly adapted policies and laws, are the ones that lack political
power. In half of the observed neighbourhoods, including those with the
strongest complaints, problems are associated primarilywithMoroccan youth.
These young immigrants do not have voting rights yet and feel in a way
isolated from Dutch society. According to some interviewed youngsters the
police react aggressively at the slightest provocation.
This observation is in line with Garland (2001, p. 135). He argues that the
denial strategy (the government acting out) is possible because of these targeted
groups that lack political power. He states that they are portrayed in themedia
as dangerous and undeserving. The newly introduced policies effect them,
but according to him, they do not have the (legal) means to react or protest.
Garland described them as vulnerable, but considering their sometimes strong
language and obvious presence on the streets, probably exposed is a better
description.
6 Or one can be ordered to report at certain times.
7 A prison sentence up to three months or a fine can be the end result.
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Themedia discourse analysis demonstrated how in the Netherlands, ethnic
youngsters are indeed frequently portrayed as dangerous in the newspapers
and are linked with supposed societal developments like neighbourhoods
falling into disrepair or the general coarsening of manners. In addition, while
analysing the political discourse it became clear that they often are the targets
(although not always explicit) of new policies.
These results are, besides confirming Garland’s ideas, also in line with
Cohen (1973; 2002) who described similar marginalised groups in the centre
of reactions and debates around crime and named them Folk Devils. He stated
that the concept of a Moral Panic and their Folk Devils have interactive re-
lationships. He described a looping effect of deviance amplification that
occurred when media attention and increased control lead to the hardening
of the original deviance.
The public discourse analysis in this thesis demonstrated that some of the
targeted youngsters indeed tend to behave accordingly to the media image.
Several young respondents complained about negative media attention and
they did not seem to have a clue about how they could use the media attention
in ways that would benefit them more. They responded rather cynically to
questions about attempting to use the media to express their own opinions.
The media are predominantly seen as ‘looking for sensation’ and ‘reinforcing
the negative stereotypes of the neighbourhoods’. A few of the interviewed
Moroccan youngsters expressed feelings of isolation and stigmatisation. Some
of them mentioned that they did not bother to adapt their ASB because the
police would keep addressing them as troublemakers anyway (see Chapter 5).
IX
Another line of inquiry of this thesis involved comparing the Dutch and British
situation. Garland argued that crime control strategies in different Western
countries are in many ways the same. Indeed, the overall currents of change,
like those in the emotional tone of crime policy and the politicisation of crime
polices, appear similar on the surface. However, at a ‘lower’ (local) research
level, differences became clear. For example, the previouslymentioned content
ofmedia discourses differs considerably, as does the implementation of policies
between the two countries.
This is again in line with Garland who argues that despite a rather limited
variety of adaptive patterns, there maywell be differences between European
and Anglo-Saxon nations in their versions of the Culture of Control. Only the
differences are not the ones he expected. According to Garland, European
nations typically have omnipresent state bureaucracies and multiple-party
political systems and are therefore less exposed to popular pressure and so
less susceptible to punitive populism. He states that – thanks to their educa-
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tional system – (especially northern8) European countries do not produce
underclass populations excluded from the social and economic mainstream
the way Anglo-Saxon nations do. However, the discourse analyses showed
that populist views on ASB (and crime) have a wide appeal in the Netherlands
as well and that social exclusion sometimes is a day-to-day reality (although
on a different scale than in the UK).
So to conclude, several elements of the Culture of Control can be recognised
in the Dutch discourses as well, but all in all they appear even more am-
biguous.Media attention plays a bigger role in Dutch ASB (crime) politics than
Garland described for the UK; high ASB (crime) rates are less of a social fact;
politicians not only ignore but almost despise criminological research, and
they claim to act on behalf of a public outcry that in reality is not that loud.
Adaptive and non-adaptive policies on paper coexist but in daily practice the
more pragmatic soft approach is often preferred.Minorities aremore frequently
connected to ASB in Dutch discourses than in the UK. This consequently leads
to processes of isolation, in some cases resulting in a looping effect, with
youngsters tending to behave in accordance with the media image. This
behaviour could further deteriorate if control (new/adapted laws and
measures) is tightened further.
The following paragraph compares more recent developments in the two
countries and will expose more differences between these two.
3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND DISCUSSION
The articles, as presented in the different chapters, have been published in
a two years period, from 2008 till 2010. In these years, ASB turned out to be
a hot political, media and public topic. The debate on the issues concerned
did not suddenly stop inmid-June 2010. Therefore it is relevant to give a short
overview of the more recent developments including some points of discussion.
I) As became clear in Chapter 2, the ASBO promised much but, in the eyes
of the new British conservative government (installed in 2010), has delivered
little. With the ASBO, right at the heart of the New Labour project, the idea
was that one could stop young thugs in their tracks before they became career
criminals. After the introduction in 1998, the ASBO developed into a mixture
of measures aimed at nipping community disorder in the bud. People clearly
liked the theory, but the problem turned out to be in the actual practice (see
Chapter 3). British Ministry of Justice figures show 55% of the almost 17,000
ASBOs issued between June 2000 and December 2008 were breached, leading
to an immediate custodial sentence in more than half of the cases.
8 In this context he refers directly to Scandinavia and Germany, and indirectly to theNether-
lands (2004).
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(Home Office, 2010 (as seen at BBC news, July 28, 2010)
In reaction to these figures, the home secretary Theresa May, has suggested
an end to the use of ASBOs in England and Wales (BBC news, 28 July 2010).
May said punishments should be ‘rehabilitative and restorative’, rather than
‘criminalising’. However Labour, which devised ASBOs, said they had made
a ‘huge contribution’ to cutting crime. Shadow home secretary Alan Johnson
(Labour) said there was no doubt that the introduction of the ASBO has made
a huge contribution towards tackling crime and ASB. Thus tackling this be-
haviour is still at the top of the UK’s political agenda despite the absence of
empirical data on the nature and extent of the problem and the lack of correct
evaluation of the measures introduced (Parr, 2009).
In the Netherlands, the discussion on ASB is still an actuality as well,
although the line of approach is completely different. Here, the repressive
measures are not abandoned. On the contrary, in November 2010 the new
rightwing government (installed in September 2010) introduced a new bill
in parliament extending the period of restraining orders imposed by a judge
for ASB from three months to two years (Kamerstukken, 2008).9
Therefore, although in both countries new conservative governments were
installed, their rationales are diverse in character. While the British Conservat-
ive party focused on returning to policies of a rehabilitative and restorative
nature because of the criminalisation effect of the new repressive measures,
the Dutch cabinet still believed in a more repressive approach to tackle ASB.
In reactions in the media10 (8 November 2010) and in a debate in parliament
9 Mayor already has the power to impose this (law to combat severe ASB).
10 http://nos.nl/artikel/196770-wijkverbod-voor-lastige-jongeren.html
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(15 December 2010) theMinister of Justice and Security Ivo Opstelten defended
the new lawwith arguments like ‘the government must be capable of address-
ing ASB’ and ‘the people say enough is enough’. These are in line with earlier
identified rationales like legitimacy of the government and enhancing the
equality of life.
An explanation for the recent divergent developments- between the Dutch
and British crime politics- could simply be that the Culture of Control in the
UK is changing because it started earlier. In crime policies, such as in other
societal developments, several successive and sometimes ambiguous trends
can be identified. Within criminology, long-term alternating conjunctures from
repressive to more lenient approaches to crime have been observed, also
referred to as control waves (e.g. Prior & Spalek, 2008; van Swaaningen, 2005;
Garland, 2008). Perhaps, in the UK, the time for a repressive mood in politics
is altering. In addition, from a Conservative perspective, these policies needed
a new approach, because these measures were symbols of former Labour
politics.
In general, a period of lesser control develops in juxtaposition to the
preceding decade of strong crime policies. Then a tough approach becomes
less popular and the UK being the trendsetter for Dutch politics (as became
clear in Chapter 4) is an early adapter (or instigator) of this new trend.
Various scholars identified a tendency among Dutch politicians to swiftly
pick up new trends from abroad (Devroe, 2008; van Swaaningen, 2008; Pakes,
2005). If this is indeed true, than softer crime policies on a national level can
be expected to be on the rise soon in the Netherlands as well. On a local level
these developments can already be indentified. For example, the local 5 years-
action plan for ASB in Rotterdam presented in 2010, sticks to combination of
restrictive and preventive policies but in addition ads softer approaches (Ge-
meente Rotterdam, 2010). For instance, the introduction of a talk groupwhere
elderly citizens and youngsters can discuss local issues. The aim of this month-
ly get-together is to enhancemutual understanding and create more tolerance
on the street.
Notwithstanding these new local social policies, the original ideas on
prevention and social policies to prevent crime and ASB were not dead in the
first place, as has been discussed in the former paragraph. Only these policies
were not emphasised by national politicians, probably out of fear of being
characterised as soft.
II) The mediatisation of politics as identified in the former paragraph has
developed further. For example, as Uitermark andGielen (2010) in their study
on the role of the Islam in the local politics also argued, conflicts over the
actions of young migrants in Western societies have become increasingly
mediatised.
The here presented analysis of the media discourse confirmed this
mediatising of the debate on ASB by young Moroccans. Events concerning
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ethnic youth are brought to the publics attention by means of alarming head-
lines, as the ones quoted earlier.
More andmore, the media have become a prime battle ground for political
struggles concerning ASB. Politicians claim they have to react to confirm the
capacity of the government to control crime. Garland states that these non-
adaptive measures can be best described as ‘the government acting out’, with
for example, symbolic police actions to impress. The very fact of acting is
enough. The capacity of the government to control crime, however doubtful,
is constantly emphasised. Crawford (2009) also refers to this symbolic role
of ASB legislation. He states that in the UK, to keep the faith of the public in
the democratic process, action against ASB was necessary and extensively
discussed in the media.
Although these policies are not surprising, -did a government ever admit
that they could not control crime? -, the foundation of them changed. Symbolic
policies, in the sense of acting out because the public demands it, are not new
but in the creation of them themedia play a bigger role than Garland assumed.
The discourse analyses demonstrated the influence of the way a topic is
constructed in the media and its effect on policymakers and politicians.
As was also argued in Chapter 1, the described discourses overlap, because
players such as politicians, journalists and city residents constantly react to
each other’s statements and influence one another. How these lines of influence
actual function was not an object of this study and the lines are often empirical-
ly difficult to disentangle, but the analyses demonstrated their intertwinement.
At first sight, politicians emerge as the primary actors in the construction
process of ASB on the street, legitimising their action by referring to the
assumed public outcry as presented in the media. However, these media
representations do not one-on-one reflect local realities and public views. The
results show that consequently, the increasing attention for ASB in the media
transformed the logic of politics. By giving ASB much attention (far more than
a decade ago, although the statistics do not justify this change) the media
‘stimulated’ politicians in taking harsher measures than probably necessary
and by that potentially escalating the conflict. This process makes politicians
followers rather than movers of change.
In 2004, (3 years after his book the Culture of Control) Garland described
the solutions that materialize out of such a complex construction process as
rational-within-views,meaning that every solution is based upon a perception
of the problem it addresses. Political actors patch together workable solutions
to problems they encounter, coping with their workload, pleasing their voters,
in other words; doing the ‘best’ job concerning the circumstances. This can
be identified within the Dutch discourses as well.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
4.1 General research question
The study showed, in short, how policies addressing ASB on the street and
its perpetrators (troublesome youth) are constructed and addressed within
the different discourses and in different settings. It answered the question
which rationales can be identified within the Dutch discourses and how these
rationales can be assessed within the context of a Culture of Control.
The analyses showed that both British andDutch governmental rationales
focus on the need for tough action and newmeasures, in response to a media
outcry and a purported public outcry. Young people are potentially criminal-
ised on account of the anxieties generated among the public by groups con-
gregating in public places. However, the local Dutch public discourse presented
a more nuanced and mixed view on this shifting policy landscape than poli-
ticians would like us to believe.
To sum up, the concept of unprecedented proportions of ASB, as is con-
structed in the media and political discourse, is used to preserve the idea ‘of
the capacity of the government to control crime’. This is completely in line
with Garland’s ideas of the Culture of Control and his views on adaptive and
denial crime policies. However, the discourse analyses also demonstrated that
the Dutch (crime) policy culture is even more complex than Garland assumed.
Media exposure plays a bigger part in Dutch ASB (crime) politics; ASB (crime)
rates are less of a social fact; politicians prefer own experience above scientific
results and claim to act on behalf of a public outcry that in reality is not that
loud. Tougher measures are introduced but in daily practice the more prag-
matic soft approach is often favoured. Minorities are portrayedmore negatively
in Dutch discourses than Garland expected to see.
The empirical research also identified undercurrents in the Culture of
Control. These currents include a public that does not dismiss social policies
for addressing ASB, local politicians and civil servants travelling the same softer
path, and British politicians turning away from repressive policies.
In conclusion, the construction process of ASB policies is more complex
than onemight expect within the context of a Culture of Control. The analyses
identified a multifaceted field of actions, reactions, opinions and debates and
demonstrated a very complicated process. As the four discourses showed, the
Dutch actors have to dealwith, for instance: 1) underlying conflicts (competing
(political) interests), 2) chronic uncertainty (about effects of measures) 3) daily
practice (old measures still work), 4) media attention (focusing on the ethnic
youngsters) 5) current taboos (on issues like soft policies towards crime).
These not-so rational rationales do not easily surface with quantitative
research approaches. Therefore, these results demonstrate the added value
of the chosen qualitative methods. A triangulation of methods like content
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analyses, interviews, observations and comparative research did justice to the
complexities that characterise this construction process.
In conclusion, although the Culture of Control is certainly not gone, it is
starting tomixwith old and newpolicies, measures and actions. Furthermore,
this thesis demonstrated that the high level of ‘social acceptance of high (sub)
crime rates’ as a basic assumption for the Culture of Control, is questionable.
Judging by the results, high (sub) crime rates have not become a social fact
in all discourses. Not so much the (purported) high rates of ASB changed how
people think or feel, but more the way the media and politicians have
responded to ASB changed the public’s views. Creating a looping effect; basic
assumptions such as a ‘public cry for newmeasures’ were no longer questioned
and eventually did result in the implementation of real new measures and
laws.
Returning to the starting point of the thesis – local politician Verburg’s
claim that ‘the ASBO helps in the fight against young people terrorising the
street’ – can be refuted in various ways. First, the problem of ASB is less a
pressing issue than Verburg assumed. Secondly, although annoyed by ASB
the public is not terrorised in the actual meaning of the word and thirdly, the
effectiveness of British ASBO is questionable. These results demonstrate that
when studying (sub) crime policies one should be aware of the underlying
suppositions.
Dutch politicians should remember the well-known saying that the grass
is not always greener on the other side of the fence. While working in the
garden, one should not underestimate the quality of one’s own lawn. The
traditional Dutch situation with a combination of soft and hard policies tackling
ASB is not such a bad approach after all. As Voltaire described in Candide
(1759), cultivating our own garden (il faut cultiver notre jardin) is, although a
modest goal in life, not a less rewarding and effective one.
In conclusion, this thesis focused on local developments, drew international
parallels and consequently identified divergent undercurrents. These and
similar empirical comparative studies are essential for recognising nuances
in general trends.
4.2 Future research
The critical aim of this thesis was to prompt readers to think differently about
the Culture of Control and to identify the range of choices and actions actors
in the different discourses have and follow. The analytical aim was (in line
with Garland, 2004) to enable readers to see beyond policymakers and poli-
ticians to the social and cultural conditions that structure political decisions.
The practical aim was to examine the assumptions on ASB and to present a
balanced picture of this alleged urgent problem.
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I wanted to show that a historical approach in combination with crimino-
logical theory and methods can yield more insight into the rules of thought
and action that shape crime policies. As an historian one should be a dis-
passionate observer, meaning an observer with a passion for the subject but
at an appropriate distance to enable one to identify the complexities. As a
criminologist one should be a crime myth buster, meaning a critical observer
of the rationales of crime policies, making more knowledge available for
politicians, policymakers, public andmedia alike. A combination of these two
disciplines could lead tomore analyses of crime policy constructions. Relatively
newly identified crime problems like some financial crimes, crimes against
the environment and crimes against humanity could benefit from discourse
analyses of their construction processes.
Another path to explore in a future study is how the lines of influence
between the discourses actually function. The extent of mutual influence was
not a subject of this thesis. The intertwinement of the discourses was obviously
discussed but how exactly these lines work needs more exploration. However,
how these lines of influence actual function is empirically difficult to analyse.
A suitable method to examine this further would be to analyse several case
studies. For example, one could study in detail how a number of events
concerning ASB evolved over the last decade. Which event triggered a media
hype around the problems of ASB? In what way did the actors in the discourses
react to each other? The concept of a moral panic or in some cases the concept
of a Culture war could be useful analytical tools (Garland, 2008). How the
media reconstruct these problems strongly determines what people consider
to be an appropriate reaction to the problem.
The present thesis did not give full attention to situations where the prob-
lems of ASB developed differently. For example, one could compare the Dutch
situation to a country where at first sight there appears to be no problemwith
ASB at all, for instance Singapore. Here, harsh crime policies, (half) censured
media coverage and a tighter social control create a totally different research
field.
Another path that could be explored is to compare the British and Dutch
situation with countries where the problem of ASB actually got out of hand.
For example, in France the problems of ASB and ethnic minorities escalated
in 2005. The coverage of the events by French journalists has been criticised.
One of themayor complaints was the overuse of sensationalism by journalists
and the simplification of the causes of ASB (Begag, 2007). Research questions
could be: How did the role of the media develop? How did politicians react
and what are the similarities and differences with the Dutch discourses?
The answers to these questions will provide valuable insights for future
ASB policy makers and will further elucidate the sometimes opaque ways in
which social construction processes and general crime trends develop.

Samenvatting
DE OORLOG TEGEN ANTISOCIAAL GEDRAG.
De beweegredenen voor beleid tegen antisociaal gedrag op straat. Britse en
Nederlandse discoursen vergeleken.
Overlast door antisociaal gedrag op straat (ASB)1 wordt de laatste twee decen-
nia door de Nederlandse samenleving als een steeds omvangrijker en ingrijpen-
der probleem ervaren. Natuurlijk is ASB geen nieuw fenomeen. Twintig jaar
geleden kwamASB net zo goed voor.Maar in die tijd was gedogen de heersende
norm. Tegenwoordig lijkt bestrijding het toverwoord. Bovendien wordt in
Nederland ASB nu vaak gekoppeld aan de problemenmet jonge (Marokkaanse)
immigranten in probleemwijken.
Uit het politieke debat blijkt regelmatig dat de bestaande regelgeving en
de handhavingpraktijk als niet toereikend worden ervaren. Mede daarom
worden geregeld repressievere alternatieven ingevoerd, zoals de nieuweWet
maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast. Bovendien spreken
Nederlandse gemeentelijke en landelijke politici over het succes van strenge
Engelse maatregelen ten aanzien van ASB zoals de anti-social behaviour order
(ASBO).
Deze constateringen passen in het beeld datwordt geschetst door invloed-
rijke theoretici (o.a. Garland, 2001; Young, 2007; Simon, 2007) over strenger
criminaliteitsbeleid inWesterse landen. Hoewel er verschillen zijn in de focus
op en benamingen van demaatschappelijke ontwikkelingen, is het overheersen-
de idee dat er steeds repressiever wordt opgetreden tegen criminaliteit en ASB
omdat de bevolking erom vraagt.
In dit proefschrift wordt deze geconstateerde macro-ontwikkeling op een
meer locaal niveau onderzocht. Daarbij staat de Culture of Control-theorie
vanGarland (2001) centraal. Garland (2004) suggereerde al dat de lange termijn
patronen die hij beschreef, aandacht verdienden op plaatselijk niveau. De
onderhavige studie naar ASB is een voorbeeld van dergelijk onderzoek. Als
ASB al als een groeiendmaatschappelijk veiligheidsprobleemwordt benaderd,
1 Hoewel ASB geen Nederlandse afkorting is, is vanwege de consistentie binnen het proef-
schrift kozen die term toch voor de rest van deze Nederlandse samenvatting toe te passen.
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wat zegt dat dan over het algemene klimaat van hetNederlandse criminaliteits-
beleid?
Het doel van dit proefschrift is omde vraag te beantwoordenwelke beweeg-
redenen om antisociaal gedrag op straat (ASB) aan te pakken kunnen worden vast-
gesteld binnen de Nederlandse discoursen en hoe deze kunnen worden beoordeeld
binnen de context van de Culture of Control.
Een discoursanalyse is kort gezegd een methode die de discussies in de
samenleving (of een deel ervan) rond een bepaald onderwerp onderzoekt
(Althoff, 2002). De term discoursanalyse staat geregeld ter discussie en is
inmiddels een containerbegrip geworden waaronder verschillende vormen
van kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden en technieken vallen.
Hier is gekozen voor een kwalitatieve analyse van heersende ideeën en concep-
ten in een relatief homogene groep binnen de maatschappij.
Discoursen en methoden
Deze studie heeft een sociaal constructivistisch perspectief. Met andere woor-
den ASB wordt benaderd als een concept dat vorm en betekenis krijgt door
de sociale en politieke context. Een dergelijk wetenschappelijk uitgangspunt
biedt de mogelijkheid de continu veranderde ideeën over het probleem van
ASB te onderzoeken. Voor deze vorm van onderzoek is het belangrijk de
verschillende discoursen waarbinnen het ASB beleid vorm krijgt, te bestuderen.
Hier is gekozen voor analyses van de vier meest relevante;
· politiek discours (de broedplaats van beleid2). De beweegredenen van het
beleid ten aanzien van ASB worden onderzocht.
· media discours (de kiem van het beleid). Media kunnen het politieke debat
over ASB aanjagen en/of interpreteren.
· publiek discours (wortels van het beleid). De ideeën die leven in de maat-
schappij over ASB worden vaak gebruikt als rechtvaardiging voor beleid.
· juridisch discours (het netto resultaat van het beleidsproces). Hierbij wor-
den beleid en andere regelgeving om ASB aan te pakken besproken.
Natuurlijk is deze verdeling slechts een heuristische methode en zijn de
groepen en discoursen in de realiteit meer divers. Om dit probleem van
(mogelijk) onderbelichte diversiteit te ondervangen is voor een milde vorm
van triangulatie gekozen: naast inhoudsanalyses (als onderdeel van een dis-
coursanalyse) zijn andere onderzoeksmethoden zoals surveys en semi-gestruc-
tureerde interviews gebruikt. Bovendien is de Nederlandse situatie rond ASB
vergeleken met de Engelse. Redenen voor dit internationaal vergelijkende
invalshoek zijn ondermeer dat Nederlandse politici verwijzen naar de Engelse
situatie en dat Garland ook de Engelse situatie beschrijft.
2 Beleid is hier een overkoepelend begrip (m.a.w criminaliteitsbeleid en andere regelgeving).
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Juridisch discours
In de nieuwe wet maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast
(Gemw art 172a) krijgen de burgemeester en de Officier van Justitie extra
bevoegdheden ompreventief in te grijpen bij ondermeer aanhoudende ernstige
overlast. Burgemeesters hebben de bevoegdheid een gebiedsverbod op te
leggen van maximaal drie maanden, met de mogelijkheid van verlenging tot
een jaar als iemand herhaaldelijk groepsgewijs de openbare orde heeft ver-
stoord. Overlastplegers is het dan niet toegestaan in een bepaalde buurt of
straat komen. Een overtreding hiervan kan strafrechtelijk worden vervolgd
(op basis van het al bestaande art 184 Sr).
Deze wet komt in de buurt van de Engelse ASBO (anti-social behaviour
order). Dezemaatregel werd in Engeland in 1998 door Labour ingevoerd. Het
betreft een civielrechtelijke procedure waarbij de rechter beperkingen aan het
gedrag in een bevel kan vastleggen, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van gebiedsverbo-
den,met als doel herhaling van ASB te voorkomen. Het vervolgens overtreden
van de ASBO is een strafbaar feit en kan leiden tot maximaal vijf jaar gevange-
nisstraf voor meerderjarigen en twee jaar voor minderjarigen.
Door de discoursanalyse wordt duidelijk dat tussen de Britse en Nederland-
se maatregelen enkele opvallende overeenkomsten zijn, zoals een langdurig
gebiedsverbod voor relatief lichte vergrijpen, gekoppeld aan een mogelijke
gevangenisstraf bij overtredingen van het gebod. Er vallen echter ook essentiële
verschillen te constateren.
In eerste instantie was de Engelse ASBO niet specifiek gericht op jongeren,
maar eerder op asociale huurders. Pas in de loop van de tijd werd het meren-
deel van de ASBO’s opgelegd aan jongeren (Matthews & Easton, 2007). De
Nederlandse wet is geformuleerd om jongerenoverlast aan te pakken, maar
gaat niet zo ver om jonge kinderen (vanaf tien jaar) ook bevelen op te leggen
wat in Engeland wel kan. Een tweede verschil is dat als een betrokkene een
ASBO heeft gekregen, dit door affiches bekend wordt gemaakt in de buurt. In
Nederland gebeurt dat niet.
Uit het onderzoek blijkt verder dat enerzijds Nederlandse gemeenten een
divers palet aan maatregelen kunnen aanspreken in hun strijd tegen ASB en
dat aan nieuwe bevoegdheden maar beperkte behoefte is. Anderzijds tonen
studies en ervaringen in Engeland aan dat de invoering van de ASBO niet aan
de verwachtingen heeft voldaan. Zo kan een afname van ASB (en indirect het
verminderen van criminaliteit) niet worden aangetoond.
Verder is er veel kritiek op de juridische constructie van de ASBO, vooral
de vage omschrijving van overlast die veel ruimte laat voor eigen uitleg en
toepassing, wordt bekritiseerd. Critici twisten ook over de disproportionaliteit
van ASBO’s die aan sociaal zwakkeren en jongeren worden opgelegd, waarbij
eigenlijk vooraf al vast staat dat ze zich er niet aan kunnen houden (Hudson,
2003; Burney, 2009). Dat zou onbedoelde effecten in de hand werken zoals
onnodige criminalisering en daarmee isolering van probleemjongeren.
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Het politieke enthousiasme in Engeland voor de ASBO zelf lijkt dan ook
af te nemen. Vanaf 2006 wordt de ASBO aanzienlijk minder opgelegd en krijgt
sociaal beleid meer prioriteit (Matthews & Easton, 2007).
Politiek discours
Uit de analyse van het politiek discours (aan de hand van o.a. interviews met
politici) komt als belangrijkste beweegreden om ASB aan te pakken naar voren;
de gevoelde noodzaak te reageren op de angsten van stemmers.
De analyse van het Engelse en het Nederlandse politiek discours maakt
vijf dezelfde beweegredenen voor een hardere aanpak van ASB zichtbaar;
· Er zijn maatregelen nodig want het huidige arsenaal is niet voldoende.
· ASB neemt toe. Het probleem wordt dagelijks erger.
· ASB moet worden aangepakt want het bedreigt de kwaliteit van leven van
inwoners van grote steden.
· De Broken-window theorie. Als ASB niet wordt aangepakt dan leidt het tot
ernstige vormen van criminaliteit.
· Door ASB aan te pakken kan het economisch en sociale verval van wijken
worden gekeerd.
De analyse toont ook opvallende verschillen tussen de twee landen aan. In
Nederland koppelen alle geïnterviewde politici ASB aan problemenmetMarok-
kaanse jongeren (van de tweede generatie). In Engeland speelt het migratie-
debat nauwelijks een rol bij de aanpak van ASB. Een verklaring kan zijn dat
Nederlandse en Engelse achterstandswijkenmoeilijkmet elkaar te vergelijken
zijn. In de van oudsher Engelse klassenmaatschappij is de sociale achterstand
van bepaalde buurten groter. Bovendien is de opbouw van de problemen
anders. Er is een grotere groep blanken met een sociale achterstand. Dit is
mede ontstaan door het de-industrialiseren van bepaalde haven- enmijnbouw-
steden en de daarbij komende massale werkloosheid.
Verder blijkt uit de analyse dat vooral Nederlandse politici de mogelijke
ondergraving van de legitimiteit van de overheid noemen als belangrijke
beweegreden om harder in te grijpen bij ASB. Om geloofwaardig te blijven
als overheid zijn volgens hen meer repressieve maatregelen noodzakelijk.
Mogelijk speelt in het geconstateerde verschil met Engeland de zogenaamde
Pim-Fortuyn opstand en de nasleep daarvan mee.
Uit de discoursanalyse komt ook naar voren dat in Nederland het bestaan-
de sociale beleid ten aanzien van ASB in de praktijk nog steeds wordt gewaar-
deerd en gehanteerd. En een ander opvallend resultaat was dat zowel Engelse
als Nederlandse politici weinig fiducie hebben in wetenschappelijk crimino-
logisch onderzoek. Hun persoonlijke ervaringen en intuïtie spelen een belangrij-
ke rol bij hun beslissingen over het te vormen beleid.
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Media discours
In de Nederlandse schrijvende pers wordt straatoverlast vaak gekoppeld aan
Marokkaanse jongeren. Uit het vergelijkende onderzoek (vanaf ruwweg 1990)
met het Engelsemedia discours blijkt dat daar demedia de overlastproblema-
tiek niet stelselmatig verbinden met migranten, maar eerder met autochtone
jeugd.
Wat verder bij de vergelijking opvalt is dat zowel in Engeland als in Neder-
land ASB door demedia als een groot en groeiend probleemwordt aangemerkt,
terwijl de daadwerkelijk ervaren ASB daalt en of gelijk blijft. Bovendien zijn
in beide landenminderheden in het justitiële systeem oververtegenwoordigd
(duidelijke cijfers over een vergelijkbare situatie bij ASB ontbreken).
Het blijft opvallend dat de benadering ten aanzien van minderheden in
de schrijvende pers in Engeland zo sterk afwijkt van die in Nederland. De
verklaring van enkele geïnterviewde lokale Nederlandse politici, beleidsmakers
en onderzoekers is dat het beeld rond ASB dat is ontstaan in het media discours
niet klopt. Marokkaanse jongeren worden onevenredig vaak in verband ge-
bracht met ASB.
De Engelse respondenten geven als verklaring aan dat Engelse instituties
enmedia bang zijn om van racisme teworden beschuldigd. Redenen hiervoor
zouden zijn: eerder geconstateerd institutioneel racisme bij de Londense politie
en de Britse koloniale geschiedenis. Door een collectief schuldgevoel over de
achterstand van minderheden zouden overlastveroorzakers uit deze groep
eerder als slachtoffers behandeld worden dan als een soort ‘folk devils’ zoals
volgens sommige respondenten inNederland gebeurt. Bovendien zou erweinig
belangstelling in de politiek en media voor zijn omdat de ASBO-maatregel op
zichzelf al omstreden genoeg is en daar de meeste aandacht naar uit gaat.
Dit geconstateerde schuldgevoel is niet nieuw maar wel boeiend gezien
het vergelijkbare Nederlandse koloniale verleden (hoewel recenter andere
migratiestromen dan in Engeland zijn ontstaan). Daarnaast is relevant dat
Engelse steden sterker zijn gesegregeerd en dat de economisch en sociale
verschillen tussen de buurten groter zijn dan in Nederland. Wellicht zijn
Engelse media zich bewust van de mogelijke explosiviteit in de steden en
hanteren zij een vorm van zelfcensuur. Gezien het, over het algemeen genomen
nogal agressieve karakter van de Engelse tabloids lijkt deze vorm van terug-
houdendheid niet waarschijnlijk.
Publiek discours
Demaatregelen omASB harder aan te pakkenworden vaak gelegitimeerd door
te verwijzen naar de publieke angst voor ASB en de groei van het probleem.
Maar uit de analyse van het publiek discours komt naar voren dat het publieke
debat genuanceerder en meer gemengd is dan politici doen voorkomen.
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Het onderzoek is uitgevoerd in elf probleemwijken in Amsterdam, Utrecht,
Rotterdam en Den Haag. Voor de locaties is gekozen omdat deze wijken in
het media en politieke debat een belangrijke rol spelen. Deze gebieden kunnen
worden omschreven als zogenaamde ‘extreme gevallen’ waar een hoge concen-
tratie van ASB verwacht kan worden.
Maar uit het onderzoek blijkt dat slechts in drie van de elf wijken ASB het
publieke debat beheerst. Het populaire idee van wijken die te vergelijkenmet
zijn met getto’s waar groepen van jonge immigranten buurtbewoners terrori-
seren wordt door het onderzoek niet bevestigd. Dit betekent niet dat er geen
problemen zijn maar de omvang van ASB en de angst hiervoor onder de
respondenten zijn niet in lijn met de beweringen van politici.
De analyse van de reacties van respondenten toont aan dat harde en
repressieve maatregelenminder worden gesteund dan vooraf werd verwacht.
Hoewel er bij winkeleigenaren wel enige sympathie is voor op de ASBO-
geïnspireerde maatregelen, vinden veel buurtbewoners dat er al voldoende
wordt gedaan om ASB aan te pakken en constateren ze eerder verbeteringen
in hun wijk dan dat deze door ASB achteruit gaat
Deze analyse belicht dus een opvallende kloof tussen wat buurtbewoners
zelf ervaren en wat politici en media daarover berichten. Enkele respondenten
suggereren dan ook dat de problemen in hun buurt worden gebruikt voor
politiek gewin.
Bevindingen en conclusies binnen de context van een Culture of Control
Garland constateert in The Culture of Control verschillendemaatschappelijke
ontwikkelingen (zie hoofdstuk 1). Zo omschrijft hij veranderingen in de emotio-
nele toon van het discours rond criminaliteit en benoemt hij de bescherming
van het publiek als het belangrijkste thema voor het te voeren beleid. Volgens
hem is het beleidsproces van criminaliteit sterk gepolitiseerd en populistisch.
In reactie op deze veranderingen reageren beleidsmakers volgens hem op
een enigszins ambivalente manier. Zo constateert hij zogenaamde aanpassings-
strategieën, waarbij bijvoorbeeld de grens van wat criminaliteit is, wordt terug-
geschroefd. Maar hij benoemt ook strategieën van ontkenning; waarbij het
beschreven ernstig dilemma van hoge criminaliteitscijfers wordt ontkend.
Bovendien is het beleid gericht op het (her)installeren van de mythe van een
sterke staat door als regering streng op te treden.
Wat opvalt in Garland’s theorie is dat de actoren in het beleidsproces geen
gelijkwaardige aandacht krijgen. Vooral de rol van media lijkt wat onder-
belicht. Ook de aanname dat hoge criminaliteitscijfers een sociaal feit zijn
geworden, is empirisch niet zo grondig onderbouwd. Bovendien besteedt
Garland niet veel aandacht aan vergelijkingen tussen de Angelsaksische en
Europese situatie, waardoor bijvoorbeeld de positie van jonge immigranten
onderbelicht is.
Samenvatting 137
In deze studie is aanvullend onderzoek gedaan naar de benoemde tekort-
komingen in de theorie van Garland. Zo blijkt uit de discoursanalyses dat
zowel de Engelse als de Nederlandse politici een harde aanpak van ASB legiti-
meren aan de hand van een vermeend dringend publiek en media verzoek
hiertoe. Deze uitkomst komt in grote lijnen wel overeenmet Garland’s ideeën
over de Culture of Control en zijn visie op de aanpassings- en ontkenningsstra-
tegieën van de overheid.
De discoursanalyses demonstreren echter ook dat het Nederlandse beleids-
proces (met betrekking tot ASB) zelfs nog complexer is dan Garland al aannam.
Zo speelt de media-aandacht een grotere rol bij de tot standkoming van ASB
beleid dan hij verwachtte; de aanname dat hoge criminaliteits (en ASB-) cijfers
een sociaal feit zijn gewordenwerd door het empirischmateriaal niet gesteund;
bovendien vertrouwen politici nog meer op hun eigen ervaringen dan op
wetenschappelijke resultaten en zeggen ze te handelen namens een dringend
verzoek van de bevolking, dat in feite niet zo urgent is. Verder worden stren-
gere maatregelen ingevoerd maar in de praktijk wordt de pragmatische zach-
tere aanpak vaak nog geprefereerd. Bovendienwordenminderheden negatiever
neergezet in het Nederlandse politiek en media discours dan Garland had
verwacht.
Het empirisch onderzoek toonde tevens verschillende onderstromen binnen
de Culture of Control aan. Zo blijken de meeste bewoners in probleemwijken
naast de repressieve ook de sociale maatregelen om ASB aan te pakken te
steunen en zijn er ook politici en ambtenaren in die wijken die hetzelfde
‘softere’ pad (willen) bewandelen. Bovendien zijn er steeds meer Engelse
politici die een repressief beleid ten aanzien van ASB verwerpen.
Concluderend: de totstandkoming van het ASB beleid is complexer dan
binnen de context van een Culture of Control verwacht kon worden. De vier
discoursanalyses toonden aan dat Nederlandse actoren/ partijen te maken
hebben met: 1) onderliggende (concurrerende) politieke belangen), 2) chroni-
sche onzekerheid over de consequenties van voorgesteld en ingevoerd beleid,
3) de dagelijkse praktijk van de nog actieve en effectieve oude maatregelen,
4)media-aandacht die zich richt op allochtone jongeren, 5) huidige taboesmet
betrekking tot kwesties zoals ‘softe’ maatregelen tegen criminaliteit.
Dergelijke minder rationele beweegredenen komen met kwantitatieve
onderzoeksmethoden vaak niet boven water. De complexe resultaten uit de
discoursanalyses bevestigen dus de toegevoegde waarde van de gekozen
kwalitatievemethodes. Hoewel uit de analyses blijkt dat de Culture of Control
zeker nog niet is verdwenen, begint deze zich dus te vermengen met oude
en nieuwe beleidslijnen, maatregelen en handelingen.
Deze studie toont verder aan dat een hogemate van sociale acceptatie van
hoge criminaliteitscijfers als basis voor de Culture of Control betwistbaar is.
Uit de discoursanalyses blijkt dat niet in elk debat de hoge criminaliteitscijfers
een sociaal feit zijn geworden. Zo hebben bewoners van probleemwijken ASB
niet massaal als feit aanvaard en roepen ze niet enmasse ommeer repressieve
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maatregelen. Het is eerder de manier waarop de media berichten over ASB
waardoor lijkt het alsof ASB een sociaal feit is geworden. Met een zogenaamd
looping effect tot gevolg; basisaannames zoals een ‘luide publieke roep om
nieuwemaatregelen’worden niet langer betwistmaar zorgen uiteindelijk wel
voor nieuw beleid.
Deze resultaten geven aan dat onderzoek naar het ontstaan van criminali-
teitsbeleid rekening moeten houden met de onderliggende beweegredenen
in de verschillende discoursen. Immers het probleem rond ASB blijkt minder
dringend danmenig Nederlands politicus aanneemt, en hoewel Nederlanders
zich storen aan ASB voelen ze zich niet geterroriseerd in de letterlijke zin van
het woord. Bovendien toonde dit onderzoek aan dat de effectiviteit van de
Engelse ASBO op zijn minst discutabel is.
Kortom, hoewel het gras bij de buurman altijd groener lijkt moet de kwali-
teit van het eigen gazon niet worden onderschat. De van oorsprong typische
Nederlands combinatie van sociaal beleid en repressief reageren wanneer dit
echt noodzakelijk is, is zo gek nog niet. Zoals Voltaire in Candide (1759) be-
schreef; het onderhouden van de eigen tuin (il faut cultiver notre jardin) is
hoewel een bescheiden levensdoel niettemin lonend.
Toekomstig onderzoek
Dit proefschrift richt zich op lokale ontwikkelingen, trekt internationale ver-
gelijkingen en stelt vervolgens uiteenlopende onderstromen vast. Deze en
soortgelijke empirische comparatieve studies zijn ook in de toekomst van
essentieel belang voor het vaststellen van nuances in maatschappelijke ontwik-
kelingen op macroniveau.
Als criminologe en historica wil ik laten zien hoe een historische aanpak
in combinatie met criminologische theorieën en methodes meer inzicht kan
geven in de denkprocessen en de handelingen die het criminaliteitsbeleid
bepalen. Een historicus moet een onbevooroordeelde waarnemer zijn, dat wil
zeggen een waarnemer met een passie voor het onderwerp maar met een
gepaste afstand om te kunnen reflecteren. Criminologenmoeten criminaliteits-
mythes ontkrachten door de beweegredenen achter criminaliteitsbeleid kritisch
te analyseren. Een combinatie van deze twee disciplines kan tot interessante
analyses van de tot standkoning van criminaliteitsbeleid leiden.
Het kritische doel van dit proefschrift is lezers een andere blik te bieden
op de Culture of Control en om de verschillende keuzes en handelingen te
benoemen die actoren in de vier discoursen hebben en (kunnen) ondernemen.
Het praktische doel is de aannames over ASB te onderzoeken en een genuan-
ceerd beeld van dit vermeend urgent probleem te presenteren.
Het analytische doel tenslotte is (overeenkomstig Garland, 2004) de beweeg-
redenen van beleidsmakers en politici bloot te leggen en de sociale en culturele
omstandigheden die aan politieke beslissingen ten grondslag liggen te benoe-
men. In de hoop in de toekomst onnodig, ineffectief of zelfs contraproductief
beleid te voorkomen.
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Appendices

Appendix I
List of abbreviations
ASB (in this thesis) Antisocial behaviour by youngsters on the street
ABC Acceptable Behaviour Contract
ASBO Anti-Social Behaviour Order
CDRP Crime and Disorders Reduction Partnership
CRASBO Crime ASBO
ESRC Economic & Social Research Council
NAO National Audit Office
NCSN National Community Safety Network
SAOA Stichting Aanpak Overlast Amsterdam

Appendix II
New British ASB-related enforcement
powers and tools
Power Legislative basis Type1
Acceptable Behaviour
Contract (ABC)
none
Anti-Social Behaviour
Order (ASBO)
Crime & Disorder
Act 1998
(Hybrid) court imposes
prohibitions which become an
offence if breached
Individual Support
Order
Criminal justice Act
2003
Support element attached to
ASBO for juveniles
Drug Intervention
Order
Drug Act 2005 Support element attached to
ASBO for adults
Housing injunction Housing Act Civil injunction
Parenting Contract ASB Act 2003 Voluntary agreement
Parenting Order Crime & Disorder Act
1998
Court imposed requirement to
attend counseling or parenting
sessions
Penalty Notice for
Disorder
Criminal Justice &
Police Act 2001
Administrative fine with
summary powers
Demoted Tenancy ASB-Act 2003 Reduced tenancy rights;
rendering eviction easier
Family Intervention
Tenancy
Housing &
Regenaration
Act 2008
Insecure tenancy with support
agreement for family
intervention project
accommodation
Housing Benefit
Sanction
Welfare reform Act
2007
Reduction to housing benefit
linked to grounds of antisocial
behaviour
Child Curfew Order Crime & disorder Act
1998
Power to impose curfew no
direct penalty
Dispersal Order ASB Act 2003 Police direction to disperse from
designated area, offence if
breached
1 Order of the measures was taken from the ESRC-report, but tells nothing about the
chronology of the measures or the order of imposition.
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Power Legislative basis Type1
Designated Public
Places Order
Criminal Justice &
Police Act 2001
Exceptional two-step
prohibition- police direction
Drinking Banning
Order
Violent Crime
Reduction Act 2006
Court imposed banning order,
offence if breached
Alcohol related
Directions to Leave an
Area
Violent Crime
Reduction Act 2006
Police direction becomes an
offence if breached (two-step
prohibition)
Crack House Closure
Order
ASB Act 2003 Temporary closure of premises
regardless of tenure
Premise Closure Order Criminal Justice &
Immigration Act 2008
Temporary closure of premises
regardless of tenure
Source: Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) (2009). Situating Anti-social
behaviour and respect
Appendix III
Dutch ASB-related enforcement powers &
tools
I Measures to Combat Soccer Vandalism and Severe Anti-Social Behaviour Act (Wet
maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast) (1-9-2010)
Gemeentewet Local Goverment Act Further explanation
Artikel 172a Notification duty, Restraining
orders (Gebiedsverbod,
groepsverbod & meldingsplicht)
Mayor can impose restraining orders
at local level. The jurisdiction
(derived from article 172) is primarily
focused on local causes of ASB in the
public domain.1
Artikel 172b Parenting order for children
under 12
Order not to leave children
unaccompanied in certain areas
Wetboek van
strafvordering
Code of Criminal Procedure
Artikel 509hh Notification duty, restraining
orders & requirement to attend
counseling (Gedragsaanwijziging
door de OvJ gebiedsverbod,
contactverbod, meldingsplicht,
hulpverlening ondergaan)
Public prosecutor authorized to
impose behavioral prohibitions
1 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken enKoninkrijksrelaties (2010).HandreikingWetmaatregelen
bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast. Den Haag; Ministeries van BZK en Justitie.
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Wetboek van Strafrecht Titel VIII. Misdrijven tegen
het openbaar gezag
Criminal code
Artikel 184 Hij die opzettelijk niet
voldoet aan een bevel of een
vordering, krachtens
wettelijk voorschrift gedaan
door een ambtenaar met de
uitoefening van enig
toezicht belast of door een
ambtenaar belast met of
bevoegd verklaard tot het
opsporen of onderzoeken
van strafbare feiten, alsmede
hij die opzettelijk enige
handeling, door een van die
ambtenaren ondernomen ter
uitvoering van enig wettelijk
voorschrift, belet, belemmert
of verijdelt, wordt gestraft
met gevangenisstraf van ten
hoogste 3 maanden of
geldboete van de tweede
categorie.
(shortened translation) He who
intentionally does not comply
with an order or a claim, under
legal requirement made by
authorized officials is punished
by imprisonment not exceeding
3 months or a fine of the
second category.
II Other Dutch administrative ASB-related enforcement powers and tools
Dutch terminology Further English explanation
Gebiedsverboden op grond van
artikel 172 Gemw of Algemene
Plaatselijk Verordening (APV)
Restraining order on basis of APV (General Local
Regulation); local councils’ own municipal byelaws
(which by definition are offences under Dutch law).
Samenscholingsverbod In (APV) dispersal/congregation order issued by
mayor for designated area.
Bestuurlijke ophouding Local Goverment Law (Gemw) articles 154a and 176a,
the mayor is authorized to detain groups
temporarily.2
Wet bestuurlijke boete overlast in de
openbare ruimte
Local council (mayor)3 may impose an administrative
fine when autonomous regulations (article 154 of
Gemw) are breached (other than APV). For instance;
urinating in public, the wrong provision of garbage
and graffiti.4
2 Brouwer, J. & A. Schilder (1999). Het wetsvoorstel bestuurlijke ophouding, een verkenning
van de rechtsstatelijke grenzen, NJB, 1640-1648.
3 http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh5ll12xt0we
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0023480/geldigheidsdatum_10-04-2009
4 Cachet, L. (ed.) (2008). Governance of security in the Netherlands and Belgium. Den Haag:
BJu legal publishers.
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III Examples of Criminal law instruments
In general within Dutch criminal law there is the possibility of different types of behavioral prohibitions,
or in the phase prior to a trial, as conditions combined wit a detention on remand (article 180 sr) or
after trial as extra with a suspended sentence (article 14 c SR). See below for some examples.
Dutch terminology Further English explanation
Halt-traject (& STOP for 12 minners) Police direction for slight offences offers
children (STOP; younger than twelve) the
opportunity to avoid a criminal record.5/6/
7 Via agency dedicated to preventing youth
crime (Bureau Halt).8
Gedragsaanwijzingen in het kader OM-
afdoening
The public prosecution service settlement
law (art. 257, 3e lid SV). The public prosecutor
and other civil servants are authorized to
impose penalties for certain punishable offences.
This decision is an out-of-court settlement and
the suspect must declare its readiness to comply
with the instructions.
5 Stokkom, B. van (2007). Regulering van antisociaal gedrag. Aanpak van persistent Overlast-
gevende jongeren in Engeland en Nederland. Tijdschrift voor veiligheid, (6) 3, 36-50.
6 Kruissink, M. & C. Verwers, (1989). Halt: een alternatieve aanpak van vandalisme. Eindrapport
van een evaluatieonderzoek naar Halt-projecten. Arnhem: Gouda Quint.
7 Ferwerda, H, e.a. (2006). Halt: het alternatief? De effecten van Halt beschreven. Onderzoek &
beleid nr 244. Den Haag: WODC/Boom juridische uitgevers.
8 Nauta, O. & L. Loef (2011). Evaluatie pilot landelijk instrumentarium jeugdstrafrechtketen.
Den Haag: WODC.
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